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Abstract
“From the range of the basic questions of metaphysics
we shall here ask this one question: “What is a thing?”
The question is quite old. What remains ever new about it
is merely that it must be asked again and again [36].”
Martin Heidegger
The goal of this paper is to summarise the first steps in developing
a fundamentally new way of constructing theories of physics. The
motivation comes from a desire to address certain deep issues that
arise when contemplating quantum theories of space and time. In
doing so we provide a new answer to Heidegger’s timeless question
“What is a thing?”.
Our basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is
equivalent to finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal
language that is attached to the system. Classical physics uses the
topos of sets. Other theories involve a different topos. For the types
of theory discussed in this paper, a key goal is to represent any physical
quantity A with an arrow A˘φ : Σφ → Rφ where Σφ and Rφ are two
special objects (the ‘state-object’ and ‘quantity-value object’) in the
appropriate topos, τφ.
1To appear in New Structures in Physics, ed R. Coecke, Springer (2008).
2email: a.doering@imperial.ac.uk
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We discuss two different types of language that can be attached to
a system, S. The first, PL(S), is a propositional language; the sec-
ond, L(S), is a higher-order, typed language. Both languages provide
deductive systems with an intuitionistic logic. With the aid of PL(S)
we expand and develop some of the earlier work4 on topos theory
and quantum physics. A key step is a process we term ‘daseinisa-
tion’ by which a projection operator is mapped to a sub-object of the
spectral presheaf Σ—the topos quantum analogue of a classical state
space. The topos concerned is SetsV(H)
op
: the category of contravari-
ant set-valued functors on the category (partially ordered set) V(H)
of commutative sub-algebras of the algebra of bounded operators on
the quantum Hilbert space H.
There are two types of daseinisation, called ‘outer’ and ‘inner’:
they involve approximating a projection operator by projectors that
are, respectively, larger and smaller in the lattice of projectors on H.
We then introduce the more sophisticated language L(S) and use it
to study ‘truth objects’ and ‘pseudo-states’ in the topos. These objects
topos play the role of states: a necessary development as the spectral
presheaf has no global elements, and hence there are no microstates
in the sense of classical physics.
One of the main mathematical achievements is finding a topos
representation for self-adjoint operators. This involves showing that,
for any bounded, self-adjoint operator Aˆ, there is a corresponding
arrow δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ→ R where R is the quantity-value object for this
theory. The construction of δ˘o(Aˆ) is an extension of the daseinisation
of projection operators.
The object R is a monoid-object only in the topos, τφ = Sets
V(H)op ,
of the theory, and to enhance the applicability of the formalism we
discuss another candidate, R↔, for the quantity-value object. In this
presheaf, both inner- and outer-daseinisation are used in a symmet-
ric way. Another option is to apply to R a topos analogue of the
Grothendieck extension of a monoid to a group. The resulting object,
k(R), is an abelian group-object in τφ.
Finally we turn to considering a collection of systems: in particu-
lar, we are interested in the relation between the topos representation
of a composite system, and the representations of its constituents. Our
approach to these matters is to construct a category of systems and
to find coherent topos representations of the entire category.
4By CJI and collaborators.
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1 Introduction
Many people who work in quantum gravity would agree that a deep change
in our understanding of foundational issues will occur at some point along
the path. However, opinions differ greatly on whether a radical revision is
necessary at the very beginning of the process, or if it will emerge ‘along
the way’ from an existing, or future, research programme that is formulated
using the current paradigms. For example, many (albeit not all) of the
current generation of string theorists seem inclined to this view, as do a,
perhaps smaller, fraction of those who work in loop quantum gravity.
In this article we take the iconoclastic view that a radical step is needed
at the very outset. However, for anyone in this camp the problem is always
knowing where to start. It is easy to talk about a ‘radical revision of current
paradigms’—the phrase slips lightly off the tongue—but converting this pious
hope into a concrete theoretical structure is a problem of the highest order.
For us, the starting point is quantum theory itself. More precisely, we
believe that this theory needs to be radically revised, or even completely
replaced, before a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity can be obtained.
In this context, a striking feature of the various current programmes for
quantising gravity—including superstring theory and loop quantum gravity—
is that, notwithstanding their disparate views on the nature of space and
time, they almost all use more-or-less standard quantum theory. Although
understandable from a pragmatic viewpoint (since all we have is more-or-less
standard quantum theory) this situation is nevertheless questionable when
viewed from a wider perspective.
For us, one of the most important issues is the use in the standard quan-
tum formalism of critical mathematical ingredients that are taken for granted
and yet which, we claim, implicitly assume certain properties of space and/or
time. Such an a priori imposition of spatio-temporal concepts would be a
major category5 error if they turn out to be fundamentally incompatible with
what is needed for a theory of quantum gravity.
A prime example is the use of the continuum6 by which, in this context,
is meant the real and/or complex numbers. These are a central ingredient in
all the various mathematical frameworks in which quantum theory is com-
monly discussed. For example, this is clearly so with the use of (i) Hilbert
5The philosophy of Kant runs strongly in our veins.
6When used in this rather colloquial way, the word ‘continuum’ suggests primarily the
cardinality of the sets concerned, and, secondly, the topology that is conventionally placed
on these sets.
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spaces or C∗-algebras; (ii) geometric quantisation; (iii) probability functions
on a non-distributive quantum logic; (iv) deformation quantisation; and (v)
formal (i.e., mathematically ill-defined) path integrals and the like. The a
priori imposition of such continuum concepts could be radically incompatible
with a quantum-gravity formalism in which, say, space-time is fundamentally
discrete: as, for example, in the causal-set programme.
As we shall argue later, this issue is closely connected with the question of
what is meant by the ‘value’ of a physical quantity. In so far as the concept is
meaningful at all at the Planck scale, why should the value be a real number
defined mathematically in the usual way?
Another significant reason for aspiring to change the quantum formalism
is the peristalithic problem of deciding how a ‘quantum theory of cosmology’
could be interpreted if one was lucky enough to find one. Most people who
worry about foundational issues in quantum gravity would probably place
the quantum-cosmology/closed-system problem at, or near, the top of their
list of reasons for re-envisioning quantum theory. However, although we are
deeply interested in such conceptual issues, the primary motivation for our
research programme is not to find a new interpretation of quantum theory.
Rather, our main goal is to find a novel structural framework within which
new types of theories of physics can be constructed.
However, having said that, in the context of quantum cosmology it is cer-
tainly true that the lack of any external ‘observer’ of the universe ‘as a whole’
renders inappropriate the standard Copenhagen interpretation with its in-
strumentalist use of counterfactual statements about what would happen if
a certain measurement is performed. Indeed, the Copenhagen interpretation
is inapplicable for any7 system that is truly ‘closed’ (or ‘self-contained’) and
for which, therefore, there is no ‘external’ domain in which an observer can
lurk. This problem has motivated much research over the years and continues
to be of wide interest.
The philosophical questions that arise are profound, and look back to the
birth of Western philosophy in ancient Greece, almost three thousand years
ago. Of course, arguably, the longevity of these issues suggests that these
questions are ill-posed in the first place, in which case the whole enterprise
is a complete waste of time! This is probably the view of most, if not all, of
our colleagues at Imperial College; but we beg to differ8.
7The existence of the long-range, and all penetrating, gravitational force means that,
at a fundamental level, there is only one truly closed system, and that is the universe
itself.
8Of course, it is also possible that our colleagues are right.
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When considering a closed system, the inadequacy of the conventional
instrumentalist interpretation of quantum theory encourages the search for
an interpretation that is more ‘realist’ in some way. For over eighty years,
this has been a recurring challenge for those concerned with the conceptual
foundations of modern physics. In rising to this challenge we join our Greek
ancestors in confronting once more the fundamental question:9
“What is a thing?”
Of course, as written, the question is itself questionable. For many
philosophers, including Kant, would assert that the correct question is not
“What is a thing?” but rather “What is a thing as it appears to us?”
However, notwithstanding Kant’s strictures, we seek the thing-in-itself, and,
therefore, we persevere with Heidegger’s form of the question.
Nevertheless, having said that, we can hardly ignore the last three thou-
sand years of philosophy. In particular, we must defend ourselves against the
charge of being ‘naive realists’.10 At this point it become clear that theoret-
ical physicists have a big advantage over professional philosophers. For we
are permitted/required to study such issues in the context of specific math-
ematical frameworks for addressing the physical world; and one of the great
fascinations of this process is the way in which various philosophical posi-
tions are implicit in the ensuing structures. For example, the exact meaning
of ‘realist’ is infinitely debatable but, when used by a classical physicist, it
invariably means the following:
1. The idea of ‘a property of the system’ (for example, ‘the value of a
physical quantity at a certain time’) is meaningful, and mathematically
representable in the theory.
2. Propositions about the system (typically asserting that the system has
this or that property) are handled using Boolean logic. This require-
ment is compelling in so far as we humans are inclined to think in a
Boolean way.
9“What is a thing?” is the title of one of the more comprehensible of Heidegger’s works
[36]. By this, we mean comprehensible to the authors of the present article. We cannot
speak for our colleagues across the channel: from some of them we may need to distance
ourselves.
10If we were professional philosophers this would be a terrible insult. :-)
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3. There is a space of ‘microstates’ such that specifying a microstate11
leads to unequivocal truth values for all propositions about the system:
i.e., a state12 encodes “the way things are”. This is a natural way of
ensuring that the first two conditions above are satisfied.
The standard interpretation of classical physics satisfies these requirements
and provides the paradigmatic example of a realist philosophy in science.
Heidegger’s answer to his own question adopts a similar position [36]:
“A thing is always something that has such and such properties,
always something that is constituted in such and such a way. This
something is the bearer of the properties; the something, as it
were, that underlies the qualities.”
In quantum theory, the situation is very different. There, the existence
of any such realist interpretation is foiled by the famous Kochen-Specker
theorem [50]. This asserts that it is impossible to assign values to all physical
quantities at once if this assignment is to satisfy the consistency condition
that the value of a function of a physical quantity is that function of the
value. For example, the value of ‘energy squared’ is the square of the value
of energy.
Thus, from a conceptual perspective, the challenge is to find a quantum
formalism that is ‘realist enough’ to provide an acceptable alternative to
the Copenhagen interpretation, with its instrumentally-construed intrinsic
probabilities, whilst taking on board the implications of the Kochen-Specker
theorem.
So, in toto what we seek is a formalism that is (i) free of prima facie
prejudices about the nature of the values of physical quantities—in particular,
there should be no fundamental use of the real or complex numbers; and (ii)
‘realist’, in at least the minimal sense that propositions are meaningful, and
are assigned ‘truth values’, not just instrumentalist probabilities of what
would happen if appropriate measurements are made.
However, finding such a formalism is not easy: it is notoriously difficult to
modify the mathematical framework of quantum theory without destroying
11In simple non-relativistic systems, the state is specified at any given moment of time.
Relativistic systems (particularly quantum gravity!) require a more sophisticated under-
standing of ‘state’, but the general idea is the same.
12We are a little slack in our use of language here and in what follows by frequently
referring to a microstate as just a ‘state’. The distinction only becomes important if
one wants to introduce things like mixed states (in quantum theory), or macrostates (in
classical physics) all of which are often just known as ‘states’. Then one must talk about
microstates (pure states) to distinguish them from the other type of state.
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the entire edifice. In particular, the Hilbert space structure is very rigid and
cannot easily be changed; and the formal path-integral techniques do not
fare much better.
To seek inspiration let us return briefly to the situation in classical physics.
There, the concept of realism (as asserted in the three statements above) is
encoded mathematically in the idea of a space of states, S, where specifying a
particular state (or ‘micro-state’), s ∈ S, determines entirely ‘the way things
are’ for the system. In particular, this suggests that each physical quantity A
should be associated with a real-valued function A˘ : S → R such that when
the state of the system is s, the value of A is A˘(s). Of course, this is indeed
precisely how the formalism of classical physics works.
In the spirit of general abstraction, one might one wonder if this formal-
ism can be generalised to a structure in which A is represented by an arrow
A˘ : Σ → R where Σ and R are objects in some category, τ , other than the
category of sets, Sets? In such a theory, one would seek to represent propo-
sitions about the ‘values’ (whatever that might mean) of physical quantities
with sub-objects of Σ, just as in classical physics propositions are represented
by subsets of the state space S (see Section 2.2 for more detail of this).
Our central conceptual idea is that such a categorial
structure constitutes a generalisation of the concept of
‘realism’ in which the ‘values’ of a physical quantity are
coded in the arrow A˘ : Σ→ R.
Clearly the propositions will play a key role in any such theory, and,
presumably, the minimum required is that the associated sub-objects of Σ
form some sort of ‘logic’, just as the subsets of S form a Boolean algebra.
This rules out most categories since, generically, the sub-objects of an
object do not have any logical structure. However, if the category τ is a
‘topos’ then the sub-objects of any object do have this property, and hence
the current research programme.
Our suggestion, therefore, is to try to construct physical theories that are
formulated in a topos other than Sets . This topos will depend on both the
theory-type and the system. More precisely, if a theory-type (such as classical
physics, or quantum physics) is applicable to a certain class of systems, then,
for each system in this class, there is a topos in which the theory is to be
formulated. For some theory-types the topos is system-independent: for
example, classical physics always uses the topos of sets. For other theory-
12
types, the topos varies from system to system: as we shall see, this is the
case in quantum theory.
In somewhat more detail, any particular example of our suggested scheme
will have the following ingredients:
1. There are two special objects in the topos τφ: the ‘state-object’
13, Σφ
and the ‘quantity-value object’, Rφ. Any physical quantity, A, is rep-
resented by an arrow Aφ : Σφ → Rφ in the topos. Whatever meaning
can be ascribed to the concept of the ‘value’ of a physical quantity is
encoded in (or derived from) this representation.
2. Propositions about a system are represented by sub-objects of the state-
object Σφ. These sub-objects form a Heyting algebra (as indeed do the
sub-objects of any object in a topos): a distributive lattice that differs
from a Boolean algebra only in that the law of excluded middle need
not hold, i.e., α∨¬α  1. A Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra with
strict equality: α ∨ ¬α = 1.
3. Generally speaking (and unlike in set theory), an object in a topos
may not be determined by its ‘points’. In particular, this may be so
for the state-object, in which case the concept of a microstate is not
so useful.14 Nevertheless, truth values can be assigned to propositions
with the aid of a ‘truth object’ (or ‘pseudo-state’). These truth values
lie in another Heyting algebra.
Of course, it is not instantly obvious that quantum theory can be writ-
ten in this way. However, as we shall see, there is a topos reformulation
of quantum theory, and this has two immediate implications. The first is
that we acquire a new type of ‘realist’ interpretation of standard quantum
theory. The second is that this new approach suggests ways of generalising
quantum theory that make no fundamental reference to Hilbert spaces, path
integrals, etc. In particular, there is no prima facie reason for introducing
standard continuum quantities. As emphasised above, this is one of our main
motivations for developing the topos approach. We shall say more about this
later.
From a conceptual perspective, a central feature of our scheme is the
‘neo-realist’ structure reflected mathematically in the three statements above.
13The meaning of the subscript ‘φ’ is explained in the main text. It refers to a particular
topos-representation of a formal language attached to the system.
14In quantum theory, the state-object has no points/microstates at all. As we shall see,
this statement is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem.
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This neo-realism is the conceptual fruit of the fact that, from a categorial per-
spective, a physical theory expressed in a topos ‘looks’ like classical physics
expressed in the topos of sets.
The fact that (i) physical quantities are represented by arrows whose
domain is the state-object, Σφ; and (ii) propositions are represented by
sub-objects of Σφ, suggests strongly that Σφ can be regarded as the topos-
analogue of a classical state space. Indeed, for any classical system the topos
is just the category of sets, Sets, and the ideas above reduce to the familiar
picture in which (i) there is a state space (set) S; (ii) any physical quantity,
A, is represented by a real-valued functions A˘ : S → R; and (iii) proposi-
tions are represented by subsets of S with a logical structure given by the
associated Boolean algebra.
Evidently the suggested mathematical structures could be used in two
different ways. The first is that of the ‘conventional’ theoretical physicist
with little interest in conceptual matters. For him/her, what we and our
colleagues are developing is a new tool-kit with which to construct novel
types of theoretical model. Whether or not Nature has chosen such models
remains to be seen, but, at the very least, the use of topoi certainly suggests
new techniques.
For those physicists who are interested in conceptual issues, the topos
framework gives a radically new way of thinking about the world. The neo-
realism inherent in the formalism is described mathematically using the in-
ternal language that is associated with any topos. This describes how things
look from ‘within’ the topos: something that should be particularly useful in
the context of quantum cosmology15.
On the other hand, the pragmatic theoretician with no interest in con-
ceptual matters can use the ‘external’ description of the topos in which the
category of sets provides a metalanguage with which to formulate the the-
ory. From a mathematical perspective, the interplay between the internal
and external languages of a topos is one of the fascinations of the subject.
However, much remains to be said about the significance of this interaction
for real theories of physics.
This present article is partly an amalgam of a series of four papers that
we placed on the ArXiv server16 in March, 2007 [21, 22, 23, 24]. However,
we have added a fair amount of new material, and also made a few minor
15In this context see the work of Markopoulou who considers a topos description of the
universe as seen by different observers who live inside it [58].
16These are due to published in Journal of Mathematical Physics in the Spring of 2008.
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corrections (mainly typos).17 We have also added some remarks about devel-
opments made by researchers other than ourselves since the ArXiv preprints
were written. Of particular importance to our general programme is the
work of Heunen and Spitters [38] which adds some powerful ingredients to
the topoi-in-physics toolkit. Finally, we have included some background ma-
terial from the earlier papers that formed the starting point for the current
research programme [44, 45, 35, 13].
We must emphasise that this is not a review article about the general
application of topos theory to physics; this would have made the article far
too long. For example, there has been a fair amount of study of the use of
synthetic differential geometry in physics. The reader can find references to
much of this on the, so-called, ‘Siberian toposes’ web site18. There is also
the work by Mallios and collaborators on ‘Abstract Differential Geometry’
[59, 60, 66, 61]. Of course, as always these days, Google will speedily reveal
all that we have omitted.
But even less is this paper a review of the use of category theory in general
in physics. For there any many important topics that we do not mention at
all. For example, Baez’s advocation of n-categories [5, 6]; ‘categorial quantum
theory’ [2, 73]; Takeuti’s theory19 of ‘quantum sets’ [71]; and Crane’s work
on categorial models of space-time [17].
Finally, a word about the style in which this article is written. We
spent much time pondering on this, as we did before writing the four ArXiv
preprints. The intended audience is our colleagues who work in theoreti-
cal physics, especially those whose interests included foundational issues in
quantum gravity and quantum theory. However, topos theory is not an easy
branch of mathematics, and this poses the dilemma of how much background
mathematics should be assumed of the reader, and how much should be ex-
plained as we go along.20 We have approached this problem by including
a short mathematical appendix on topos theory. However, reasons of space
precluded a thorough treatment, and we hope that, fairly soon, someone will
write an introductory review of topos theory in a style that is accessible to
a typical theoretical-physicist reader.
17Some of the more technical theorems have been placed in the Appendix with the hope
that this makes the article a little easier to read.
18This is http://users.univer.omsk.su/˜topoi/. See also Cecilia Flori’s website that deals
more generally with topos theory and physics: http://topos-physics.org/
19Takeuti’s work is not exactly about category theory applied to quantum theory: it is
more about the use of formal logic, but the spirit is similar. For a recent paper in this
genre see [64].
20The references that we have found most helpful in our research are [55, 29, 52, 8, 56, 48].
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This article is structured in the following way. We begin with a discussion
of some of the conceptual background, in particular the role of the real num-
bers in conventional theoretical physics. Then in Section 3 we introduce the
idea of attaching a propositional language, PL(S), to each physical system
S. The intent is that each theory of S corresponds to a particular represen-
tation of PL(S). In particular, we show how classical physics satisfies this
requirement in a very natural way.
Propositional languages have limited scope (they lack the quantifiers ‘∀’
and ‘∃’), and in Section 4 we propose the use of a higher-order language
L(S). Languages of this type are a central feature of topos theory and it is
natural to consider the idea of representing L(S) in different topoi. Classical
physics always takes place in the topos, Sets, of sets but our expectation is
that other areas of physics will use a different topos.
This expectation is confirmed in Section 5 where we discuss in detail the
representation of PL(S) for a quantum system (the representation of L(S) is
discussed in Section 8). The central idea is to represent propositions as sub-
objects of the ‘spectral presheaf’ Σ which belongs to the topos, SetsV(H)
op
,
of presheaves (set-valued, contravariant functors) on the category, V(H), of
abelian sub-algebras of the algebra B(H) of all bounded operators on H.
This representation employs the idea of ‘daseinisation’ in which any given
projection operator Pˆ is represented at each context/stage-of-truth V in
V(H) by the ‘closest’ projector to it in V . There are two variants of this:
(i) ‘outer’ daseinisation, in which Pˆ is approached from above (in the lattice
of projectors in V ); and (ii) ‘lower’ daseinisation, in which Pˆ is approached
from below.
The next key move is to discuss the ‘truth values’ of propositions in a
quantum theory. This requires the introduction of some analogue of the mi-
crostates of classical physics. We say ‘analogue’ because the spectral presheaf
Σ—which is the quantum topos equivalent of a classical state space—has no
global elements, and hence there are no microstates at all: this is equivalent
to the Kochen-Specker theorem. The critical idea is that of a ‘truth object’,
or ‘pseudo-state’ which, as we show in Section 6, is the closest one can get
in quantum theory to a microstate.
In Section 7 we introduce the ‘de Groote’ presheaves and the associated
ideas that lead to the concept of daseinising an arbitrary bounded self-adjoint
operator, not just a projector. Then, in Section 8, the spectral theorem is
used to construct several possible models for the quantity-value presheaf
in quantum physics. The simplest choice is R, but this uses only outer
daseinisation, and a more balanced choice is R↔ which uses both inner and
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outer daseinisation. Another possibility is k(R): the Grothendieck topos
extension of the monoid object R. A key result is the ‘non-commutative
spectral theorem’ which involves showing how each bounded, self-adjoint
operator Aˆ can be represented by an arrow A˘ : Σ→ R↔.
In Section 10 we discuss the way in which unitary operators act on the
quantum topos objects. Then, in Sections 11, 12 and 13 we discuss the
problem of handling ‘all’ possible systems in a single coherent scheme. This
involves introducing a category of systems which, it transpires, has a natural
monoidal structure. We show in detail how this scheme works in the case of
classical and quantum theory.
Finally, in Section 14 we discuss/speculate on some properties of the state
object, quantity-value object, and truth objects that might be present in any
topos representation of a physical system.
To facilitate reading this long article, some of the more technical material
has been put in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2 there is a short introduction to
some of the relevant parts of topos theory.
2 The Conceptual Background of our Scheme
2.1 The Problem of Using Real Numbers a Priori
As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the main goals of our work is to
find new tools with which to develop theories that are significant extensions
of, or developments from, quantum theory but without being tied a priori
to the use of the standard real or complex numbers.
In this context we note that real numbers arise in theories of physics in
three different (but related) ways: (i) as the values of physical quantities; (ii)
as the values of probabilities; and (iii) as a fundamental ingredient in models
of space and time (especially in those based on differential geometry). All
three are of direct concern vis-a-vis our worries about making unjustified, a
priori assumptions in quantum theory. We shall now examine them in detail.
2.1.1 Why Are Physical Quantities Assumed to be Real-Valued?
One reason for assuming physical quantities are real-valued is undoubtedly
grounded in the remark that, traditionally (i.e., in the pre-digital age), they
are measured with rulers and pointers, or they are defined operationally in
terms of such measurements. However, rulers and pointers are taken to be
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classical objects that exist in the physical space of classical physics, and this
space is modelled using the reals. In this sense there is a direct link between
the space in which physical quantities take their values (what we call the
‘quantity-value space’) and the nature of physical space or space-time [41].
If conceded, this claim means the assumption that physical quantities
are real-valued is problematic in any theory in which space, or space-time,
is not modelled by a smooth manifold. Admittedly, if the theory employs
a background space, or space-time—and if this background is a manifold—
then the use of real-valued physical quantities is justified in so far as their
value-space can be related to this background. Such a stance is particularly
appropriate in situations where the background plays a central role in giving
meaning to concepts like ‘observers’ and ‘measuring devices’, and thereby
provides a basis for an instrumentalist interpretation of the theory.
But even here caution is needed since many theoretical physicists have
claimed that the notion of a ‘space-time point in a manifold’ is intrinsically
flawed. One argument (due to Penrose) is based on the observation that any
attempt to localise a ‘thing’ is bound to fail beyond a certain point because
of the quantum production of pairs of particles from the energy/momentum
uncertainty caused by the spatial localisation. Another argument concerns
the artificiality21 of the use of real numbers as coordinates with which to
identify a space-time point. There is also Einstein’s famous ‘hole argument’
in general relativity which asserts that the notion of a space-time point (in
a manifold) has no physical meaning in a theory that is invariant under the
group of space-time diffeomorphisms.
Another cautionary caveat concerning the invocation of a background is
that this background structure may arise only in some ‘sector’ of the theory;
or it may exist only in some limiting, or approximate, sense. The associated
instrumentalist interpretation would then be similarly limited in scope. For
this reason, if no other, a ‘realist’ interpretation is more attractive than an
instrumentalist one.
In fact, in such circumstances, the phrase ‘realist interpretation’ does
not really do justice to the situation since it tends to imply that there are
other interpretations of the theory, particularly instrumentalism, with which
the realist one can contend on a more-or-less equal footing. But, as we
just argued, the instrumentalist interpretation may be severely limited as
compared to the realist one. To flag this point, we will sometimes refer to a
21The integers, and associated rationals, have a ‘natural’ interpretation from a physical
perspective since we can all count. On the other hand, the Cauchy-sequence and/or the
Dedekind-cut definitions of the reals are distinctly un-intuitive from a physical perspective.
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‘realist formalism’, rather than a ‘realist interpretation’.22
2.1.2 Why Are Probabilities Required to Lie in the Interval [0, 1]?
The motivation for using the subset [0, 1] of the real numbers as the value
space for probabilities comes from the relative-frequency interpretation of
probability. Thus, in principle, an experiment is to be repeated a large
number, N , times, and the probability associated with a particular result
is defined to be the ratio Ni/N , where Ni is the number of experiments in
which that result was obtained. The rational numbers Ni/N necessarily lie
between 0 and 1, and if the limit N → ∞ is taken—as is appropriate for
a hypothetical ‘infinite ensemble’—real numbers in the closed interval [0, 1]
are obtained.
The relative-frequency interpretation of probability is natural in instru-
mentalist theories of physics, but it is not meaningful if there is no classical
spatio-temporal background in which the necessary measurements could be
made; or, if there is a background, it is one to which the relative-frequency
interpretation cannot be adapted.
In the absence of a relativity-frequency interpretation, the concept of
‘probability’ must be understood in a different way. In the physical sciences,
one of the most discussed approaches involves the concept of ‘potentiality’,
or ‘latency’, as favoured by Heisenberg [37], Margenau [57], and Popper [65]
(and, for good measure, Aristotle). In this case there is no compelling reason
why the probability-value space should necessarily be a subset of the real
numbers. The minimal requirement is that this value-space is an ordered
set, so that one proposition can be said to be more or less probable than an-
other. However, there is no prima facie reason why this set should be totally
ordered: i.e., there may be pairs of propositions whose potentialities cannot
be compared—something that seems eminently plausible in the context of
non-commensurable quantities in quantum theory.
By invoking the idea of ‘potentiality’, it becomes feasible to imagine
a quantum-gravity theory with no spatio-temporal background but where
probability is still a fundamental concept. However, it could also be that
the concept of probability plays no fundamental role in such circumstances,
and can be given a meaning only in the context of a sector, or limit, of the
22Of course, such discussions are unnecessary in classical physics since, there, if knowl-
edge of the value of a physical quantity is gained by making a (ideal) measurement, the
reason why we obtain the result that we do, is because the quantity possessed that value
immediately before the measurement was made. In other words, “epistemology models
ontology”.
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theory where a background does exist. This background could then sup-
port a limited instrumentalist interpretation which would include a (limited)
relative-frequency understanding of probability.
In fact, most modern approaches to quantum gravity aspire to a formalism
that is background independent [4, 15, 67, 68]. So, if a background space does
arise, it will be in one of the restricted senses mentioned above. Indeed, it is
often asserted that a proper theory of quantum gravity will not involve any
direct spatio-temporal concepts, and that what we commonly call ‘space’
and ‘time’ will ‘emerge’ from the formalism only in some appropriate limit
[12]. In this case, any instrumentalist interpretation could only ‘emerge’ in
the same limit, as would the associated relative-frequency interpretation of
probability.
In a theory of this type, there will be no prima facie link between the val-
ues of physical quantities and the nature of space or space-time, although, of
course, this cannot be totally ruled out. In any event, part of the fundamen-
tal specification of the theory will involve deciding what the ‘quantity-value
space’ should be.
These considerations suggest that quantum theory must be radically
changed if one wishes to accommodate situations where there is no back-
ground space/space-time, manifold within which an instrumentalist interpre-
tation can be formulated. In such a situation, some sort of ‘realist’ formalism
is essential.
These reflections also suggest that the quantity-value space employed in
an instrumentalist realisation of a theory—or a ‘sector’, or ‘limit’, of the
theory—need not be the same as the quantity-value space in a neo-realist
formulation. At first sight this may seem strange but, as is shown in Section
8, this is precisely what happens in the topos reformulation of standard
quantum theory.
2.2 The Genesis of Topos Ideas in Physics
2.2.1 Why are Space and Time Modelled with Real Numbers?
Even setting aside the more exotic considerations of quantum gravity, one can
still query the use of real numbers to model space and/or time. One might
argue that (i) the use of (triples of) real numbers to model space is based on
empirically-based reflections about the nature of ‘distances’ between objects;
and (ii) the use of real numbers to model time reflects our experience that
‘instants of time’ appear to be totally ordered, and that intervals of time are
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always divisible23.
However, what does it really mean to say that two particles are separated
by a distance of, for example,
√
2cms? From an empirical perspective, it
would be impossible to make a measurement that could unequivocally re-
veal precisely that value from among the continuum of real numbers that lie
around it. There will always be experimental errors of some sort: if noth-
ing else, there are thermodynamical fluctuations in the measuring device;
and, ultimately, uncertainties arising from quantum ‘fluctuations’. Similar
remarks apply to attempts to measure time.
Thus, from an operational perspective, the use of real numbers to label
‘points’ in space and/or time is a theoretical abstraction that can never be
realised in practice. But if the notion of a space/time/space-time ‘point’ in
a continuum, is an abstraction, why do we use it? Of course it works well in
theories used in normal physics, but at a fundamental level it must be seen
as questionable.
These operational remarks say nothing about the structure of space (or
time) ‘in itself’, but, even assuming that this concept makes sense, which is
debatable, the use of real numbers is still a metaphysical assumption with
no fundamental justification.
Traditionally, we teach our students that measurements of physical quan-
tities that are represented theoretically by real numbers, give results that
fall into ‘bins’, construed as being subsets of the real line. This suggests
that, from an operational perspective, it would be more appropriate to base
mathematical models of space or time on a theory of ‘regions’, rather than
the real numbers themselves.
But then one asks “What is a region?”, and if we answer “A subset of
triples of real numbers for space, and a subset of real numbers for time”, we
are thrown back to the real numbers. One way of avoiding this circularity is
to focus on relations between these ‘subsets’ and see if they can be axioma-
tised in some way. The natural operations to perform on regions are (i) take
intersections, or unions, of pairs of regions; and (ii) take the complement of
a region. If the regions are modelled on Borel subsets of R, then the inter-
sections and unions could be extended to countable collections. If they are
modelled on open sets, it would be arbitrary unions and finite intersections.
From a physical perspective, the use of open subsets as models of regions
is attractive as it leaves a certain, arguably desirable, ‘fuzziness’ at the edges,
which is absent for closed sets. Thus, following this path, we would axioma-
23These remarks are expressed in the context of the Newtonian view of space and time,
but it is easy enough to generalise them to special relativity.
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tise that a mathematical model of space or time (or space-time) involves an
algebra of entities called ‘regions’, and with operations that are the analogue
of unions and intersections for subsets of a set. This algebra would allow
arbitrary ‘unions’ and finite ‘intersections’, and would distribute24 over these
operations. In effect, we are axiomatising that an appropriate mathematical
model of space-time is an object in the category of locales.
However, a locale is the same thing as a complete Heyting algebra (for
the definition see below), and, as we shall, Heyting algebras are inexorably
linked with topos theory.
2.2.2 Another Possible Role for Heyting Algebras
The use of a Heyting algebra to model space/time/space-time is an attractive
possibility, and was the origin of the interest in topos theory of one of us (CJI)
some years ago. However, there is another motivation which is based more
on logic, and the desire to construct a ‘neo-realist’ interpretation of quantum
theory.
To motivate topos theory as the source of neo-realism let us first consider
classical physics, where everything is defined in the category, Sets, of sets
and functions between sets. Then (i) any physical quantity, A, is represented
by a real-valued function A˘ : S → R, where S is the space of microstates;
and (ii) a proposition of the form “Aε∆” (which asserts that the value of
the physical quantity A lies in the subset ∆ of the real line R)25 is repre-
sented by the subset26 A˘−1(∆) ⊆ S. In fact any proposition P about the
system is represented by an associated subset, SP , of S: namely, the set of
states for which P is true. Conversely, every (Borel) subset of S represents
a proposition.27
It is easy to see how the logical calculus of propositions arises in this
picture. For let P and Q be propositions, represented by the subsets SP and
24If the distributive law is dropped we could move towards the quantum-set ideas of
[71]; or, perhaps, the ideas of non-commutative geometry instigated by Alain Connes [14].
25In the rigorous theory of classical physics, the set S is a symplectic manifold, and ∆
is a Borel subset of R. Also, the function A˘ : S → R may be required to be measurable,
or continuous, or smooth, depending on the quantity, A, under consideration.
26Throughout this article we will adopt the notation in which A ⊆ B means that A is a
subset of B that could equal B; while A ⊂ B means that A is a proper subset of B; i.e.,
A does not equal B. Similar remarks apply to other pairs of ordering symbols like ≺,;
or ≻,, etc.
27More precisely, every Borel subset of S represents many propositions about the values
of physical quantities. Two propositions are said to be ‘physically equivalent’ if they are
represented by the same subset of S.
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SQ respectively, and consider the proposition “P and Q”. This is true if, and
only if, both P and Q are true, and hence the subset of states that represents
this logical conjunction consists of those states that lie in both SP and SQ—
i.e., the set-theoretic intersection SP ∩ SQ. Thus “P and Q” is represented
by SP ∩ SQ. Similarly, the proposition “P or Q” is true if either P or Q
(or both) are true, and hence this logical disjunction is represented by those
states that lie in SP plus those states that lie in SQ—i.e., the set-theoretic
union SP ∪ SQ. Finally, the logical negation “not P” is represented by all
those points in S that do not lie in SP—i.e., the set-theoretic complement
S/SP .
In this way, a fundamental relation is established between the logical
calculus of propositions about a physical system, and the Boolean algebra
of subsets of the state space. Thus the mathematical structure of classical
physics is such that, of necessity, it reflects a ‘realist’ philosophy, in the sense
in which we are using the word.
One way to escape from the tyranny of Boolean algebras and classical
realism is via topos theory. Broadly speaking, a topos is a category that
behaves very much like the category of sets; in particular, the collection
of sub-objects of an object forms a Heyting algebra, just as the collection
of subsets of a set form a Boolean algebra. Our intention, therefore, is to
explore the possibility of associating physical propositions with sub-objects
of some object Σ (the analogue of a classical state space) in some topos.
A Heyting algebra, h, is a distributive lattice with a zero element, 0, and
a unit element, 1, and with the property that to each pair α, β ∈ h there is
an implication α⇒ β, characterized by
γ  (α⇒ β) if and only if γ ∧ α  β. (2.1)
The negation is defined as ¬α := (α ⇒ 0) and has the property that the
law of excluded middle need not hold, i.e., there may exist α ∈ h, such that
α ∨ ¬α ≺ 1 or, equivalently, there may existα ∈ h such that ¬¬α ≻ α. This
is the characteristic property of an intuitionistic logic.28 A Boolean algebra
is the special case of a Heyting algebra in which there is the strict equality:
i.e., α ∨ ¬α = 1 for all α. It is known from Stone’s theorem [70] that each
Boolean algebra is isomorphic to an algebra of (clopen, i.e., closed and open)
subsets of a suitable (topological) space.
28Here, α ⇒ β is nothing but the category-theoretical exponential βα and γ ∧ α is
the product γ × α. The definition uses the adjunction between the exponential and the
product, Hom(γ, βα) = Hom(γ×α, β). A slightly easier, albeit ‘less categorical’ definition
is: a Heyting algebra, h, is a distributive lattice such that for any two elements α, β ∈ h,
the set {γ ∈ h | γ ∧ α ≤ β} has a maximal element, denoted by (α⇒ β).
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The elements of a Heyting algebra can be manipulated in a very similar
way to those in a Boolean algebra. One of our claims is that, as far as theories
of physics are concerned, Heyting logic is a viable29 alternative to Boolean
logic.
To give some idea of the difference between a Boolean algebra and a
Heyting algebra, we note that the paradigmatic example of the former is the
collection of all measurable subsets of a measure space X. Here, if α ⊆ X
represents a proposition, the logical negation, ¬α, is just the set-theoretic
complement X\α.
On the other hand, the paradigmatic example of a Heyting algebra is the
collection of all open sets in a topological space X. Here, if α ⊆ X is open,
the logical negation ¬α is defined to be the interior of the set-theoretical
complement X\α. Therefore, the difference between ¬α in the topological
space X, and ¬α in the measurable space generated by the topology of X,
is just the ‘thin’ boundary of the closed set X\α.
2.2.3 Our Main Contention about Topos Theory and Physics
We contend that, for a given theory-type (for example, classical physics,
or quantum physics), each system S to which the theory is applicable is
associated with a particular topos τφ(S) within whose framework the theory,
as applied to S, is to be formulated and interpreted. In this context, the
‘φ’-subscript is a label that changes as the theory-type changes. It signifies
the representation of a system-language in the topos τφ(S): we will come to
this later.
The conceptual interpretation of this formalism is ‘neo-realist’ in the fol-
lowing sense:
1. A physical quantity, A, is to be represented by an arrow Aφ,S : Σφ,S →
Rφ,S where Σφ,S and Rφ,S are two special objects in the topos τφ(S).
These are the analogues of, respectively, (i) the classical state space,
S; and (ii) the real numbers, R, in which classical physical quantities
take their values.
29The main difference between theorems proved using Heyting logic and those using
Boolean logic is that proofs by contradiction cannot be used in the former. In particular,
this means that one cannot prove that something exists by arguing that the assumption
that it does not leads to contradiction; instead it is necessary to provide a constructive
proof of the existence of the entity concerned. Arguably, this does not place any major
restriction on building theories of physics. Indeed, over the years, various physicists (for
example, Bryce DeWitt) have argued that constructive proofs should always be used in
physics.
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In what follows, Σφ,S and Rφ,S are called the ‘state object’, and the
‘quantity-value object’, respectively.
2. Propositions about the system S are represented by sub-objects of Σφ,S.
These sub-objects form a Heyting algebra.
3. Once the topos analogue of a state (a ‘truth object’) has been speci-
fied, these propositions are assigned truth values in the Heyting logic
associated with the global elements of the sub-object classifier, Ωτφ(S),
in the topos τφ(S).
Thus a theory expressed in this way looks very much like classical physics
except that whereas classical physics always employs the topos of sets, other
theories—including quantum theory and, we conjecture, quantum gravity—
use a different topos.
One deep result in topos theory is that there is an internal language asso-
ciated with each topos. In fact, not only does each topos generate an internal
language, but, conversely, a language satisfying appropriate conditions gen-
erates a topos. Topoi constructed in this way are called ‘linguistic topoi’,
and every topos can be regarded as a linguistic topos. In many respects, this
is one of the profoundest ways of understanding what a topos really ‘is’.30.
These results are exploited in Section 4 where we introduce the idea that,
for any applicable theory-type, each physical system S is associated with
a ‘local’ language, L(S). The application of the theory-type to S is then
involves finding a representation of L(S) in an appropriate topos; this is
equivalent to finding a ‘translation’ of L(S) into the internal language of
that topos.
Closely related to the existence of this linguistic structure is the striking
fact that a topos can be used as a foundation for mathematics itself, just as
set theory is used in the foundations of ‘normal’ (or ‘classical’) mathematics.
In this context, the key remark is that the internal language of a topos has
a form that is similar in many ways to the formal language on which normal
set theory is based. It is this internal, topos language that is used to interpret
the theory in a ‘neo-realist’ way.
The main difference with classical logic is that the logic of the topos
language does not satisfy the principle of excluded middle, and hence proofs
by contradiction are not permitted. This has many intriguing consequences.
For example, there are topoi in which there exist genuine infinitesimals that
30This aspect of topos theory is discussed at length in the books by Bell [8], and Lambek
and Scott [52]
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can be used to construct a rival to normal calculus. The possibility of such
quantities stems from the fact that the normal proof that they do not exist
is a proof by contradiction.
Thus each topos carries its own world of mathematics: a world which,
generally speaking, is not the same as that of classical mathematics.
Consequently, by postulating that, for a given theory-type, each physical
system carries its own topos, we are also saying that to each physical sys-
tem plus theory-type there is associated a framework for mathematics itself!
Thus classical physics uses classical mathematics; and quantum theory uses
‘quantum mathematics’—the mathematics formulated in the topoi of quan-
tum theory. To this we might add the conjecture: “Quantum gravity uses
‘quantum gravity’ mathematics”!
3 Propositional Languages and Theories of
Physics
3.1 Two Opposing Interpretations of Propositions
Attempts to construct a na¨ıve realist interpretation of quantum theory founder
on the Kochen-Specker theorem. However, if, despite this theorem, some de-
gree of realism is still sought, there are not that many options.
One approach is to focus on a particular, maximal commuting subset of
physical quantities and declare by fiat that these are the ones that ‘have’
values; essentially, this is what is done in ‘modal’ interpretations of quantum
theory. However, this leaves open the question of why Nature should select
this particular set, and the reasons proposed vary greatly from one scheme
to another.
In our work, we take a completely different approach and try to formulate
a scheme which takes into account all these different choices for commuting
sets of physical quantities; in particular, equal ontological status is ascribed
to all of them. This scheme is grounded in the topos-theoretic approach
that was first proposed in [44, 45, 35, 13]. This uses a technique whose first
step is to construct a category, C, the objects of which can be viewed as
contexts in which the quantum theory can be displayed: in fact, they are
just the commuting sub-algebras of operators in the theory. All this will be
explained in more detail in Section 5.
In this earlier work, it was postulated that the logic for handling quan-
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tum propositions from this perspective is that associated with the topos of
presheaves31 (contravariant functors from C to Sets), SetsCop . The idea is
that a single presheaf will encode quantum propositions from the perspec-
tive of all contexts at once. However, in the original papers, the crucial
‘daseinisation’ operation (see Section 5) was not known and, consequently,
the discussion became rather convoluted in places. In addition, the general-
ity and power of the underlying procedure was not fully appreciated by the
authors.
For this reason, in the present article we return to the basic questions
and reconsider them in the light of the overall topos structure that has now
become clear.
We start by considering the way in which propositions arise, and are ma-
nipulated, in physics. For simplicity, we will concentrate on systems that
are associated with ‘standard’ physics. Then, to each such system S there
is associated a set of physical quantities—such as energy, momentum, posi-
tion, angular momentum etc.32—all of which are real-valued. The associated
propositions are of the form “Aε∆”, where A is a physical quantity, and ∆
is a subset33 of R.
From a conceptual perspective, the proposition “Aε∆” can be read in
two, very different, ways:
(i) The (na¨ıve) realist interpretation: “The physical quantity A has
a value, and that value lies in ∆.”
(ii) The instrumentalist interpretation: “If a measurement is made
of A, the result will be found to lie in ∆.”
The former is the familiar, ‘commonsense’ understanding of propositions in
both classical physics and daily life. The latter underpins the Copenhagen in-
terpretation of quantum theory. Of course, the instrumentalist interpretation
can also be applied to classical physics, but it does not lead to anything new.
For, in classical physics, what is measured is what is the case: “Epistemology
models ontology”.
31In quantum theory, the category C is just a partially-ordered set, which simplifies
many manipulations.
32This set does not have to contain ‘all ’ possible physical quantities: it suffices to
concentrate on a subset that are deemed to be of particular interest. However, at some
point, questions may arise about the ‘completeness’ of the set.
33As was remarked earlier, for various reasons, the subset ∆ ⊆ R is usually required to
be a Borel subset, and for the most part we will assume this without further comment.
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We will now study the role of propositions in physics more carefully,
particularly in the context of ‘realist’ interpretations.
3.2 The Propositional Language PL(S)
3.2.1 Intuitionistic Logic and the Definition of PL(S)
We are going to construct a formal language, PL(S), with which to express
propositions about a physical system, S, and to make deductions concerning
them. Our intention is to interpret these propositions in a ‘realist’ way: an
endeavour whose mathematical underpinning lies in constructing a represen-
tation of PL(S) in a Heyting algebra, H, that is part of the mathematical
framework involved in the application of a particular theory-type to S.
In constructing PL(S) we suppose that we have first identified some set,
Q(S), of physical quantities : this plays a fundamental role in our language.
In addition, for any system S, we have the set, PBR of (Borel) subsets of
R. We use the sets Q(S) and PBR to construct the ‘primitive propositions’
about the system S. These are of the form “Aε∆” where A ∈ Q(S) and
∆ ∈ PBR.
We denote the set of all such strings by PL(S)0. Note that what has
been here called a ‘physical quantity’ could better (but more clumsily) be
termed the ‘name’ of the physical quantity. For example, when we talk about
the ‘energy’ of a system, the word ‘energy’ is the same, and functions in the
same way in the formal language, irrespective of the details of the actual
Hamiltonian of the system.
The primitive propositions “Aε∆” are used to define ‘sentences’. More
precisely, a new set of symbols {¬,∧,∨,⇒} is added to the language, and
then a sentence is defined inductively by the following rules (see Ch. 6 in
[29]):
1. Each primitive proposition “Aε∆” in PL(S)0 is a sentence.
2. If α is a sentence, then so is ¬α.
3. If α and β are sentences, then so are α ∧ β, α ∨ β, and α⇒ β.
The collection of all sentences, PL(S), is an elementary formal language that
can be used to express and manipulate propositions about the system S. Note
that, at this stage, the symbols ¬, ∧, ∨, and ⇒ have no explicit meaning,
although of course the implicit intention is that they should stand for ‘not’,
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‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘implies’, respectively. This implicit meaning becomes explicit
when a representation of PL(S) is constructed as part of the application
of a theory-type to S (see below). Note also that PL(S) is a propositional
language only: it does not contain the quantifiers ‘∀’ or ‘∃’. To include them
requires a higher-order language. We shall return to this in our discussion of
the language L(S).
The next step arises because PL(S) is not only a vehicle for expressing
propositions about the system S: we also want to reason with it about the
system. To achieve this, a series of axioms for a deductive logic must be
added to PL(S). This could be either classical logic or intuitionistic logic,
but we select the latter since it allows a larger class of representations/models,
including representations in topoi in which the law of excluded middle fails.
The axioms for intuitionistic logic consist of a finite collection of sentences
in PL(S) (for example, α∧β ⇒ β∧α), plus a single rule of inference, modus
ponens (the ‘rule of detachment’) which says that from α and α ⇒ β the
sentence β may be derived.
Others axioms might be added to PL(S) to reflect the implicit meaning of
the primitive proposition “Aε∆”: i.e., (in a realist reading) “A has a value,
and that value lies in ∆ ⊆ R”. For example, the sentence “Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2”
(‘A belongs to ∆1’ and ‘A belongs to ∆2’) might seem to be equivalent to
“A belongs to ∆1 ∩ ∆2” i.e., “Aε∆1 ∩ ∆2”. A similar remark applies to
“Aε∆1 ∨ Aε∆2”.
Thus, along with the axioms of intuitionistic logic and detachment, we
might be tempted to add the following axioms:
Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩∆2 (3.1)
Aε∆1 ∨ Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∪∆2 (3.2)
These axioms are consistent with the intuitionistic logical structure of PL(S).
We shall see later the extent to which the axioms (3.1–3.2) are compatible
with the topos representations of classical and quantum physics. However,
the other obvious proposition to consider in this way—“It is not the case
that A belongs to ∆”—is clearly problematical.
In classical logic, this proposition34, “¬(Aε∆)”, is equivalent to “A be-
longs to R\∆”, where R\∆ denotes the set-theoretic complement of ∆ in R.
This might suggest augmenting (3.1–3.2) with a third axiom
¬(Aε∆)⇔ AεR\∆ (3.3)
34The parentheses ( ) are not symbols in the language; they are just a way of grouping
letters and sentences.
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However, applying ‘¬’ to both sides of (3.3) gives
¬¬(Aε∆)⇔ Aε∆ (3.4)
because of the set-theoretic result R\(R\∆) = ∆. But in an intuitionistic
logic we do not have α⇔ ¬¬α but only α⇒ ¬¬α, and so (3.3) could be false
in a Heyting-algebra representation of PL(S) that is not Boolean. Therefore,
adding (3.3) as an axiom in PL(S) is not indicated if representations are to
be sought in non-Boolean topoi.
3.2.2 Representations of PL(S).
To use a language PL(S) ‘for real’ for some specific physical system S one
must first decide on the set Q(S) of physical quantities that are to be used in
describing S. This language must then be represented in the concrete math-
ematical structure that arises when a theory-type (for example: classical
physics, quantum physics, DI-physics,. . . ) is applied to S. Such a represen-
tation, π, maps each primitive proposition, α, in PL(S)0 to an element, π(α),
of some Heyting algebra (which could be Boolean), H, whose specification is
part of the theory of S. For example, in classical mechanics, the propositions
are represented in the Boolean algebra of all (Borel) subsets of the classical
state space.
The representation of the primitive propositions can be extended recur-
sively to all of PL(S) with the aid of the following rules [29]:
(a) π(α ∨ β) := π(α) ∨ π(β) (3.5)
(b) π(α ∧ β) := π(α) ∧ π(β) (3.6)
(c) π(¬α) := ¬π(α) (3.7)
(d) π(α⇒ β) := π(α)⇒ π(β) (3.8)
Note that, on the left hand side of (3.5–3.8), the symbols {¬,∧,∨,⇒} are
elements of the language PL(S), whereas on the right hand side they denote
the logical connectives in the Heyting algebra, H, in which the representation
takes place.
This extension of π from PL(S)0 to PL(S) is consistent with the ax-
ioms for the intuitionistic, propositional logic of the language PL(S). More
precisely, these axioms become tautologies: i.e., they are all represented by
the maximum element, 1, in the Heyting algebra. By construction, the map
π : PL(S)→ H is then a representation of PL(S) in the Heyting algebra H.
A logician would say that π : PL(S) → H is an H-valuation, or H-model, of
the language PL(S).
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Note that different systems, S, can have the same language. For example,
consider a point-particle moving in one dimension, with a Hamiltonian func-
tion H(x, p) = p
2
2m
+V (x) and state space T ∗R. Different potentials V corre-
spond to different systems (in the sense in which we are using the word ‘sys-
tem’), but the physical quantities for these systems—or, more precisely, the
‘names’ of these quantities, for example, ‘energy’, ‘position’, ‘momentum’—
are the same for them all. Consequently, the language PL(S) is independent
of V . However, the representation of, say, the proposition “Eε∆” (where ‘E’
is the energy), with a specific subset of the state space will depend on the
details of the Hamiltonian.
Clearly, a major consideration in using the language PL(S) is choosing
the Heyting algebra in which the representation is to take place. A funda-
mental result in topos theory is that the set of all sub-objects of any object in
a topos is a Heyting algebra, and these are the Heyting algebras with which
we will be concerned.
Of course, beyond the language, S, and its representation π, lies the
question of whether or not a proposition is ‘true’. This requires the con-
cept of a ‘state’ which, when specified, yields ‘truth values’ for the primitive
propositions in PL(S). These can then be extended recursively to the rest of
PL(S). In classical physics, the possible truth values are just ‘true’ or ‘false’.
However, as we shall see, the situation in topos theory is more complex.
3.2.3 Using Geometric Logic
The inductive definition of PL(S) given above means that sentences can
involve only a finite number of primitive propositions, and therefore only
a finite number of disjunctions (‘∨’) or conjunctions (‘∧’). An interesting
variant of this structure is the, so-called, ‘propositional geometric logic’. This
is characterised by modifying the language and logical axioms so that:
1. There are arbitrary disjunctions, including the empty disjunction (‘0’).
2. There are finite conjunctions, including the empty conjunction (‘1’)
3. Conjunction distributes over arbitrary disjunctions; disjunction dis-
tributes over finite conjunctions.
This structure does not include negation, implication, or infinite conjunc-
tions.
From a conceptual viewpoint, this set of rules is obtained by considering
what it means to actually ‘affirm’ the propositions in PL(S). A careful
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analysis of this concept is given by Vickers [72]; the idea itself goes back
to work by Abramsky [1]. The conclusion is that the set of ‘affirmable’
propositions should satisfy the rules above.
Clearly such a logic is tailor-made for seeking representations in the open
sets of a topological space—the paradigmatic example of a Heyting algebra.
The phrase ‘geometric logic’ is normally applied to a first-order logic with
the properties above, and we will return to this in our discussion of the typed
language L(S). What we have here is just the propositional part of this logic.
The restriction to geometric logic would be easy to incorporate into our
languages PL(S): for example, the axiom (3.2) (if added) could be extended
to read35 ∨
i∈I
(Aε∆i) = Aε
⋃
i∈I
∆i (3.9)
for all index sets I.
The move to geometric logic is motivated by a conception of truth that
is grounded in the actions of making real measurements. This resonates
strongly with the logical positivism that seems still to lurk in the collective
unconscious of the physics profession, and which, of course, was strongly
affirmed by Bohr in his analysis of quantum theory. However, our drive to-
wards ‘neo-realism’ involves replacing the idea of observation/measurement
with that of ‘the way things are’, albeit in a more sophisticated interpre-
tation than that of the ubiquitous cobbler-in-the-market. Consequently, the
conceptual reasons for using ‘affirmative’ logic are less compelling. This issue
deserves further thought: at the moment we are open-minded about it.
The use of geometric logic becomes more interesting in the context of the
typed language L(S), and we shall return to this in Section 4.2.2
3.2.4 Introducing Time Dependence
In addition to describing ‘the way things are’ there is also the question of
how the-way-things-are changes in time. In the form presented above, the
language PL(S) may seem geared towards a ‘canonical’ perspective in so
far as the propositions concerned are implicitly taken to be asserted at a
particular moment of time. As such, PL(S) deals with the values of physi-
cal quantities at that time. In other words, the underlying spatio-temporal
35Note that the bi-implication⇔ used in, for example, (3.1–3.2), is not available if there
is no implication symbol. Thus we have assumed that we are now working with a logical
structure in which ‘equality’ is a meaningful concept; hence the introduction of ‘=’ in
(3.9).
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perspective seems thoroughly ‘Newtonian’.
However, this is only partly true since the phrase ‘physical quantity’ can
have meanings other than the canonical one. For example, one could talk
about the ‘time average of momentum’, and call that a physical quantity. In
this case, the propositions would be about histories of the system, not just
‘the way things are’ at a particular moment in time.
In practice, the question of time dependence can be addressed in various
ways. One is to attach a (external) time label, t, to the physical quantities,
so that the primitive propositions become of the form “At ε ∆”. This can
be interpreted in two ways. The first is to think of Q(S) as including the
symbols At for all physical quantities A and all values of time t ∈ R. The
second is to keep Q(S) fixed, but instead let the language itself becomes
time-dependent, so that we should write PL(S)t, t ∈ R.
In the former case, PL(S) would naturally include history propositions
of the form
(A1t1 ε∆1) ∧ (A2t2 ε∆2) ∧ · · · ∧ (Antn ε∆n) (3.10)
and other obvious variants of this. Here we assume that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn.
The sequential proposition in (3.10) is to be interpreted (in a realist read-
ing) as asserting that “ ‘The physical quantity A1 has a value that lies in ∆1
at time t1’ and ‘the physical quantity A2 has a value that lies in ∆2 at time t2’
and · · · and ‘the physical quantity An has a value that lies in ∆n at time tn’
”. Clearly what we have here is a type of temporal logic. Thus this would be
an appropriate structure with which to discuss the ‘consistent histories’ in-
terpretation of quantum theory, particularly in the, so-called, HPO (history
projection formalism) [39]. In that context, (3.10) represents a, so-called,
‘homogeneous’ history.
From a general conceptual perspective, one might prefer to have an in-
ternal time object, rather than adding external time labels in the language.
Indeed, in our later discussion of the higher-order language L(S) we will
strive to eliminate external entities. However, in the present case, ∆ ⊆ R
is already an ‘external’ (to the language) entity, as indeed is A ∈ Q(S), so
there seems no particular objection to adding a time label too.
In the second approach, where there is only one time label, the represen-
tation π will map “At ε∆” to a time-dependent element, π(At ε∆), of the
Heyting algebra, H; one could say that this is a type of ‘Heisenberg picture’.
This suggests another option, which is to keep the language free of any
time labels, but allow the representation to be time-dependent. In this case,
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πt(Aε∆) is a time-dependent member of H.
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A different approach is to ascribe time dependence to the ‘truth objects’
in the theory: this corresponds to a type of Schro¨dinger picture. The concept
of a truth object is discussed in detail in Section 6.
3.2.5 The Representation of PL(S) in Classical Physics
Let us now look at the representation of PL(S) that corresponds to classical
physics. In this case, the topos involved is just the category, Sets, of sets
and functions between sets.
We will denote by πcl the representation of PL(S) that describes the
classical, Hamiltonian mechanics of a system, S, whose state-space is a sym-
plectic (or Poisson) manifold S. We denote by A˘ : S → R the real-valued
function37 on S that represents the physical quantity A.
Then the representation πcl maps the primitive proposition “Aε∆” to
the subset of S given by
πcl(Aε∆) := {s ∈ S | A˘(s) ∈ ∆}
= A˘−1(∆). (3.11)
This representation can be extended to all the sentences in PL(S) with the
aid of (3.5–3.8). Note that, since ∆ is a Borel subset of R, A˘−1(∆) is a Borel
subset of the state-space S. Hence, in this case, H is equal to the Boolean
algebra of all Borel subsets of S.
We note that, for all (Borel) subsets ∆1,∆2 of R we have
A˘−1(∆1) ∩ A˘−1(∆2) = A˘−1(∆1 ∩∆2) (3.12)
A˘−1(∆1) ∪ A˘−1(∆2) = A˘−1(∆1 ∪∆2) (3.13)
¬A˘−1(∆1) = A˘−1(R\∆1) (3.14)
and hence, in classical physics, all three conditions (3.1–3.3) that we discussed
earlier can be added consistently to the language PL(S).
Consider now the assignment of truth values to the propositions in this
theory. This involves the idea of a ‘microstate’ which, in classical physics, is
36Perhaps we should also consider the possibility that the Heyting algebra is time de-
pendent, in which case pit(Aε∆) is a member of Ht.
37In practice, A˘ is required to be measurable, or smooth, depending on the type of
physical quantity that A is. However, for the most part, these details of classical mechanics
are not relevant to our discussions, and usually we will not characterise A˘ : S → R beyond
just saying that it is a function/map from S to R.
34
simply an element s of the state space S. Each microstate s assigns to each
primitive proposition “Aε∆”, a truth value, ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
, which lies in the
set {false, true} (which we identify with {0, 1}) and is defined as
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if A˘(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise
(3.15)
for all s ∈ S.
3.2.6 The Failure to Represent PL(S) in Standard Quantum The-
ory.
The procedure above that works so easily for classical physics fails completely
if one tries to apply it to standard quantum theory.
In quantum physics, a physical quantity A is represented by a self-adjoint
operator Aˆ on a Hilbert space H, and the proposition “Aε∆” is represented
by the projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] which projects onto the subset ∆ of the
spectrum of Aˆ; i.e.,
π(Aε∆) := Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]. (3.16)
Of course, the set of all projection operators, P(H), inH has a ‘logic’ of its
own—the ‘quantum logic’38 of the Hilbert space H—but this is incompatible
with the intuitionistic logic of the language PL(S), and the representation
(3.16).
Indeed, since the ‘logic’ P(H) is non-distributive, there will exist non-
commuting operators Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, and Borel subsets ∆A,∆B,∆C of R such that
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Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧
(
Eˆ[B ∈ ∆B] ∨ Eˆ[C ∈ ∆C ]
)
6=(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧ Eˆ[B ∈ ∆B]
)
∨
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧ Eˆ[C ∈ ∆C ]
)
(3.17)
while, on the other hand, the logical bi-implication
α ∧ (β ∨ γ)⇔ (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) (3.18)
can be deduced from the axioms of the language PL(S).
38For an excellent survey of quantum logic see [18]. This includes a discussion of a
first-order axiomatisation of quantum logic, and with an associated sequent calculus. It is
interesting to compare our work with what the authors of this paper have done. We hope
to return to this at some time in the future.
39There is a well-known example that uses three rays in R2, so this phenomenon is not
particularly exotic.
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This failure of distributivity bars any na¨ıve realist interpretation of quan-
tum logic. If an instrumentalist interpretation is used instead, the spectral
projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] now represent propositions about what would happen if
a measurement is made, not propositions about what is ‘actually the case’.
And, of course, when a state is specified, this does not yield actual truth
values but only the Born-rule probabilities of getting certain results.
4 A Higher-Order, Typed Language for Physics
4.1 The Basics of the Language L(S)
We want now to consider the possibility of representing the physical quanti-
ties of a system by arrows in a topos other than Sets.
The physical meaning of such an arrow is not clear, a priori. Nor is it
even clear what it is that is being represented in this way. However, what is
clear is that in such a situation it is not correct to assume that the quantity-
value object is necessarily the real-number object in the topos (assuming that
there is one). Rather, the target-object, RS, has to be determined for each
topos, and is therefore an important part of the ‘representation’.
A powerful technique for allowing the quantity-value object to be system-
dependent is to add a symbol ‘R’ to the system language. Developing this
line of thinking suggests that ‘Σ’, too, should be added to the language, as
should a set of symbols of the form ‘A : Σ→R’, to be construed as ‘what it
is’ (hopefully a physical quantity) that is represented by arrows in a topos.
Similarly, there should be a symbol ‘Ω’, to act as the linguistic precursor to
the sub-object classifier in the topos; in the topos Sets, this is just the set
{0, 1}.
The clean way of doing all this is to construct a ‘local language’ [8]. Our
basic assumption is that such a language, L(S), can be associated with each
system S. A physical theory of S then corresponds to a representation of
L(S) in an appropriate topos.
The symbols of L(S). We first consider the minimal set of symbols needed
to handle elementary physics. For more sophisticated theories in physics it
will be necessary to change, or enlarge, this set of ‘ground-type’ symbols.
The symbols for the local language, L(S), are defined recursively as fol-
lows:
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1. (a) The basic type symbols are 1,Ω,Σ,R. The last two, Σ and R, are
known as ground-type symbols. They are the linguistic precursors
of the state object, and quantity-value object, respectively.
If T1, T2, . . . , Tn, n ≥ 1, are type symbols, then so is40 T1 × T2 ×
· · · × Tn.
(b) If T is a type symbol, then so is PT .
2. (a) For each type symbol, T , there is associated a countable set of
variables of type T .
(b) There is a special symbol ∗.
3. (a) To each pair (T1, T2) of type symbols there is associated a set,
FL(S)(T1, T2), of function symbols. Such a symbol, A, is said to
have signature T1 → T2; this is indicated by writing A : T1 → T2.
(b) Some of these sets of function symbols may be empty. However, in
our case, particular importance is attached to the set, FL(S)(Σ,R),
of function symbols A : Σ→R, and we assume this set is non-
empty.
The function symbols A : Σ → R represent the ‘physical quantities’ of
the system, and hence FL(S)(Σ,R) will depend on the system S. In fact,
the only parts of the language that are system-dependent are these function
symbols. The set FL(S)(Σ,R) is the analogue of the set, Q(S), of physical
quantities associated with the propositional language PL(S).
For example, if S1 is a point particle moving in one dimension, the
set of physical quantities could be chosen to be FL(S1)(Σ,R) = {x, p,H}
which represent the position, momentum, and energy of the system. On
the other hand, if S2 is a particle moving in three dimensions, we could
have FL(S2)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, H} to allow for three-dimensional po-
sition and momentum (with respect to some given Euclidean coordinate
system). Or, we could decide to add angular momentum too, to give the
set FL(S2)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}. A still further extension
would be to add the quantities x · n and p ·m for all unit vectors n and m;
and so on.
Note that, as with the propositional language PL(S), the fact that a given
system has a specific Hamiltonian41—expressed as a particular function of
position and momentum coordinates—is not something that is to be coded
40By definition, if n = 0 then T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn := 1.
41It must be emphasised once more that the use of a local language is not restricted to
standard, canonical systems in which the concept of a ‘Hamiltonian’ is meaningful. The
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into the language: instead, such system dependence arises in the choice of
representation of the language. This means that many different systems can
have the same local language.
Finally, it should be emphasised that this list of symbols is minimal and
one will certainly want to add more. One obvious, general, example is a type
symbol N that is to be interpreted as the linguistic analogue of the natural
numbers. The language could then be augmented with the axioms of Peano
arithmetic.
The terms of L(S). The next step is to enumerate the ‘terms’ in the
language, together with their associated types [8, 52]:
1. (a) For each type symbol T , the variables of type T are terms of type
T .
(b) The symbol ∗ is a term of type 1.
(c) A term of type Ω is called a formula; a formula with no free
variables is called a sentence.
2. If A is function symbol with signature T1 → T2, and t is a term of type
T1, then A(t) is term of type T2.
In particular, if A : Σ → R is a physical quantity, and t is a term of
type Σ, then A(t) is a term of type R.
3. (a) If t1, t2, . . . , tn are terms of type T1, T2, . . . , Tn, then 〈t1, t2, . . . , tn〉
is a term of type T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn.
(b) If t is a term of type T1×T2×· · ·×Tn, and if 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then (t)i
is a term of type Ti.
4. (a) If ω is a term of type Ω, and x˜ is a variable of type T , then {x˜ | ω}
is a term of type PT .
(b) If t1, t2 are terms of the same type, then ‘t1 = t2’ is a term of type
Ω.
(c) If t1, t2 are terms of type T, PT respectively, then t1 ∈ t2 is a term
of type Ω.
scope of the linguistic ideas is much wider than that and the canonical systems are only
an example. Indeed, our long-term interest is in the application of these ideas to quantum
gravity where the local language is likely to be very different from that used here. However,
we anticipate that the basic ideas will be the same.
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Note that the logical operations are not included in the set of symbols.
Instead, they can all be defined using what is already given. For example,
(i) true := (∗ = ∗); and (ii) if α and β are terms of type Ω, then42 α ∧ β :=(〈α, β〉 = 〈true, true〉). Thus, in terms of the original set of symbols, we have
α ∧ β := (〈α, β〉 = 〈∗ = ∗, ∗ = ∗〉) (4.1)
and so on.
Terms of particular interest to us. Let A be a physical quantity in the
set FL(S)
(
Σ,R), and therefore a function symbol of signature Σ → R. In
addition, let ∆˜ be a variable (and therefore a term) of type PR; and let s˜ be
a variable (and therefore a term) of type Σ. Then some terms of particular
interest to us are the following:
1. A(s˜) is a term of type R with a free variable, s˜, of type Σ.
2. ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is a term of type Ω with free variables (i) s˜ of type Σ; and
(ii) ∆˜ of type PR.
3. {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} is a term of type PΣ with a free variable ∆˜ of type
PR.
As we shall see, ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is an analogue of the primitive propositions
“Aε∆” in the propositional language PL(S). However, there is a crucial
difference. In PL(S), the ‘∆’ in “Aε∆” is a specific subset of the external
(to the language) real line R. On the other hand, in the local language L(S),
the ‘∆˜’ in ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is an internal variable within the language.
Adding axioms to the language. To make the language L(S) into a
deductive system we need to add a set of appropriate axioms and rules of
inference. The former are expressed using sequents : defined as expressions
of the form Γ : α where α is a formula (a term of type Ω) and Γ is a set of
such formula. The intention is that ‘Γ : α’ is to be read intuitively as “the
collection of formula in Γ ‘imply’ α”. If Γ is empty we just write : α.
The basic axioms include things like ‘α : α’ (tautology), and ‘: t˜ ∈ {t˜ |
42The parentheses ( ) are not symbols in the language, they are just a way of grouping
letters and sentences. The same remark applies to the inverted commas ‘’.
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α} ⇔ α’ (comprehension) where t˜ is a variable of type T . These axioms43
and the rules of inference (sophisticated analogues of modus ponens) give rise
to a deductive system using intuitionistic logic. For the details see [8, 52].
For applications in physics we could, and presumably should, add extra
axioms (in the form of sequents). For example, perhaps the quantity-value
object should always be an abelian-group object, or at least a semi-group44?
This can be coded into the language by adding the axioms for an abelian
group structure for R. This involves the following steps:
1. Add the following symbols:
(a) A ‘unit’ function symbol 0 : 1 → R; this will be the linguistic
analogue of the unit element in an abelian group.
(b) An ‘addition’ function symbol + : R×R → R.
(c) An ‘inverse’ function symbol − : R→ R
2. Then add axioms like ‘: ∀r˜( + 〈r˜, 0(∗)〉 = r˜)’ where r˜ is a variable of
type R, and so on.
For another example, consider a point particle moving in three dimen-
sions, with the function symbols FL(S)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}.
As L(S) stands, there is no way to specify, for example, that ‘Jx = ypz−zpy’.
Such relations can only be implemented in a representation of the language.
However, if this relation is felt to be ‘universal’ (i.e., if it is expected to
hold in all physically-relevant representations) then it could be added to the
language with the use of extra axioms.
43The complete set is [8]:
Tautology: α = α
Unity : x˜1 = ∗ where x˜1 is a variable of type 1.
Equality: x = y, α(z˜/x) : α(z˜/y). Here, α(z˜/x) is the term α with z˜ replaced
by the term x for each free occurrence of the variable z˜. The terms
x and y must be of the same type as z˜.
Products: : (〈x1, . . . , xn〉)i = xi
: x = 〈(x)1, . . . , (x)n〉
Comprehension: : t˜ ∈ {t˜ | α} ⇔ α
44One could go even further and add the axioms for real numbers. However, the example
of quantum theory suggests that this is inappropriate: in general, the quantity-value object
will not be the real-number object [23].
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One of the delicate decisions that has to be made about L(S) is what
extra axioms to add to the base language. Too few, and the language lacks
content; too many, and representations of potential physical significance are
excluded. This is one of the places in the formalism where a degree of physical
insight is necessary!
4.2 Representing L(S) in a Topos
The construction of a theory of the system S involves choosing a represen-
tation45/model, φ, of the language L(S) in a topos46 τφ. The choice of both
topos and representation depend on the theory-type being used.
For example, consider a system, S, that can be treated using both clas-
sical physics and quantum physics, such as a point particle moving in three
dimensions. Then, for the application of the theory-type ‘classical physics’,
in a representation denoted σ, the topos τσ is Sets, and Σ is represented
by the symplectic manifold Σσ := T
∗R3; R is represented by the usual real
numbers R.
On the other hand, as we shall see in Section 5, for the application of
the theory-type ‘quantum physics’, τφ is the topos, Sets
V(H)op , of presheaves
over the category47 V(H), where H ≃ L2(R3, d3x) is the Hilbert space of the
system S. In this case, Σ is represented by Σφ := Σ, where Σ is the spectral
presheaf; this representation is discussed at length in Sections 5. For both
theory types, the details of, for example, the Hamiltonian, are coded in the
representation.
We now list the τφ-representation of the most significant symbols and
terms in our language, L(S) (we have picked out only the parts that are
immediately relevant to our programme: for full details see [8, 52]).
1. (a) The ground type symbols Σ and R are represented by objects Σφ
and Rφ in τφ. These are identified physically as the state object
45The word ‘interpretation’ is often used in the mathematical literature, but we want
to reserve that for use in discussions of interpretations of quantum theory, and the like.
46A more comprehensive notation is τφ(S), which draws attention to the system S under
discussion; similarly, the state object could be written as Σφ,S, and so on. This extended
notation is used in Section 11 where we are concerned with the relations between different
systems, and then it is essential to indicate which system is meant. However, in the present
article, only one system at a time is being considered, and so the truncated notation is
fine.
47We recall that the objects in V(H) are the unital, commutative von Neumann sub-
algebras of the algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H. We will explain, and
motivate, this later.
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and quantity-value object, respectively.
(b) The symbol Ω, is represented by Ωφ := Ωτφ , the sub-object classi-
fier of the topos τφ.
(c) The symbol 1, is represented by 1φ := 1τφ, the terminal object in
τφ.
2. For each type symbol PT , we have (PT )φ := PTφ, the power object of
the object Tφ in τφ.
In particular, (PΣ)φ = PΣφ and (PR)φ = PRφ.
3. Each function symbol A : Σ → R in FL(S)
(
Σ,R) (i.e., each physical
quantity) is represented by an arrow Aφ : Σφ →Rφ in τφ.
We will generally require the representation to be faithful : i.e., the map
A 7→ Aφ is one-to-one.
4. A term of type Ω of the form ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ (which has free variables s˜, ∆˜
of type Σ and PR respectively) is represented by an arrow [[A(s˜) ∈
∆˜ ]]φ : Σφ × PRφ → Ωτφ . In detail, this arrow is
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ = eRφ ◦ 〈[[A(s˜) ]]φ, [[ ∆˜ ]]φ〉 (4.2)
where eRφ : Rφ × PRφ → Ωτφ is the usual evaluation map; [[A(s˜) ]]φ :
Σφ → Rφ is the arrow Aφ; and [[ ∆˜ ]]φ : PRφ → PRφ is the identity.
Thus [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ is the chain of arrows:
Σφ × PRφ
Aφ×id−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ−→Ωτφ . (4.3)
We see that the analogue of the ‘∆’ used in the PL(S)-proposition
“Aε∆” is played by sub-objects of Rφ (i.e., global elements of PRφ)
in the domain of the arrow in (4.3). These objects are, of course,
representation-dependent (i.e., they depend on φ).
5. A term of type PΣ of the form {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} (which has a free
variable ∆˜ of type PR) is represented by an arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ :
PRφ → PΣφ. This arrow is the power transpose48of [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ:
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ = p[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φq (4.4)
48One of the basic properties of a topos is that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between arrows f : A × B → Ω and arrows pfq : B → PA := ΩA. In general, pfq is
called the power transpose of f . If B ≃ 1 then pfq is known as the name of the arrow
f : A→ Ω.
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6. A term, ω, of type Ω with no free variables is represented by a global
element [[ω ]]φ : 1τφ → Ωτφ . These will typically act as ‘truth values’ for
propositions about the system.
7. Any axioms that have been added to the language are required to be
represented by the arrow true : 1τφ → Ωτφ .
4.2.1 The Local Set Theory of a Topos.
We should emphasise that the decision to focus on the particular type of
language that we have, is not an arbitrary one. Indeed, there is a deep
connection between such languages and topos theory.
In this context, we first note that to any local language, L, there is
associated a ‘local set theory’. This involves defining an ‘L-set’ to be a term
X of power type (so that expressions of the form x ∈ X are meaningful)
and with no free variables. Analogues of all the usual set operations can be
defined on L-sets. For example, if X, Y are L-sets of type PT , one can define
X ∩ Y := {x˜ | x˜ ∈ X ∧ x˜ ∈ Y } where x˜ is a variable of type T .
Furthermore, each local language, L, gives rise to an associated topos,
C(L), whose objects are equivalence classes of L-sets, where X ≡ Y is defined
to mean that the equation X = Y (i.e., a term of type Ω with no free
variables) can be proved using the sequent calculus of the language with its
axioms. From this perspective, a representation of the system-language L(S)
in a topos τ is equivalent to a functor from the topos C(L(S)) to τ .
4.2.2 Theory Construction as a Translation of Languages
Conversely, for each topos τ there is a local language, L(τ), whose ground-
type symbols are the objects of τ , and whose function symbols are the arrows
in τ . It then follows that a representation of a local language, L, in τ is
equivalent to a ‘translation’ of L in L(τ).
Thus constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to
finding a suitable translation of the system language,
L(S), to the language, L(τ), of an appropriate topos τ .
As we will see later, the idea of translating one local language into another
plays a central role in the discussion of composite systems and sub-systems.
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In the case of spoken languages, one can translate from, say, (i) English
to German; or (ii) from English to Greek, and then from Greek to German.
However, no matter how good the translators, these two ways of going from
English to German will generally not agree. This is partly because the trans-
lation process is not unique, but also because each language possesses certain
intrinsic features that simply do not admit of translation.
There is an interesting analogous question for the representation of the
local languages L(S). Namely, suppose φ1 : L(S)→ L(τφ1) and φ2 : L(S)→
L(τφ2) are two different topos theories of the same system S (these could
be, say, classical physics and quantum physics). The question is if/when will
there be a translation φ12 : L(τφ1)→ L(τφ2) such that
φ2 = φ12 ◦ φ1 (4.5)
In terms of the representation functors from the topos C(L(S)) to the topoi
τφ1 and τφ2 , the question is if there exists an interpolating functor from τφ1
to τφ2 .
In Section 12.2, we will introduce a certain category, M(Sys), whose
objects are topoi and whose arrows are geometric morphisms between topoi.
It would be natural to require the arrow from τφ1 to τφ2 (if it exists) to be
an arrow in this category.
It is at this point that ‘geometric logic’ enters the scene (cf. Section 3.2.3).
A formula in L(S) is said to be positive if it does not contain the symbols49
⇒ or ∀. These conditions imply that ¬ is also absent. In fact, a positive
formula uses only ∃,∧ and ∨. A disjunction can have an arbitrary index
set, but a conjunction can have only a finite index set. A sentence of the
form ∀x(α ⇒ β) is said to be a geometric implication if both α and β are
positive. Then a geometric logic is one in which only geometric implications
are present in the language.
The advantage of using just the geometric part of logic is that
geometric implications are preserved under geometric morphisms.
This makes it appropriate to ask for the existence of ‘geometric
translations’ φ12 : L(τφ1) → L(τφ2), as in (4.5), since these will
preserve the logical structure of the language L(S).
The notion of ‘toinvariance’ introduced recently by Landsmann [53] can
be interpreted within our structures as asserting that the translations φ12 :
49Here, the formula α ⇒ β is defined as α ⇒ β := (α ∧ β) = α; ∀ is defined as
∀xα := ({x | α} = {x | true}); where true := ∗ = ∗
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L(τφ1) → L(τφ2) should always exist; or, at least, they should under appro-
priate conditions. Of course, the significance of this depends on how much
information about the system is reflected in the language L(S) and how much
in the individual representations.
For example, in the case of classical and quantum physics, one might go
so far as to include information about the dynamics of the system within the
local language L(S). If the topoi φ1 and φ2 are those for the classical and
quantum physics of S respectively (so that φ1 is Sets and φ2 is Sets
V(H)op),
then an interpolating translation φ12 : L(Sets)→ L(SetsV(H)op) would be a
nice realisation of Landsmann’s long-term goal of regarding quantisation as
some type of functorial operation.
Of course, introducing dynamics raises interesting questions about the
status of the concept of ‘time’ (cf the discussion in Section 3.2.4). In par-
ticular, is time to be identified as an object in representing topos, or is it
an external parameter, like the ‘∆’ quantities in the propositional languages
PL(S)?
4.3 Classical Physics in the Local Language L(S)
The quantum theory representation of L(S) is studied in Section 5. Here we
will look at the concrete form of the expressions above for the example of
classical physics. In this case, for all systems S, and all classical representa-
tions, σ, the topos τσ is Sets. This representation of L(S) has the following
ingredients:
1. (a) The ground-type symbol Σ is represented by a symplectic mani-
fold, Σσ, that is the state-space for the system S.
(b) The ground-type symbol R is represented by the real line, i.e.,
Rσ := R.
(c) The type symbol PΣ is represented by the set, PΣσ, of all
50 sub-
sets of the state space Σσ.
The type symbol PR is represented by the set, PR, of all subsets
of R.
2. (a) The type symbol Ω, is represented by ΩSets := {0, 1}: the sub-
object classifier in Sets.
50To be super precise, we really need to use the collection PBorΣσ of all Borel subsets
of Σσ.
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(b) The type symbol 1, is represented by the singleton set: i.e., 1Sets =
{∗}, the terminal object in Sets.
3. Each function symbol A : Σ→R, and hence each physical quantity, is
represented by a real-valued function, Aσ : Σσ → R, on the state space
Σσ.
4. The term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ of type Ω (where s˜ and ∆˜ are free variables of
type Σ and PR respectively) is represented by the function [[A(s˜) ∈
∆˜ ]]σ : Σσ × PR → {0, 1} that is defined by (c.f. (4.3))
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ(s,∆) =
{
1 if Aσ(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(4.6)
for all (s,∆) ∈ Σσ × PR.
5. The term {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} of type PΣ (where ∆˜ is a free variable of type
PR) is represented by the function [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]σ : PR → PΣσ
that is defined by
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]σ(∆) := {s ∈ Σφ | Aσ(s) ∈ ∆}
= A−1σ (∆) (4.7)
for all ∆ ∈ PR.
4.4 Adapting the Language L(S) to Other Types of
Physical System
Our central contention in this work is that (i) each physical system, S, can be
equipped with a local language, L(S); and (ii) constructing an explicit theory
of S in a particular theory-type is equivalent to finding a representation of
L(S) in a topos which may well be other than the topos of sets.
There are many situations in which the language is independent of the
theory-type, and then, for a given system S, the different topos representa-
tions of L(S) correspond to the application of the different theory-types to the
same system S. We gave an example earlier of a point particle moving in three
dimensions: the classical physics representation is in the topos Sets, but the
quantum-theory representation is in the presheaf topos SetsV(L
2(R3, d3x)) .
However, there are other situations where the relationship between the
language and its representations is more complicated than this. In particular,
there is the critical question about what features of the theory should go into
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the language, and what into the representation. The first step in adding new
features is to augment the set of ground-type symbols. This is because these
represent the entities that are going to be of generic interest (such as a state
object or quantity-value object). In doing this, extra axioms may also be
introduced to encode the properties that the new objects are expected to
possess in all representations of physical interest.
For example, suppose we want to use our formalism to discuss space-
time physics: where does the information about the space-time go? If the
subject is classical field theory in a curved space-time, then the topos τ is
Sets, and the space-time manifold is part of the background structure. This
makes it natural to have the manifold assumed in the representation; i.e., the
information about the space-time is in the representation.
Alternatively, one can add a new ground type symbol, ‘M ’, to the lan-
guage, to serve as the linguistic progenitor of ‘space-time’; thusM would have
the same theoretical status as the symbols Σ and R. In this context, we re-
call the brief discussion in Section 2.2.1 about the use of the real numbers
in modelling space and/or time, and the motivation this provides for repre-
senting space-time as an object in a topos, and whose sub-objects represent
the fundamental ‘regions’.
If ‘M ’ is added to the language, a function symbol ψ : M →R is then the
progenitor of a physical field. In a representation, φ, the object Mφ plays the
role of ‘space-time’ in the topos τφ, and ψφ : Mφ →Rφ is the representation
of the field.
Of course, the language L(S) says nothing about what sort of entityMφ is,
except in so far as such information is encoded in extra axioms. For example,
if the subject is classical field theory, then τφ = Sets, and Mφ would be a
standard differentiable manifold. On the other hand, if the topos τφ admits
‘infinitesimals’, then Mφ could be a manifold according to the language of
synthetic differential geometry [51].
The same type of argument applies to the status of ‘time’ in a canonical
theory. In particular, it would be possible to add a ground-type symbol,
T , so that, in any representation, φ, the object Tφ in the topos τφ is the
analogue of the ‘time-line’ for that theory. For standard physics in Sets we
have Tφ = R, but the form of Tφ in a more general topos, τφ, would be a rich
subject for speculation.
The addition of a ‘time-type’ symbol, T , to the language L(S) is a prime
example of a situation where one might want to add extra axioms. These
could involve ordering properties, or algebraic properties like those of an
abelian group, and so on. In any topos representation, these properties would
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then be realised as the corresponding type of object in τφ. Thus abelian group
axioms mean that Tφ is an abelian-group object in the topos τφ; total-ordering
axioms for the time-type T mean that Tφ is a totally-ordered object in τφ,
and so on.
As an interesting extension of this idea, one could have a space-time
ground type symbol M , but then add the axioms for a partial ordering. In
that case, Mφ would be a poset-object in τφ, which could be interpreted
physically as the τφ-analogue of a causal set [27].
5 Quantum Propositions as Sub-Objects of
the Spectral Presheaf
5.1 Some Background Remarks
5.1.1 The Kochen-Specker Theorem
The idea of representing quantum theory in a topos of presheaves stemmed
originally [44] from a desire to acquire a new perspective on the Kochen-
Specker theorem [50]. It will be helpful at this stage to review some of this
older material.
A commonsense belief, and one apparently shared by Heidegger, is that
at any given time any physical quantity must have a value even if we do not
know what it is. In classical physics, this is not problematic since the under-
lying mathematical structure is geared precisely to realise it. Specifically, if
S is the state space of some classical system, and if the physical quantity A
is represented by a real-valued function A˘ : S → R, then the value Vs(A) of
A in any state s ∈ S is simply
V s(A) = A˘(s). (5.1)
Thus all physical quantities possess a value in any state. Furthermore, if
h : R → R is a real-valued function, a new physical quantity h(A) can be
defined by requiring the associated function ˘h(A) to be
˘h(A)(s) := h(A˘(s)) (5.2)
for all s ∈ S; i.e., ˘h(A) := h ◦ A˘ : S → R. Thus the physical quantity h(A)
is defined by saying that its value in any state s is the result of applying the
function h to the value of A; hence, by definition, the values of the physical
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quantities h(A) and A satisfy the ‘functional composition principle’
V s(h(A)) = h(V s(A)) (5.3)
for all states s ∈ S.
However, standard quantum theory precludes any such naive realist in-
terpretation of the relation between formalism and physical world. And this
obstruction comes from the mathematical formalism itself, in the guise of
the famous Kochen-Specker theorem which asserts the impossibility of as-
signing values to all physical quantities whilst, at the same time, preserving
the functional relations between them [50].
In a quantum theory, a physical quantity A is represented by a self-adjoint
operator Aˆ on the Hilbert space of the system, and the first thing one has to
decide is whether to regard a valuation as a function of the physical quantities
themselves, or on the operators that represent them. From a mathematical
perspective, the latter strategy is preferable, and we shall therefore define
a valuation to be a real-valued function V on the set of all bounded, self-
adjoint operators, with the properties that : (i) the value V (Aˆ) of the physical
quantity A represented by the operator Aˆ belongs to the spectrum of Aˆ (the
so-called ‘value rule’); and (ii) the functional composition principle (or FUNC
for short) holds:
V (Bˆ) = h(V (Aˆ)) (5.4)
for any pair of self-adjoint operators Aˆ, Bˆ such that Bˆ = h(Aˆ) for some real-
valued function h. If they existed, such valuations could be used to embed the
set of self-adjoint operators in the commutative ring of real-valued functions
on an underlying space of microstates, thereby laying the foundations for a
hidden-variable interpretation of quantum theory.
Several important results follow from the definition of a valuation. For
example, if Aˆ1 and Aˆ2 commute, it follows from the spectral theorem that
there exists an operator Cˆ and functions h1 and h2 such that Aˆ1 = h1(Cˆ)
and Aˆ2 = h2(Cˆ). It then follows from FUNC that
V (Aˆ1 + Aˆ2) = V (Aˆ1) + V (Aˆ2) (5.5)
and
V (Aˆ1Aˆ2) = V (Aˆ1)V (Aˆ2). (5.6)
The defining equation (5.4)) for a valuation makes sense whatever the
nature of the spectrum sp(Aˆ) of the operator Aˆ. However, if sp(Aˆ) contains
a continuous part, one might doubt the physical meaning of assigning one
of its elements as a value. To handle the more general case, we shall view
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a valuation as primarily giving truth-values to propositions about the values
of a physical quantity, rather than assigning a specific value to the quantity
itself.
As in Section 3, the propositions concerned are of the type “Aε∆”, which
(in a realist reading) asserts that the value of the physical quantity A lies
in the (Borel) subset ∆ of the spectrum sp(Aˆ) of the associated operator Aˆ.
This proposition is represented by the spectral projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆], which
motivates studying the general mathematical problem of assigning truth-
values to projection operators.
If Pˆ is a projection operator, the identity Pˆ = Pˆ 2 implies that V (Pˆ ) =
V (Pˆ 2) = (V (Pˆ ))2 (from (5.6)); and hence, necessarily, V (Pˆ ) = 0 or 1. Thus
V defines a homomorphism from the Boolean algebra {0ˆ, 1ˆ, Pˆ ,¬Pˆ ≡ (1ˆ−Pˆ )}
to the ‘false(0)-true(1)’ Boolean algebra {0, 1}. More generally, a valuation
V induces a homomorphism χV : W → {0, 1} where W is any Boolean
sub-algebra of the lattice P(H) of projectors on H. In particular,
αˆ  βˆ implies χV (αˆ) ≤ χV (βˆ) (5.7)
where ‘αˆ  βˆ’ refers to the partial ordering in the lattice P(H), and ‘χV (αˆ) ≤
χV (βˆ)’ is the ordering in the Boolean algebra {0, 1}.
The Kochen-Specker theorem asserts that no global valuations exist if the
dimension of the Hilbert space H is greater than two. The obstructions to
the existence of such valuations typically arise when trying to assign a single
value to an operator Cˆ that can be written as Cˆ = g(Aˆ) and as Cˆ = h(Bˆ)
with [Aˆ, Bˆ] 6= 0.
The various interpretations of quantum theory that aspire to use ‘be-
ables’, rather than ‘observables’, are all concerned in one way or another
with addressing this issue. Inherent in such schemes is a type of ‘contextual-
ity’ in which a value given to a physical quantity C cannot be part of a global
assignment of values but must, instead, depend on some context in which C
is to be considered. In practice, contextuality is endemic in any attempt to
ascribe properties to quantities in a quantum theory. For example, as em-
phasized by Bell [9], in the situation where Cˆ = g(Aˆ) = h(Bˆ), if the value
of C is construed counterfactually as referring to what would be obtained if
a measurement of A or of B is made—and with the value of C then being
defined by applying to the result of the measurement the relation C = g(A),
or C = h(B)—then one can claim that the actual value obtained depends on
whether the value of C is determined by measuring A, or by measuring B.
In the programme to be discussed here, the idea of a contextual valuation
will be developed in a different direction from that of the existing modal
50
interpretations in which ‘reality’ is ascribed to only some commutative subset
of physical quantities. In particular, rather than accepting such a limited
domain of beables we shall propose a theory of ‘generalised’ valuations that
are defined globally on all propositions about values of physical quantities.
However, the price of global existence is that any given proposition may
have only a ‘generalised ’ truth-value. More precisely, (i) the truth-value of a
proposition “Aε∆” belongs to a logical structure that is larger than {0, 1};
and (ii) these target-logics, and truth values, are context-dependent.
It is clear that the main task is to formulate mathematically the idea of a
contextual, truth-value in such a way that the assignment of generalised
truth-values is consistent with an appropriate analogue of the functional
composition principle FUNC.
5.1.2 The Introduction of Coarse-Graining
In the original paper [44], this task is tackled using a type of ‘coarse-graining’
operation. The key idea is that, although in a given situation in quantum
theory it may not be possible to declare a particular proposition “Aε∆” to
be true (or false), nevertheless there may be (Borel) functions f such that the
associated propositions “f(A) ε f(∆)” can be said to be true. This possibility
arises for the following reason.
Let WA denote the spectral algebra of the operator Aˆ that represents a
physical quantity A. Thus WA is the Boolean algebra of projectors Eˆ[A ∈
∆] that project onto the eigenspaces associated with the Borel subsets ∆
of the spectrum sp(Aˆ) of Aˆ; physically speaking, Eˆ[Aε∆] represents the
proposition “Aε∆”. It follows from the spectral theorem that, for all Borel
subsets J of the spectrum of f(Aˆ), the spectral projector Eˆ[f(A) ε J ] for
the operator f(Aˆ) is equal to the spectral projector Eˆ[Aε f−1(J)] for Aˆ. In
particular, if f(∆) is a Borel subset of sp(f(Aˆ)) then, since ∆ ⊆ f−1(f(∆)),
we have Eˆ[Aε∆]  Eˆ[Aε f−1(f(∆))]; and hence
Eˆ[Aε∆]  Eˆ[f(A) ε f(∆)]. (5.8)
Physically, the inequality in (5.8) reflects the fact that the proposition
“f(A) ε f(∆)” is generally weaker than the proposition “Aε∆” in the sense
that the latter implies the former, but not necessarily vice versa. For example,
the proposition “f(A) = f(a)” is weaker than the original proposition “A =
a” if the function f is many-to-one and such that more than one eigenvalue
of Aˆ is mapped to the same eigenvalue of f(Aˆ). In general, we shall say that
“f(A) ε f(∆)” is a coarse-graining of “Aε∆”.
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Now, if the proposition “Aε∆” is evaluated as ‘true’ then, from (5.7) and
(5.8), it follows that the weaker proposition “f(A) ε f(∆)” is also evaluated
as ‘true’.
This remark provokes the following observation. There may be situations
in which, although the proposition “Aε∆” cannot be said to be either true
or false, the weaker proposition “f(A) ε f(∆)” can. In particular, if the lat-
ter can be given the value ‘true’, then—by virtue of the remark above—it
is natural to suppose that any further coarse-graining to give an operator
g(f(Aˆ)) will yield a proposition “g(f(A)) ∈ g(f(∆))” that will also be eval-
uated as ‘true’. Note that there may be more than one possible choice for
the ‘initial’ function f , each of which can then be further coarse-grained in
this way. This multi-branched picture of coarse-graining is one of the main
justifications for our invocation of the topos-theoretic idea of a presheaf.
It transpires that the key remark above is the statement:
If “f(A) ε f(∆)” is true, then so is “g(f(A) ε g(f(∆)”
for any function g : R → R.
This is key because the property thus asserted can be restated by saying
that the collection of all functions f such that “f(A) ε f(∆)” is ‘true’ is a
sieve; and sieves are closely associated with global elements of the sub-object
classifier in a category of presheaves.
To clarify this we start by defining a category O whose objects are the
bounded, self-adjoint operators on H. For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume for the moment that O consists only of the operators whose spectrum
is discrete. Then we say that there is a ‘morphism’ from Bˆ to Aˆ if there exists
a Borel function (more precisely, an equivalence class of Borel functions)
f : sp(Aˆ)→ R such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), where sp(Aˆ) is the spectrum of Aˆ. Any
such function on sp(Aˆ) is unique (up to the equivalence relation), and hence
there is at most one morphism between any two operators. If Bˆ = f(Aˆ), the
corresponding morphism in the category O will be denoted fO : Bˆ → Aˆ. It
then becomes clear that the statement in the box above is equivalent to the
statement that the collection of all functions f such that “f(A) ε f(∆)” is
‘true’, is a sieve51 on the object Aˆ in the category O.
This motivates very strongly looking at the topos category, SetsO
op
of
contravariant52, set-valued functors on O. Then, bearing in mind our dis-
51It is a matter of convention whether this is called a sieve or a co-sieve.
52Ab initio, we could just as well have looked at covariant functors, but with our defi-
nitions the contravariant ones are more natural.
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cussion of values of physical quantities, it is rather natural to construct the
following object in this topos:
Definition 5.1 The spectral presheaf on O is the contravariant functor Σ :
O → Sets defined as follows:
1. On objects: Σ(Aˆ) := sp(Aˆ).
2. On morphisms: If fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then Σ(fO) :
σ(Aˆ)→ σ(Bˆ) is defined by Σ(fO)(λ) := f(λ) for all λ ∈ σ(Aˆ).
Note that Σ(fO) is well-defined since, if λ ∈ σ(Aˆ), then f(λ) is indeed an
element of the spectrum of Bˆ; indeed, for these discrete-spectrum operators
we have σ(f(Aˆ)) = f(σ(Aˆ)).
The key remark now is the following. If C is any category, a global element ,
of a contravariant functor X : C → Sets is defined to be a function γ that
assigns to each object A in the category C an element γA ∈ X(A) in such
a way that if f : B → A then X(f)(γA) = γB (see Appendix 2 for more
details).
In the case of the spectral functor Σ, a global element is therefore a
function γ that assigns to each (bounded, discrete spectrum) self-adjoint
operator Aˆ, a real number γA ∈ sp(Aˆ) such that if Bˆ = f(Aˆ) then f(γA) =
γB. But this is precisely the condition FUNC in Eq. (5.4) for a valuation!
Thus, the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the
statement that, if dimH > 2, the spectral presheaf Σ
has no global elements.
It was this observation that motivated the original suggestion by one of
us (CJI) and his collaborators that quantum theory should be studied from
the perspective of topos theory. However, as it stands, the discussion above
works only for operators with a discrete spectrum. This is fine for finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces, but in an infinite-dimensional space operators
can have continuous parts in their spectra, and then things get more com-
plicated.
One powerful way of tackling this problem is to replace the category
of operators with a category, V(H), whose objects are commutative von
Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra B(H) of all bounded operators on H.
There is a close link with the category C since each self-adjoint operator
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generates a commutative von Neumann algebra, but using V(H) rather than
C solves all the problems associated with continuous spectra [35].
Of course, this particular motivation for introducing V(H) is purely math-
ematical, but there are also very good physics reasons for this step. As we
have mentioned earlier, one approach to handling the implications of the
Kochen-Specker theorem is to ‘reify’ only a subset of physical variables, as is
done in the various ‘modal interpretations’. The topos-theoretic extension of
this idea of ‘partial reification’, first proposed in [44, 45, 35, 13], is to build a
structure in which all possible reifiable sets of physical variables are included
on an equal footing. This involves constructing a category, C, whose objects
are collections of quantum observables that can be simultaneously reified be-
cause the corresponding self-adjoint operators commute. The application of
this type of topos scheme to an actual modal interpretation is discussed in
the recent paper by Nakayama [62]
From a physical perspective, the objects in the category C can be viewed
as contexts (or ‘world-views’, or ‘windows on reality’, or ‘classical snapshots’)
from whose perspectives the quantum theory can be displayed. This is the
physical motivation for using commutative von Neumann algebras.
In the normal, instrumentalist interpretation of quantum theory, a con-
text is therefore a collection of physical variables that can be measured si-
multaneously. The physical significance of this contextual logic is discussed
at length in [44, 45, 35, 13, 46] and [22, 23].
5.1.3 Alternatives to von Neumann Algebras
It should be remarked that V(H) is not the only possible choice for the cate-
gory of concepts. Another possibility is to construct a category whose objects
are the Boolean sub-algebras of the non-distributive lattice of projection op-
erators on the Hilbert space; more generally we could consider the Boolean
sub-algebras of any non-distributive lattice. This option was discussed in
[44].
Yet another possibility is to consider the abelian C∗-sub-algebras of the
algebra B(H) of all bounded operators on H. More generally, one could con-
sider the abelian sub-algebras of any C∗-algebra; this is the option adopted by
Heunen and Spitters [38] in their very interesting recent development of our
scheme. One disadvantage of a C∗-algebra is that does not contain projectors,
and if one wants to include them it is necessary to move to AW∗-algebras,
which are the abstract analogue of the concrete von Neumann algebras that
we employ. For each of these choices there is a corresponding spectral object,
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and these different spectral objects are closely related.
It is clear that a similar procedure could be followed for any algebraic
quantity A that has an ‘interesting’ collection of commutative sub-algebras.
We will return to this remark in Section 14.1.4.
5.2 From Projections to Global Elements of the Outer
Presheaf
5.2.1 The Definition of δ(Pˆ )V
The fundamental thesis of our work is that in constructing theories of physics
one should seek representations of a formal language in a topos that may be
other than Sets. We want now to study this idea closely in the context of
the ‘toposification’ of standard quantum theory, with particular emphasis on
a topos representation of propositions. Most ‘standard’ quantum systems
(for example, one-dimensional motion with a Hamiltonian H = p
2
2m
+ V (x))
are obtained by ‘quantising’ a classical system, and consequently the formal
language is the same as it is for the classical system. Our immediate goal is
to represent physical propositions with sub-objects of the spectral presheaf
Σ.
In this Section we concentrate on the propositional language PL(S) in-
troduced in Section 3.2. Thus a key task is to find the map πqt : PL(S)0 →
Sub(Σ), where the primitive propositions in PL(S)0 are of the form “Aε∆”.
As we shall see, this is where the critical concept of daseinisation arises: the
procedure whereby a projector Pˆ is transformed to a sub-object, δ(Pˆ ), of the
spectral presheaf, Σ, in the topos SetsV(H)
op
(the precise definition of Σ is
given in Section 5.3.1).
In standard quantum theory, a physical quantity is represented by a self-
adjoint operator Aˆ in the algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H.
If ∆ ⊆ R is a Borel subset, we know from the spectral theorem that the
proposition “Aε∆” is represented by53 the projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] in
B(H). For typographical simplicity, for the rest of this Section, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
will be denoted by Pˆ .
We are going to consider the projection operator Pˆ from the perspective
of the ‘category of contexts’—a keystone of the topos approach to quantum
theory. As we have remarked earlier, there are several possible choices for
53Note, however, that the map from propositions to projections is not injective: two
propositions “Aε∆1” and “Bε∆2” concerning two distinct physical quantities, A and B,
can be represented by the same projector: i.e., Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] = Eˆ[B ∈ ∆2].
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this category most of which are considered in detail in the original papers [44,
45, 35, 13]. Here we have elected to use the category V(H) of unital, abelian
sub-algebras of B(H). This partially-ordered set has a category structure in
which (i) the objects are the abelian sub-algebras of B(H); and (ii) there is
an arrow iV ′V : V
′ → V , where V ′, V ∈ Ob(V(H)),54 if and only if V ′ ⊆ V .
By definition, the trivial sub-algebra V0 = |C1ˆ is not included in the objects of
V(H). A context could also be called a ‘world-view’, a ‘classical snap-shot’, a
‘window on reality’, or even a Weltanschauung55; mathematicians often refer
to it as a ‘stage of truth’.
The critical question is what can be said about the projector Pˆ ‘from the
perspective’ of a particular context V ∈ Ob(V(H))? If Pˆ belongs to V then
a ‘full’ image of Pˆ is obtained from this view-point, and there is nothing
more to say. However, suppose the abelian sub-algebra V does not contain
Pˆ : what then?
We need to ‘approximate’ Pˆ from the perspective of V , and an important
ingredient in our work is to define this as meaning the ‘smallest’ projection
operator, δ(Pˆ )V , in V that is greater than, or equal to, Pˆ :
δ(Pˆ )V :=
∧{
αˆ ∈ P(V ) | αˆ  Pˆ}. (5.9)
where ‘’ is the usual ordering of projection operators, and where P(V )
denotes the set of all projection operators in V .
To see what this means, let Pˆ and Qˆ represent the propositions “Aε∆”
and “Aε∆′” respectively with ∆ ⊆ ∆′, so that Pˆ  Qˆ. Since we learn
less about the value of A from the proposition “Aε∆′” than from “Aε∆”,
the former proposition is said to be weaker. Clearly, the weaker proposition
“Aε∆′” is implied by the stronger proposition “Aε∆”. The construction of
δ(Pˆ )V as the smallest projection in V greater than or equal to Pˆ thus gives
the strongest proposition expressible in V that is implied by Pˆ (although, if
Aˆ /∈ V , the projection δ(Pˆ )V cannot usually be interpreted as a proposition
about A).56 Note that if Pˆ belongs to V , then δ(Pˆ )V = Pˆ . The mapping
Pˆ 7→ δ(Pˆ )V was originally introduced by de Groote in [32], who called it the
‘V -support’ of Pˆ .
54We denote by Ob(C) the collection of all objects in the category C.
55‘Weltanschauung’ is a splendid German word. ‘Welt’ means world; ‘schauen’ is a verb
and means to look, to view; ‘anschauen’ is to look at; and ‘-ung’ at the end of a word can
make a noun from a verb. So it’s Welt-an-schau-ung.
56Note that the definition in (5.9) exploits the fact that the lattice P(V ) of projec-
tion operators in V is complete. This is the main reason why we chose von Neumann
sub-algebras rather than C∗-algebras: the former contain enough projections, and their
projection lattices are complete.
56
The key idea in this part of our scheme is that rather than thinking of a
quantum proposition, “Aε∆”, as being represented by the single projection
operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆], instead we consider the entire collection {δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])
V
|
V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of projection operators, one for each context V . As we will
see, the link with topos theory is that this collection of projectors is a global
element of a certain presheaf.
This ‘certain’ presheaf is in fact the ‘outer’ presheaf, which is defined as
follows:
Definition 5.2 The outer57 presheaf O is defined over the category V(H)
as follows [44, 35]:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): We have OV := P(V )
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping O(iV ′V ) : OV → OV ′ is
given by O(iV ′V )(αˆ) := δ(αˆ)V ′ for all αˆ ∈ P(V ).
With this definition, it is clear that, for each projection operator Pˆ , the
assignment V 7→ δ(Pˆ )V defines a global element of the presheaf O. Indeed,
for each context V , we have the projector δ(Pˆ )V ∈ P(V ) = OV , and if
iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , then
δ
(
δ(Pˆ )V
)
V ′
=
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ′) | Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V
}
= δ(Pˆ )V ′ (5.10)
and so the elements δ(Pˆ )V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), are compatible with the structure
of the outer presheaf. Thus we have a mapping
δ : P(H) → ΓO
Pˆ 7→ {δ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (5.11)
from the projectors in P(H) to the global elements, ΓO, of the outer presheaf.58
57In the original papers by CJI and collaborators, this was called the ‘coarse-graining’
presheaf, and was denoted G. The reason for the change of nomenclature will become
apparent later.
58Vis-a-vis our use of the language L(S) a little further on, we should emphasise that
the outer presheaf has no linguistic precursor, and in this sense, it has no fundamental
status in the theory. In fact, we could avoid the outer presheaf altogether and always work
directly with the spectral presheaf, Σ, which, of course, does have a linguistic precursor.
However, it is technically convenient to introduce the outer presheaf as an intermediate
tool.
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5.2.2 Properties of the Mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO.
Let us now note some properties of the map δ : P(H)→ ΓO that are relevant
to our overall scheme.
1. For all contexts V , we have δ(0ˆ)V = 0ˆ.
The null projector represents all propositions of the form “Aε∆” with
the property that sp(Aˆ)∩∆ = ∅. These propositions are trivially false.
2. For all contexts V , we have δ(1ˆ)V = 1ˆ.
The unit operator 1ˆ represents all propositions of the form “Aε∆” with
the property that sp(Aˆ) ∩∆ = sp(Aˆ). These propositions are trivially
true.
3. There exist global elements of O that are not of the form δ(Pˆ ) for any
projector Pˆ . This phenomenon will be discussed later. However, if
γ ∈ ΓO is of the form δ(Pˆ ) for some Pˆ , then
Pˆ =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δ(Pˆ )V , (5.12)
because δ(Pˆ )V  Pˆ for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), and δ(Pˆ )V = Pˆ for any V
that contains Pˆ .
The next result is important as it means that ‘nothing is lost’ in mapping
a projection operator Pˆ to its associated global element, δ(Pˆ ), of the presheaf
O.
Theorem 5.1 The map δ : P(H)→ ΓO is injective.
This simply follows from (5.12): if δ(Pˆ ) = δ(Qˆ) for two projections Pˆ , Qˆ,
then
Pˆ =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δ(Pˆ )V =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δ(Qˆ)V = Qˆ. (5.13)
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5.2.3 A Logical Structure for ΓO?
We have seen that the quantities δ(Pˆ ) := {δ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}, Pˆ ∈
P(H), are elements of ΓO, and if they are to represent quantum propositions,
one might expect/hope that (i) these global elements of O form a Heyting
algebra; and (ii) this algebra is related in some way to the Heyting algebra
of sub-objects of Σ. Let us see how far we can go in this direction.
Our first remark is that any two global elements γ1, γ2 of O can be com-
pared at each stage V in the sense of logical implication. More precisely, let
γ1V ∈ P(V ) denote the V ’th ‘component’ of γ1, and ditto for γ2V . Then we
have the following result:
Definition 5.3 A partial ordering on ΓO can be constructed in a ‘local’ way
(i.e., ‘local’ with respect to the objects in the category V(H)) by defining
γ1  γ2 if, and only if, ∀V ∈ Ob(V(H)), γ1V  γ2V (5.14)
where the ordering on the right hand side of (5.14) is the usual ordering in
the lattice of projectors P(V ).
It is trivial to check that (5.14) defines a partial ordering on ΓO. Thus ΓO
is a partially ordered set.
Note that if Pˆ , Qˆ are projection operators, then it follows from (5.14)
that
δ(Pˆ )  δ(Qˆ) if and only if Pˆ  Qˆ (5.15)
since Pˆ  Qˆ implies δ(Pˆ )V  δ(Qˆ)V for all contexts V .59 Thus the mapping
δ : P(H)→ ΓO respects the partial order.
The next thing is to see if a logical ‘∨’-operation can be defined on ΓO.
Once again, we try a ‘local’ definition:
Theorem 5.2 A ‘∨’-structure on ΓO can be defined locally by
(γ1 ∨ γ2)V := γ1V ∨ γ2V (5.16)
for all γ1, γ2 ∈ ΓO, and for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
Proof. It is not instantly clear that (5.16) defines a global element of O.
However, a key result in this direction is the following:
59On the other hand, in general, Pˆ ≻ Qˆ does not imply δ(Pˆ )V ≻ δ(Qˆ)V but only
δ(Pˆ )V  δ(Qˆ)V .
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Lemma 5.3 For each context V , and for all αˆ, βˆ ∈ P(V ), we have
O(iV ′V )(αˆ ∨ βˆ) = O(iV ′V )(αˆ) ∨O(iV ′V )(βˆ) (5.17)
for all contexts V ′ such that V ′ ⊆ V .
The proof is a straightforward consequence of the definition of the presheaf
O.
One immediate consequence is that (5.16) defines a global element60 of
O. Hence the theorem is proved.
It is also straightforward to show that, for any pair of projectors Pˆ , Qˆ ∈
P(H), we have δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V = δ(Pˆ )V ∨ δ(Qˆ)V , for all contexts V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
This means that, as elements of ΓO,
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) = δ(Pˆ ) ∨ δ(Qˆ). (5.18)
Thus the mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO preserves the logical ‘∨’ operation.
However, there is no analogous equation for the logical ‘∧’-operation. The
obvious local definition would be, for each context V ,
(γ1 ∧ γ2)V := γ1V ∧ γ2V (5.19)
but this does not define a global element of O since, unlike (5.17), for the
∧-operation we have only
O(iV ′V )(αˆ ∧ βˆ)  O(iV ′V )(αˆ) ∧ O(iV ′V )(βˆ) (5.20)
for all V ′ ⊆ V . As a consequence, for all V , we have only the inequality
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)V  δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V (5.21)
and hence
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)  δ(Pˆ ) ∧ δ(Qˆ). (5.22)
It is easy to find examples where the inequality is strict. For example,
let Pˆ 6= 0ˆ, 1ˆ and Qˆ = 1ˆ − Pˆ . Then Pˆ ∧ Qˆ = 0 and hence δV (Pˆ ∧ Qˆ) = 0ˆ,
while δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V can be strictly larger than 0ˆ, since δ(Pˆ )V  Pˆ and
δ(Qˆ)V  Qˆ.
60The existence of the ∨-operation on ΓO can be extended to O itself. More precisely,
there is an arrow ∨ : O × O → O where O × O denotes the product presheaf over V(H),
whose objects are (O × O)V := OV × OV . Then the arrow ∨ : O × O → O is defined at
any context V by ∨V (αˆ, βˆ) := αˆ ∨ βˆ for all αˆ, βˆ ∈ OV .
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5.2.4 Hyper-Elements of ΓO.
We have seen that the global elements of O, i.e., the elements of ΓO, can be
equipped with a partial-ordering and a ‘∨’-operation, but attempts to define
a ‘∧’-operation in the same way fail because of the inequality in (5.21).
However, the form of (5.20–5.21) suggests the following procedure. Let
us define a hyper-element of O to be an association, for each stage V ∈
Ob(V(H)), of an element γV ∈ OV with the property that
γV ′  O(iV ′V )(γV ) (5.23)
for all V ′ ⊆ V . Clearly every element of ΓO is a hyper-element, but not
conversely.
Now, if γ1 and γ2 are hyper-elements, we can define the operations ‘∨’
and ‘∧’ locally as:
(γ1 ∨ γ2)V := γ1V ∨ γ2V (5.24)
(γ1 ∧ γ2)V := γ1V ∧ γ2V (5.25)
Because of (5.20) we have, for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
O(iV ′V )
(
(γ1 ∧ γ2)V
)
= O(iV ′V )
(
γ1V ∧ γ2V
)
(5.26)
 O(iV ′V )(γ1V ) ∧O(iV ′V )(γ2V ) (5.27)
 γ1V ′ ∧ γ2V ′ (5.28)
= (γ1 ∧ γ2)V ′ (5.29)
so that the hyper-element condition (5.23) is preserved.
The occurrence of a logical ‘∨’ and ∧’ structure is encouraging, but it
is not yet what we want. For one thing, there is no mention of a negation
operation; and, anyway, this is not the expected algebra of sub-objects of a
‘state space’ object. To proceed further we must study more carefully the
sub-objects of the spectral presheaf.
5.3 Daseinisation: Heidegger Encounters Physics
5.3.1 From Global Elements of O to Sub-Objects of Σ.
The spectral presheaf, Σ, played a central role in the earlier discussions of
quantum theory from a topos perspective [44, 45, 35, 13]. Here is the formal
definition.
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Definition 5.4 The spectral presheaf, Σ, is defined as the following functor
from V(H)op to Sets:
1. On objects V : ΣV is the Gel’fand spectrum of the unital, abelian sub-
algebra V of B(H); i.e., the set of all multiplicative linear functionals
λ : V → |C such that 〈λ, 1ˆ〉 = 1.
2. On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ is defined by
Σ(iV ′V )(λ) := λ|V ′; i.e., the restriction of the functional λ : V → |C to
the sub-algebra V ′ ⊆ V .
One central result of spectral theory is that ΣV has a topology that is compact
and Hausdorff, and with respect to which the Gel’fand transforms61 of the
elements of V are continuous functions from ΣV to |C. This will be important
in what follows [49].
The spectral presheaf plays a fundamental role in our research programme
as applied to quantum theory. For example, it was shown in the earlier work
that the Kochen-Specker theorem [50] is equivalent to the statement that Σ
has no global elements. However, Σ does have sub-objects, and these are
central to our scheme:
Definition 5.5 A sub-object S of the spectral presheaf Σ is a functor S :
V(H)op → Sets such that
1. SV is a subset of ΣV for all V .
2. If V ′ ⊆ V , then S(iV ′V ) : SV → SV ′ is just the restriction λ 7→ λ|V ′
(i.e., the same as for Σ), applied to the elements λ ∈ SV ⊆ ΣV .
This definition of a sub-object is standard. However, for our purposes we
need something slightly different, namely concept of a ‘clopen’ sub-object.
This is defined to be a sub-object S of Σ such that, for all V , the set SV is a
clopen62 subset of the compact, Hausdorff space ΣV . We denote by Subcl(Σ)
the set of all clopen sub-objects of Σ. We will show later (in the Appendix)
that, like Sub(Σ), the set Subcl(Σ) is a Heyting algebra. In Section 6.5 we
show that there is an object PclΣ whose global elements are precisely the
clopen sub-objects of Σ.
This interest in clopen sets is easy to explain. For, according to the
Gel’fand spectral theory, a projection operator αˆ ∈ P(V ) corresponds to a
61If Aˆ ∈ V , the Gel’fand transform, A : ΣV → |C, of Aˆ is defined by A(λ) := 〈λ, Aˆ〉 for
all λ ∈ ΣV .
62A ‘clopen’ subset of a topological space is one that is both open and closed.
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unique clopen subset, Sαˆ of the Gel’fand spectrum, ΣV . Furthermore, the
Gel’fand transform α : ΣV → |C of αˆ takes the values 0, 1 only, since the
spectrum of a projection operator is just {0, 1}.
It follows that α is the characteristic function of the subset, Sαˆ, of ΣV ,
defined by
Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1}. (5.30)
The clopen nature of Sαˆ follows from the fact that, by the spectral theory,
the function α : ΣV → {0, 1} is continuous.
In fact, there is a lattice isomorphism between the lattice P(V ) of pro-
jectors in V and the lattice CL(ΣV ) of clopen subsets of ΣV ,63 given by
αˆ 7→ Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1}. (5.31)
Conversely, given a clopen subset S ∈ CL(ΣV ), we get the corresponding
projection αˆ as the (inverse Gel’fand transform of the) characteristic function
of S. Hence, each S ∈ CL(ΣV ) is of the form S = Sαˆ for some αˆ ∈ P(V ).
Our claim is the following:
Theorem 5.4 For each projection operator Pˆ ∈ P(H), the collection
δ(Pˆ ) := {Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (5.32)
forms a (clopen) sub-object of the spectral presheaf Σ.
Proof. To see this, let λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V . Then if V ′ is some abelian sub-algebra
of V , we have δ(Pˆ )V ′ =
∧{
αˆ ∈ P(V ′) | αˆ  δ(Pˆ )V
}  δ(Pˆ )V . Now let
αˆ := δ(Pˆ )V ′ − δ(Pˆ )V . Then 〈λ, δ(Pˆ )V ′〉 = 〈λ, δ(Pˆ )V 〉 + 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1, since
〈λ, δ(Pˆ )V 〉 = 1 and 〈λ, αˆ〉 ∈ {0, 1}. This shows that
{λ|V ′ | λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V } ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ . (5.33)
However, the left hand side of (5.33) is the subset O(iV ′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ ΣV ′ of
the outer-presheaf restriction of elements in Sδ(Pˆ )V to ΣV ′, and the restricted
elements all lie in Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ . It follows that the collection of sets
δ(Pˆ ) := {Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (5.34)
63The lattice structure on CL(ΣV ) is defined as follows: if (Ui)i∈I is an arbitrary family
of clopen subsets of ΣV , then the closure
⋃
i∈I Ui is the maximum. The closure is necessary
since the union of infinitely many closed sets need not be closed. The interior int
⋂
i∈I Ui
is the minimum of the family. One must take the interior since
⋂
i∈I Ui is closed, but not
necessarily open.
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forms a (clopen) sub-object of the spectral presheaf Σ.
By these means we have constructed a mapping
δ : P(H) −→ Subcl(Σ)
Pˆ 7→ δ(Pˆ ) := {Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (5.35)
which sends projection operators on H to clopen sub-objects of Σ. As a
matter of notation, we will denote the clopen subset Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV as δ(Pˆ )V .
The notation δ(Pˆ )V refers to the element (i.e., projection operator) of OV
defined earlier.
5.3.2 The Definition of Daseinisation
As usual, the projection Pˆ is regarded as representing a proposition about
the quantum system. Thus δ maps propositions about a quantum system to
(clopen) sub-objects of the spectral presheaf. This is strikingly analogous to
the situation in classical physics, in which propositions are represented by
subsets of the classical state space.
Definition 5.6 The map δ in (5.35) is a fundamental part of our
constructions. We call it the daseinisation of Pˆ . We shall use the
same word to refer to the operation in (5.9) that relates to the outer
presheaf.
The expression ‘daseinisation’ comes from the German wordDasein, which
plays a central role in Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Dasein translates
to ‘existence’ or, in the very literal sense often stressed by Heidegger, to
being-there-in-the-world64. Thus daseinisation ‘brings-a-quantum-property-
into-existence’65 by hurling it into the collection of all possible classical snap-
shots of the world provided by the category of contexts.
We will summarise here some useful properties of daseinisation.
1. The null projection 0ˆ is mapped to the empty sub-object of Σ:
δ(0ˆ) = {∅V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (5.36)
64The hyphens are very important.
65The hyphens are very important.
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2. The identity projection 1ˆ is mapped to the unit sub-object of Σ:
δ(1ˆ) = {ΣV | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} = Σ (5.37)
3. Since the daseinisation map δ : P(H) → ΓO is injective (see Section
5.2.2), and the mapping ΓO → Γ(PclΣ) is injective (because there is a
monic arrow O → PclΣ in SetsV(H)op ; see Section 6.5.2), it follows that
the daseinisation map δ : P(H)→ Γ(PclΣ) ≃ Subcl(Σ) is also injective.
Thus no information about the projector Pˆ is lost when it is daseinised
to become δ(Pˆ ).
5.4 The Heyting Algebra Structure on Subcl(Σ).
The reason for daseinising projections is that the set, Sub(Σ), of sub-objects
of the spectral presheaf forms a Heyting algebra. Thus the idea is to find a
map πqt : PL(S)0 → Sub(Σ) and then extend it to all of PL(S) using the
simple recursion ideas discussed in Section 3.2.2.
In our case, the act of daseinisation gives a map from the projection
operators to the clopen sub-objects of Sub(Σ), and therefore a map πqt :
PL(S)0 → Subcl(Σ) can be defined by
πqt(Aε∆) := δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) (5.38)
However, to extend this definition to PL(S), it is necessary to show that
the set of clopen sub-objects, Subcl(Σ), is a Heyting algebra. This is not
completely obvious from the definition alone. However, it is true, and the
proof is given in Theorem 16.1 in the Appendix.
In conclusion: daseinisation can be used to give a representation/model
of the language PL(S) in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ).66
5.5 Daseinisation and the Operations of Quantum Logic.
It is interesting to ask to what extent the map δ : P(H)→ Subcl(Σ) respects
the lattice structure on P(H). Of course, we know that it cannot be com-
pletely preserved since the quantum logic P(H) is non-distributive, whereas
Subcl(Σ) is a Heyting algebra, and hence distributive.
66Since the clopen subobjects of Σ correspond bijectively to the global sections of the
outer presheaf O, it is clear that ΓO too is a Heyting algebra.
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We saw in Section 5.2.3 that, for the mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO, we have
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V = δ(Pˆ )V ∨ δ(Qˆ)V , (5.39)
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)V  δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V (5.40)
for all contexts V in Ob(V(H)).
The clopen subset of ΣV that corresponds to δ(Pˆ )V ∨ δ(Qˆ)V is Sδ(Pˆ )V ∪
Sδ(Qˆ)V . This implies that the daseinisation map δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ) is a
morphism of ∨-semi-lattices.
On the other hand, δ(Pˆ )V∧δ(Qˆ)V corresponds to the subset Sδ(Pˆ )V ∩Sδ(Qˆ)V
of ΣV . Therefore, since Sδ(Pˆ∧Qˆ)V ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ∩ Sδ(Qˆ)V , daseinisation is not a
morphism of ∧-semi-lattices. In summary, for all projectors Pˆ , Qˆ we have
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) = δ(Pˆ ) ∨ δ(Qˆ) (5.41)
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)  δ(Pˆ ) ∧ δ(Qˆ) (5.42)
where the logical connectives on the left hand side lie in the quantum logic
P(H), and those on the right hand side lie in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ),
as do the symbols ‘=’ and ‘’.
As remarked above, it is not surprising that (5.42) is not an equality.
Indeed, the quantum logic P(H) is non-distributive, whereas the Heyting
algebra Subcl(Σ) is distributive, and so it would be impossible for both (5.41)
and (5.42) to be equalities. The inequality in (5.42) is the price that must
be paid for liberating the projection operators from the shackles of quantum
logic and transporting them to the existential world of Heyting algebras.
5.5.1 The Status of the Possible Axiom ‘Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩
∆2’
We have the representation in (5.38), πqt(Aε∆) := δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]), of the
primitive propositions Aε∆, and, as explained in Section 3.2.2, this can be
extended to compound sentences by making the obvious definitions:
(a) πqt(α ∨ β) := πqt(α) ∨ πqt(β) (5.43)
(b) πqt(α ∧ β) := πqt(α) ∧ πqtβ) (5.44)
(c) πqt(¬α) := ¬πqt(α) (5.45)
(d) πqt(α⇒ β) := πqt(α)⇒ πqt(β) (5.46)
As a result, we necessarily get a representation of the full language PL(S)
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in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ). However, we then find that:
πqt(Aε∆1 ∧Aε∆2) := πqt(Aε∆1) ∧ πqt(Aε∆2) (5.47)
= δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1]) ∧ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) (5.48)
 δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] ∧ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) (5.49)
= δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∩∆2)]) (5.50)
= πqt(Aε∆1 ∩∆2) (5.51)
where, (5.49) comes from (5.42), and in (5.50) we have used the property of
spectral projectors that Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] ∧ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2] = Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∩∆2)]. Thus,
although by definition, πqt(Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2) = πqt(Aε∆1) ∧ πqt(Aε∆2), we
only have the inequality
πqt(Aε∆1 ∩∆2)  πqt(Aε∆1 ∧Aε∆2) (5.52)
On the other hand, the same line of argument shows that
πqt(Aε∆1 ∨ Aε∆2) = πqt(Aε∆1 ∪∆2) (5.53)
Thus it would be consistent to add the axiom
Aε∆1 ∨Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∪∆2 (5.54)
to the language PL(S), but not
Aε∆1 ∧Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩∆2 (5.55)
Of, course, both axioms are consistent with the representation of PL(S) in
classical physics.
It should be emphasised that there is nothing wrong with this result:
indeed, as stated above, it is the necessary price to be paid for forcing a
non-distributive algebra to have a ‘representation’ in a Heyting algebra.
5.5.2 Inner Daseinisation and δ(¬Pˆ ).
In the same spirit, one might ask about “¬(Aε∆)”. By definition, as in (3.8),
we have πqt(¬(Aε∆)) := ¬πqt(Aε∆) = ¬δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]). However, the ques-
tion then is how, if at all, this is related to δ(Eˆ[A ∈ R/∆]) = δ(¬Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]),
bearing in mind the axiom
¬(Aε∆)⇔ AεR\∆ (5.56)
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that can be added to the classical representation of PL(S). Thus something
needs to be said about δ(¬Pˆ ), where ¬Pˆ = 1ˆ− Pˆ is the negation operation
in the quantum logic P(H).
To proceed further, we need to introduce another operation:
Definition 5.7 The inner daseinisation, δi(Pˆ ), of Pˆ is defined for each con-
text V as
δi(Pˆ )V :=
∨{
βˆ ∈ P(V ) | βˆ  Pˆ}. (5.57)
This should be contrasted with the definition of outer daseinisation in (5.9).
Thus δi(Pˆ )V is the best approximation that can be made to Pˆ by taking
the ‘largest’ projector in V that implies Pˆ .
As with the other daseinisation construction, this operation was first in-
troduced by de Groote in [32] where he called it the core of the projection
operator Pˆ . We prefer to use the phrase ‘inner daseinisation’, and then to
refer to (5.9) as the ‘outer daseinisation’ operation on Pˆ . The existing nota-
tion δ(Pˆ )V will be replaced with δ
o(Pˆ )V if there is any danger of confusing
the two daseinisation operations.
With the aid of inner daseinisation, a new presheaf, I, can be constructed
as an exact analogue of the outer presheaf, O, defined in Section 5.2.1. Specif-
ically:
Definition 5.8 The inner presheaf I is defined over the category V(H) as
follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): We have IV := P(V )
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping I(iV ′V ) : IV → IV ′ is
given by I(iV ′V )(αˆ) := δ
i(αˆ)V for all αˆ ∈ P(V ).
It is easy to see that the collection {δi(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of projection
operators given by (5.57) is a global element of I.
It is also straightforward to show that
O(iV ′V )(¬αˆ) = ¬ I(iV ′V )(αˆ) (5.58)
for all projectors αˆ in V , and for all V ′ ⊆ V . It follows from (5.58) that
δo(¬Pˆ )V = 1ˆ− δi(Pˆ )V (5.59)
for all projectors Pˆ and all contexts V .
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It is clear from (5.58) that the negation operation on projectors defines
a map ¬ : ΓO → ΓI, γ 7→ ¬γ; i.e., for all contexts V , we map γ(V ) 7→
¬γ(V ) := 1ˆ−γ(V ). Actually, one can go further than this and show that the
presheaves O and I are isomorphic in the category SetsV(H)
op
. This means
that, in principle, we can always work with one presheaf only. However, for
reasons of symmetry it is sometime useful to invoke both presheaves.
As with outer daseinisation, inner daseinisation can also be used to define
a mapping from projection operators to sub-objects of the spectral presheaf.
Specifically, if Pˆ is a projection, for each V ∈ Ob(V(H)) define
Tδi(Pˆ )V := {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, δi(Pˆ )V 〉 = 0}. (5.60)
It is easy to see that these subsets form a clopen subobject, δi(Pˆ ), of Σ. It
follows from (5.59) that Tδi(Pˆ )V = Sδo(¬Pˆ )V .
5.5.3 Using Boolean Algebras as the Base Category
As we have mentioned several times already, the collection, V(H), of all
commutative von Neumann sub-algebras of B(H) is not the only possible
choice for the base category over which to construct presheaves. In fact,
if we are only interested in the propositional language PL(S), a somewhat
simpler choice is the collection, Bl(H) of all Boolean sub-algebras of the non-
distributive lattice, P(H), of projection operators on H. More abstractly,
for any non-distributive lattice B, one could use the category of Boolean
sub-algebras of B. This possibility was raised in the original paper [44] but
has not been used much thereafter. However, it does have some interesting
features.
The analogue of the (von Neumann algebra) spectral presheaf, Σ, is the
so-called dual presheaf, D:
Definition 5.9 The dual presheaf on Bl(H) is the contravariant functor
D : Bl(H)→ Sets defined as follows:
1. On objects in Bl(H): D(B) is the dual of B; i.e., the set Hom(B, {0, 1})
of all homomorphisms from the Boolean algebra B to the Boolean alge-
bra {0, 1}.
2. On morphisms in Bl(H): If iB2B1 : B2 ⊆ B1 then D(iB2B1) : D(B1)→
D(B2) is defined by D(iB2B1)(χ) := χ|B2, where χ|B2 denotes the re-
striction of χ ∈ D(B1) to the sub-algebra B2 ⊆ B1.
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A global element of the functor D : Bl(H)op → Set is then a function γ
that associates to each B ∈ Ob(Bl(H)) an element γB of the dual of B such
that if iB2B1 : B2 → B1 then γB1 |B2 = γB2; thus, for all αˆ ∈ B2,
γB2(αˆ) = γB1((iB2B1(αˆ)). (5.61)
Since each projection operator, αˆ belongs to at least one Boolean algebra
(for example, the algebra {0ˆ, 1ˆ, αˆ,¬αˆ}) it follows that a global element of the
presheaf D associates to each projection operator αˆ a number V (αˆ) which is
either 0 or 1, and is such that, if αˆ ∧ βˆ = 0ˆ, then V (αˆ ∨ βˆ) = V (αˆ) + V (βˆ).
These types of valuation are often used in the proofs of the Kochen-Specker
theorem that focus on the construction of specific counter-examples. In fact,
it is easy to see the following:
The Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement
that, if dimH > 2, the dual presheaf D : Bl(H)op → Sets has
no global elements.
It is easy to apply the concept of ‘daseinisation’ to the topos SetsBl(H)
op
.
In the case of von Neumann algebras, the outer daseinisation of a projection
operator Pˆ was defined as (see (5.9))
δ(Pˆ )V :=
∧{
αˆ ∈ P(V ) | αˆ  Pˆ} (5.62)
where P(V ) denotes the collection of all projection operators in the com-
mutative von Neumann algebra V . In this form, δ(Pˆ ) appears as a global
element of the outer presheaf O.
When using the base category, Bl(H), of Boolean sub-algebras of P(H),
we define
δ(Pˆ )B :=
∧{
αˆ ∈ B | αˆ  Pˆ} (5.63)
for each Boolean sub-algebra B of projection operators on H. Clearly, the
(outer) daseinisation, δ(Pˆ ), is now a global element of the obvious B(H)-
analogue of the outer presheaf O. There are parallel remarks for the inner
daseinisation and inner presheaf. The existence of these daseinisation oper-
ations means that the propositional language PL(S) can be represented in
the topos SetsBl(H)
op
in a way that is closely analogous to that used above
for the topos SetsV(H)
op
.
Note that (i) each Boolean algebra of projection operators B generates a
commutative von Neumann algebra, B′′, (the double commutant); and, con-
versely, (ii) to each von Neumann algebra V there is associated the Boolean
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algebra P(V ) of the projection operators in V . This implies that the opera-
tion
φ : Bl(H) → V(H) (5.64)
B 7→ B′′ (5.65)
defines a full and faithful functor between the categories Bl(H) and V(H).
This functor can be used to pull-back the spectral presheaf, Σ, in SetsV(H)
op
to the object φ∗Σ := Σ ◦φ in SetsBl(H)op . This pull-back is closely related to
the dual presheaf D.
5.6 The Special Nature of Daseinised Projections
5.6.1 Daseinised Projections as Optimal Sub-Objects
We have shown how daseinisation leads to an interpretation/model of the
language PL(S) in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ). In particular, any primitive
proposition “Aε∆” is represented by the clopen sub-object δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]).
We have seen that, in general, the ‘and’, δ(Pˆ )∧δ(Qˆ), of the daseinisation
of two projection operators Pˆ and Qˆ, is not itself of the form δ(Rˆ) for any
projector Rˆ. The same applies to the negation ¬δ(Pˆ ).
This raises the question of whether the sub-objects of Σ that are of the
form δ(Pˆ ) can be characterised in a simple way. Rather interestingly, the
answer is ‘yes’, as we will now see.
Let V ′, V ∈ Ob(V(H)) be such that V ′ ⊆ V . As would be expected,
there is a close connection between the restriction O(iV ′V ) : OV → OV ′,
δ(Pˆ )V 7→ δ(Pˆ )V ′, of the outer presheaf, and the restriction Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV →
ΣV ′, λ 7→ λ|V ′ , of the spectral presheaf. Indeed, if Pˆ ∈ P(H) is a projection
operator, and Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV is defined as in (5.30), we have the following
result:
SO(iV ′V )(δ(Pˆ )V ) = Σ(iV
′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ). (5.66)
The proof is given in Theorem 16.2 in the Appendix
This result shows that the sub-objects δ(Pˆ ) = {Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}
of Σ are of a very special kind. Namely, they are such that the restrictions
Σ(iV ′V ) : Sδ(Pˆ )V → Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ (5.67)
are surjective mapping of sets.
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For an arbitrary sub-object K of Σ, this will not be the case and Σ(iV ′V )
only maps KV into KV ′ . Indeed, this is essentially the definition of a sub-
object of a presheaf. Thus we see that the daseinised projections δ(Pˆ ) =
{Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} are optimal in the following sense. As we go ‘down
the line’ to smaller and smaller sub-algebras of a context V—for example,
from V to V ′ ⊆ V , then to V ′′ ⊆ V ′ etc.—then the subsets Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ , Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ ,...
are as small as they can be; i.e., Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ is the smallest subset of ΣV ′ such
that Σ(iV ′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ , likewise Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ is the smallest subset of ΣV ′′
such that Σ(iV ′′V ′)(Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ ) ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ , and so on.
It is also clear from this result that there are lots of sub-objects of Σ that
are not of the form δ(Pˆ ) for any projector Pˆ ∈ P(H).
These more general sub-objects of Σ show up explicitly in the represen-
tation of the more sophisticated language L(S). This will be discussed thor-
oughly in Section 8 when we analyse the representation, φ, of the language
L(S) in the topos SetsV(H)op . This involves constructing the quantity-value
object Rφ (to be denoted R), and then finding the representation of a func-
tion symbol A : Σ → R in L(S), in the form of a specific arrow A˘ : Σ → R
in the topos. The generic sub-objects of Σ are then of the form A˘−1(Ξ) for
sub-objects Ξ of R. This is an illuminating way of studying the sub-objects
of Σ that do not come from the propositional language PL(S).
6 Truth Values in Topos Physics
6.1 The Mathematical Proposition “x ∈ K”
So far we have concentrated on finding a Heyting-algebra representation of
the propositions in quantum theory, but of course there is more to physics
than that. We also want to know if/when a certain proposition is true: a
question which, in physical theories, is normally answered by specifying a
(micro) state of the system, or something that can play an analogous role.
In classical physics, the situation is straightforward (see Section 3.2.5).
There, a proposition “Aε∆” is represented by the subset πcl(Aε∆) :=
A˘−1(∆) ⊆ S of the state space S; and then, the proposition is true in a
state s if and only if s ∈ A˘−1(∆); i.e., if and only if the (micro-) state s
belongs to the subset, πcl(Aε∆), of S that represents the proposition.
Thus, each state s assigns to any primitive proposition “Aε∆”, a truth
value, ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
, which lies in the set {false, true} (which we identify with
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{0, 1}) and is defined as
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if s ∈ πcl(Aε∆) := A˘−1(∆);
0 otherwise.
(6.1)
However, the situation in quantum theory is very different. There, the
spectral presheaf Σ—which is the analogue of the classical state space S—
has no global elements at all. Our expectation is that this will be true in any
topos-based theory that goes ‘beyond quantum theory’: i.e., ΓΣφ is empty;
or, if Σφ does have global elements, there are not enough of them to determine
Σφ as an object in the topos. In this circumstance, a new concept is required
to replace the familiar idea of a ‘state of the system’. As we shall see, this
involves the concept of a ‘truth object’, or ‘pseudo-state’.
In physics, the propositions of interest are of the form “Aε∆”, which
refers to the value of a physical quantity. However, in constructing a theory of
physics, such physical propositions must first be translated into mathematical
propositions. The concept of ‘truth’ is then studied in the context of the
latter.
Let us start with set-theory based mathematics, where the most basic
proposition is of the form “x ∈ K”, where K is a subset of a set X, and
x is an element of X. Then the truth value, denoted ν
(
x ∈ K ), of the
proposition “x ∈ K” is
ν
(
x ∈ K ) = { 1 if x belongs to K;
0 otherwise.
(6.2)
Thus the proposition “x ∈ K” is true if, and only if, x belongs to K. In
other words, x 7→ ν( x ∈ K ) is the characteristic function of the subset K
of X; cf. (17.1) in the Appendix.
This remark is the foundation of the assignment of truth values in classical
physics. Specifically, if the state is s ∈ S, the truth value, ν(Aε∆; s),
of the physical proposition “Aε∆” is defined to be the truth value of the
mathematical proposition “A˘(s) ∈ ∆”; or, equivalently, of the mathematical
proposition “s ∈ A˘−1(∆)”. Thus, using (6.2), we get, for all s ∈ S,
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if s belongs to A˘−1(∆);
0 otherwise.
(6.3)
which reproduces (6.1).
We now consider the analogue of the above in a general topos τ . Let X
be an object in τ , and let K be a sub-object of X. Then K is determined
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by a characteristic arrow χK : X → Ωτ , where Ωτ is the sub-object classifier;
equivalently, we have an arrow pKq : 1τ → PX.
Now suppose that x : 1τ → X is a global element of X; i.e., x ∈ ΓX :=
Homτ
(
1τ , X
)
. Then the truth value of the mathematical proposition “x ∈
K” is defined to be
ν
(
x ∈ K ) := χK ◦ x (6.4)
where χK ◦ x : 1τ → Ωτ . Thus ν
(
x ∈ K ) is an element of ΓΩτ ; i.e., it is a
global element of the sub-object classifier Ωτ .
The connection with the result (6.2) (in the topos Sets) can be seen by
noting that, in (6.2), the characteristic function of the subset K ⊆ X is the
function χK : X → {0, 1} such that χK(x) = 1 if x ∈ K, and χK(x) = 0
otherwise. It follows that (6.2) can be rewritten as
ν
(
x ∈ K ) = χK(x) (6.5)
= χK ◦ x (6.6)
where in (6.6), x denotes the function x : {∗} → X that is defined by
x(∗) := x. The link with (6.4) is clear when one remembers that, in the
topos Sets, the terminal object, 1Sets, is just the singleton set {∗}.
In quantum theory, the topos is SetsV(H)
op
, and so the objects are all
presheaves. In particular, at each stage V , the sub-object classifier Ω :=
ΩSetsV(H)op is the set of sieves on V . In this case, if K is a sub-object of X,
and x ∈ ΓX, the explicit form for (6.6) is the sieve
ν
(
x ∈ K )
V
:= {V ′ ⊆ V | xV ′ ∈ KV ′} (6.7)
at each stage V ∈ Ob(V(H)). In other words, at each stage/context V, the
truth value of the mathematical proposition “x ∈ K” is defined to be all
those stages V ′ ⊆ V ‘down the line’ such that the ‘component’, xV ′ of x at
that stage is an element of the component, KV ′ ⊆ XV ′, of K at that stage.
The definitions (6.4) and (6.7) play a central role in constructing truth
values in out quantum topos scheme. However, as Σ has no global elements,
these truth values cannot be derived from some expression ν
(
s ∈ K ) with
s : 1SetsV(H)op → Σ. Therefore, we must proceed differently, as will become
clear by the end of the following Section.
However, before we do so, let us make one final remark concerning (6.2).
Namely, in normal set theory the proposition “x ∈ K” is true if, and only if,
{x} ⊆ K (6.8)
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i.e., if an only if the set {x} is a subset of K. The transition from the
proposition “x ∈ K” to the proposition “{x} ⊆ K” is seemingly trivial, but
in a topos other than sets it takes on a new significance. In particular, as we
shall see shortly, although the spectral presheaf, Σ, has no global elements,
it does have certain ‘minimal’ sub-objects that are as ‘close’ as one can get
to a global element, and then the topos analogue of (6.8) is very important.
6.2 Truth Objects
6.2.1 Linguistic Aspects of Truth Objects.
To understand how ‘truth values’ of physical propositions arise we return
again to our earlier discussion of local languages. In this Section we will em-
ploy the local language L(S) rather than the propositional language, PL(S),
that was used earlier in this article.
Thus, let L(S) be the local language for a system S. This is a typed
language whose minimal set of ground-type symbols is Σ and R. In addition,
there is a non-empty set, FL(S)
(
Σ,R), of function symbols A : Σ → R that
correspond to the physical quantities of S.
Now consider a representation, φ, of L(S) in a topos τφ. As discussed
earlier, the propositional aspects of the language L(S) are captured in the
term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ of type Ω, where s˜ and ∆˜ are variables of type Σ and PR
respectively [21]. In a topos representation, φ, the representation, [[A(s˜) ∈
∆˜ ]]φ, of the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is given by the chain of arrows67[8] (cf (4.3))
Σφ × PRφ
Aφ×id−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ−→Ωτφ (6.9)
in the topos τφ. Then, if pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ is the name of a sub-object, Ξ, of
the quantity-value object Rφ, we get the chain
Σφ ≃ Σφ × 1τφ
id×pΞq−→Σφ × PRφAφ×id−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ−→Ωτφ . (6.10)
which is the characteristic arrow of the sub-object of Σφ that represents the
physical proposition “AεΞ”.
Equivalently, we can use the term, {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜}, which has a free
variable ∆˜ of type PR and is of type PΣ. This term is represented by the
arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ : PRφ → PΣφ, which is the power transpose of
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ (cf (4.4)):
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ = p[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φq (6.11)
67In (6.9), eRφ : Rφ × PRφ → Ωτφ is the evaluation arrow associated with the power
object PRφ.
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The proposition “AεΞ” is then represented by the arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ◦
pΞq : 1τφ → PΣφ; this is the name of the sub-object of Σφ that represents
“AεΞ”.
We note an important difference from the analogous situation for the
language PL(S). In propositions of the type “Aε∆”, the symbol ‘∆’ is a
specific subset of R and is hence external to the language. In particular,
it is independent of the representation of PL(S). However, in the case of
L(S), the variable ∆˜ is internal to the language, and the quantity Ξ in the
proposition “AεΞ” is a sub-object of Rφ in a specific topos representation,
φ, of L(S).
So, this is how physical propositions are represented mathematically. But
how are truth values to be assigned to these propositions? In the topos τφ
a truth value is an element of the Heyting algebra ΓΩτφ . Thus the challenge
is to assign a global element of Ωτφ to each proposition associated with the
representation of the term {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} of type PΣ; (or, equivalently, the
representation of the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’).
Let us first pose this question at a linguistic level. In a representation φ,
an element of ΓΩτφ is associated with a representation of a term of type Ω
with no free variables. Hence the question can be rephrased as asking how a
term, t, in L(S) of type PΣ can be ‘converted’ into a term of type Ω? At this
stage, we are happy to have free variables, in which case the desired term will
be represented by an arrow in τφ whose co-domain is Ωτφ , but whose domain
is other than 1τφ . This would be an intermediate stage to obtaining a global
element of Ωτφ .
In the context of the language L(S) there are three obvious ways of ‘con-
verting’ the term t of type PΣ to a term of type Ω:
1. Choose a term, s, of type Σ; then the term ‘s ∈ t’ is of type Ω. We will
call this the ‘micro-state’ option.
2. Choose a term, T, of type PPΣ; then the term ‘t ∈ T’ is of type Ω.
We shall refer to this as the ‘truth-object’ option.
3. Choose a term, w, of type PΣ; then the term ‘w ⊆ t’ is of type Ω.68
For reasons that will become clear later we shall refer to this as the
‘pseudo-state’ option.
68In general, if t and s are set-like terms (i.e., terms of power type, PX , say), then
‘t ⊆ s’ is defined as the term ‘∀x˜ ∈ t(x˜ ∈ s)’; here, x˜ is a variable of type X .
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6.2.2 The Micro-State Option
In regard to the first option, the simplest example of a term of type Σ is a
variable s˜1 of type Σ. Then, the term ‘s˜1 ∈ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜}’ is of type Ω
with the free variables s˜1 and ∆˜ of type Σ and PR respectively. However,
the axiom of comprehension in L(S) says that
s˜1 ∈ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ⇔ A(s˜1) ∈ ∆˜ (6.12)
and so we are back with the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’, which is of type Ω and with
the free variable s˜ of type Σ.
As stated above, the φ-representation, [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ, of ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is the
chain of arrows in (6.9). Now, suppose the representation, φ, is such that
there exist global elements, s : 1τφ → Σφ, of Σφ. Then each such element can
be regarded as a ‘(micro)-state’ of the system in that topos representation.
Furthermore, let pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ be the name of a sub-object, Ξ, of
the quantity-value object Rφ. Then, by the basic property of the product
Σφ × PRφ, there is an arrow 〈s, pΞq〉 : 1τφ → Σφ × PRφ. This can be
combined with the arrow [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ : Σφ × PRφ → Ωτφ to give the arrow
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ ◦ 〈s, pΞq〉 : 1τφ −→ Ωτφ (6.13)
This is the desired global element of Ωτφ .
In other words, when the ‘state of the system’ is s ∈ ΓΣφ, the ‘truth
value’ of the proposition “AεΞ” is the global element of Ωτφ given by the
arrow [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ ◦ 〈s, pΞq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ .
This is the procedure that is adopted in classical physics when a truth
value is assigned to propositions by specifying a micro-state, s ∈ Σσ, where
Σσ is the classical state space in the representation σ of L(S). Specifically,
for all s ∈ Σσ, the truth value of the proposition “Aε∆” as given by (6.13)
is (c.f. (6.1))
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
= [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ(s,∆) =
{
1 if Aσ(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(6.14)
where [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ : Σσ × PR → Ωτσ ≃ {0, 1}. Thus we recover the earlier
result (6.3).
6.2.3 The Truth Object Option.
By hindsight, we know that the option to use global elements of Σφ is not
available in the quantum case. For there the state object, Σ, is the spectral
77
presheaf, and this has no global elements by virtue of the Kochen-Specker
theorem. The absence of global elements of the state object Σφ could well
be true in many other topos models of physics (particularly those that go
‘beyond quantum theory’), and therefore an alternative general strategy is
needed to that employing micro-states psq : 1τφ → Σφ.
This takes us to the second possibility: namely, to introduce a term, T,
of type PPΣ, and then work with the term ‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T’, which is of
type Ω, and has whatever free variables are contained in T, plus the variable
∆˜ of type PR.
The simplest choice is to let the term of type PPΣ be a variable, T˜, of
type PPΣ, in which case the term ‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜’ has variables ∆˜ and
T˜ of type PR and PPΣ respectively. Therefore, in a topos representation it
is represented by an arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ : PRφ × P (PΣφ)→ Ωτφ .
In detail (see [8]) we have that
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ = ePΣφ ◦ [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ × [[ T˜ ]]φ (6.15)
where ePΣφ : PΣφ × P (PΣφ) → Ωτφ is the usual evaluation arrow. In using
this expression we need the φ-representatives:
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ : PRφ → PΣφ (6.16)
[[ T˜ ]]φ : P (PΣφ)
id−→ P (PΣφ) (6.17)
Finally, let 〈pΞq, pTq〉 be a pair of global elements in PRφ and P (PΣφ)
respectively, so that pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ and pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣφ). Thus, pTq
is the name of a ‘truth object’, T, in τφ. Then, for the physical proposition
“AεΞ”, we have the truth value
ν
(
AεΞ;T
)
= [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ ◦ 〈pΞq, pTq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ (6.18)
where 〈pΞq, pTq〉 : 1τφ → PRφ × P (PΣφ).
A small generalisation: Slightly more generally, if J˜ and T˜ are variables
of type PΣ and P (PΣ) respectively, the term of interest is ‘J˜ ∈ T˜’. In
the representation, φ, of L(S), this term maps to an arrow [[ J˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ :
PΣφ × P (PΣφ) → Ωτφ . Here, [[ J˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ = ePΣφ ◦ [[ J˜ ]]φ × [[ T˜ ]]φ where
[[ J˜ ]]φ : PΣφ
id→ PΣφ and [[ T˜ ]]φ : P (PΣφ) id−→ P (PΣφ). Let pJq, pTq be
global elements of PΣφ and P (PΣφ) respectively, so that pJq : 1τφ → PΣφ
and pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣφ). Then the truth of the (mathematical) proposition
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“J ∈ T” is
ν
(
J ∈ T ) = [[ J˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ ◦ 〈pJq, pTq〉
= ePΣφ ◦ 〈pJq, pTq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ (6.19)
6.2.4 The Example of Classical Physics.
If classical physics is studied this way, the general formalism simplifies, and
the term ‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜’ is represented by the function ν(Aε∆;T) :=
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]σ : PR× P (PΣσ)→ ΩSets ≃ {0, 1} defined by
ν
(
Aε∆;T
)
:= [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]σ(∆,T) =
{
1 if {s ∈ Σσ | Aσ(s) ∈ ∆} ∈ T;
0 otherwise
=
{
1 if A−1σ (∆) ∈ T;
0 otherwise
(6.20)
for all T ∈ P (PΣσ). We can clearly see the sense in which the truth object T
is playing the role of a state. Note that the result (6.20) of classical physics
is a special case of (6.18).
To recover the usual truth values given in (6.14), an appropriate truth
object, Ts, must be associated with each micro-state s ∈ Σσ. The correct
choice is
Ts := {J ⊆ Σσ | s ∈ J} (6.21)
for each s ∈ Σσ. It is clear that s ∈ A−1σ (∆) (or, equivalently, Aσ(s) ∈ ∆) if,
and only if, A−1σ (∆) ∈ Ts. Hence (6.20) can be rewritten as
ν
(
Aε∆;Ts
)
=
{
1 if s ∈ A−1σ (∆);
0 otherwise.
(6.22)
which reproduces (6.14) once ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
is identified with ν
(
Aε∆;Ts
)
.
6.3 Truth Objects in Quantum Theory
6.3.1 Preliminary Remarks
We can now start to discuss the application of these ideas to quantum theory.
In order to use (6.18) (or (6.19)) we need to construct concrete truth objects,
T, in the topos τφ := Sets
V(H)op . Thus the presheaf T is a sub-object of PΣ;
equivalently, pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣ).
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However, we have to keep in mind the need to restrict to clopen sub-
objects of Σ. In particular, we must show that there is a well-defined presheaf
PclΣ such that
Subcl(Σ) ≃ Γ(PclΣ) (6.23)
We will prove this in Section 6.5. Given (6.23) and J ∈ Subcl(Σ), it is then
clear that a truth object, T, actually has to be a sub-object of PclΣ in order
that the valuation ν
(
J ∈ T ) in (6.19) is meaningful.
This truth value, ν
(
J ∈ T ), is a global element of Ω, and in the topos of
presheaves, SetsV(H)
op
, we have (see (6.7))
ν
(
J ∈ T )
V
:= {V ′ ⊆ V | JV ′ ∈ TV ′} (6.24)
for each context V .
There are various examples of the presheaf J that are of interest to us. In
particular, let J = δ(Pˆ ) for some projector Pˆ . Then, using the propositional
language PL(S) introduced earlier, the ‘truth’ of the proposition represented
by Pˆ (for example, “Aε∆”) is
ν
(
δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T )
V
= {V ′ ⊆ V | δ(Pˆ )
V ′
∈ TV ′} (6.25)
for all stages V .
When using the local language L(S), an important class of examples of
the sub-object J of Σ are of the form A−1φ (Ξ), for some sub-object Ξ of R.
This will yield the truth value, ν
(
AεΞ;T
)
, in (6.18). However, to discuss
this further requires the representation of function symbols A : Σ → R in
the topos SetsV(H)
op
, and this is deferred until Section 7.
6.3.2 The Truth Objects T |ψ〉.
The definition of truth objects in quantum theory was studied in the original
papers [44, 45, 35, 13]. It was shown there that to each quantum state
|ψ〉 ∈ H, there corresponds a truth object, T |ψ〉, which was defined as the
following sub-object of the outer presheaf, O:
T
|ψ〉
V := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉) = 1}
= {αˆ ∈ OV | 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1} (6.26)
for all stages V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Here, Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉) is the usual expression for
the probability that the proposition represented by the projector αˆ is true,
given that the quantum state is the (normalised) vector |ψ〉.
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It is easy to see that (6.26) defines a genuine sub-object T |ψ〉 = {T |ψ〉V |
V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of O. Indeed, if βˆ  αˆ, then 〈ψ| βˆ |ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉, and
therefore, if V ′ ⊆ V and αˆ ∈ OV , then 〈ψ|O(iV ′V )(αˆ) |ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉. In
particular, if 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1 then 〈ψ|O(iV ′V )(αˆ) |ψ〉 = 1.
The next step is to define the presheaf PclΣ, and show that there is a
monic arrow O → PclΣ, so that O is a sub-object of PclΣ. Then, since T |ψ〉
is a sub-object of O, and O is a sub-object of PclΣ, it follows that T
|ψ〉 is a
sub-object of PclΣ, as required. The discussion of the construction of PclΣ is
deferred to Section 6.5 so as not to break the flow of the presentation.
With this definition of T |ψ〉, the truth value, (6.25), for the propositional
language PL(S) becomes
ν
(
δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉 )
V
= {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (6.27)
It is easy to see that the definition of a truth object in (6.26) can be
extended to a mixed state with a density-matrix operator ρˆ: simply replace
the definition in (6.26) with
T
ρˆ
V := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; ρ) = 1}
= {αˆ ∈ OV | tr(ρˆαˆ) = 1} (6.28)
However there is an important difference between the truth object associ-
ated with a vector state, |ψ〉, and the one associated with a density matrix,
ρ. In the vector case, it is easy to see that the mapping |ψ〉 → T |ψ〉 is one-
to-one (up to a phase factor on |ψ〉) so that, in principle, the state |ψ〉 can
be recovered from T |ψ〉 (up to a phase-factor). On the other hand, there are
simple counterexamples which show that, in general, the density matrix, ρ
cannot be recovered from Tρˆ.
In a sense, this should not surprise us. The analogue of a density matrix
in classical physics is a probability measure µ defined on the classical state
space S. Individual microstates s ∈ S are in one-to-one correspondence with
probability measures of the form µs defined by µs(J) = 1 if s ∈ J , µs(J) = 0
if s 6∈ J .
However, one of the main claims of our programme is that any theory
can be made to ‘look like’ classical physics in the appropriate topos. This
suggests that, in the topos version of quantum theory, a density matrix should
be represented by some sort of measure on the state object Σ in the topos τφ;
and this should relate in some way to an ‘integral’ of ‘vector truth objects’.
The recent work by Heunen and Spitters provides the mathematical basis for
such a construction [38]. We shall return to some of their ideas later.
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6.4 The Pseudo-state Option
6.4.1 Some Background Remarks
We turn now to the third way mentioned above whereby a term, t, of type
PΣ in L(S) can be ‘converted’ to a term of type Ω. Namely, choose a term,
w, of type PΣ and then use ‘w ⊆ t’. As we shall see, this idea is easy to
implement in the case of quantum theory and leads to an alternative way of
thinking about truth objects.
Let us start by considering once more the case of classical physics. There,
for each microstate s in the symplectic state manifold Σσ, there is an asso-
ciated truth object, Ts, defined by Ts := {J ⊆ Σσ | s ∈ J}, as in (6.21). It
is clear that the state s can be uniquely recovered from the collection of sets
Ts as
s =
⋂
{J ⊆ Σσ | s ∈ J} (6.29)
Note that (6.29) implies that Ts is an ultrafilter of subsets of Σσ
69. As we
shall shortly see, there is an intriguing analogue of this property for the
quantum truth objects.
The analogue of (6.29) in the case of quantum theory is rather interesting.
Now, of course, there are no microstates, but we do have the truth objects
defined in (6.26), one for each vector state |ψ〉 ∈ H. To proceed further we
note that 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1 if and only if |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ. Thus T |ψ〉 can be rewritten
as
T
|ψ〉
V := {αˆ ∈ OV | |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ} (6.30)
for each stage V . Note that, as defined in (6.30), T |ψ〉 is a sub-object of O;
i.e., it is defined in terms of projection operators. However, as will be shown
in Section 6.5.2, there is a monic arrow O → PclΣ, and by using this arrow,
T |ψ〉 can be regarded as a sub-object of PclΣ; hence ΓT
|ψ〉 is a collection of
clopen sub-objects of Σ. In this form, the definition of T |ψ〉 involves clopen
subsets of the spectral sets ΣV , V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
It is clear from (6.30) that, for each V , T
|ψ〉
V is a filter of projection
operators in OV ≃ P(V ); equivalently, it is a filter of clopen sub-sets of ΣV .
These ordering properties are associated with the following observation.
69Let L be a lattice with zero element 0. A subset F ⊂ L is a ‘filter base’ if (i) 0 /∈ F
and (ii) for all a, b ∈ F , there is some c ∈ F such that c ≤ a∧b. A subset D ⊂ L is called a
‘(proper) dual ideal’ or a ‘filter’ if (i) 0 /∈ D, (ii) for all a, b ∈ D, a∧ b ∈ D and (iii) a ∈ D
and b > a implies b ∈ D. A maximal dual ideal/filter F in a complemented, distributive
lattice L is called an ‘ultrafilter’. It has the property that for all a ∈ L, either a ∈ F or
a′ ∈ F , where a′ is the complement of a.
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If |ψ〉 is any vector state, we can collect together all the projection operators
that are ‘larger’ or equal to |ψ〉〈ψ| and define:
T |ψ〉 := {αˆ ∈ P(H) | |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ} (6.31)
It is clear that, for all stages/contexts V ∈ Ob(V(H)), we have
T
|ψ〉
V = T
|ψ〉 ∩ V (6.32)
Thus the presheaf T |ψ〉 is obtained by ‘localising’ T |ψ〉 at each context V .
The significance of this localisation property is that T |ψ〉 is a maximal
(proper) filter in the non-distributive lattice, P(H), of all projection opera-
tors on H. Such maximal filters in the projection lattices of von Neumann
algebras were extensively discussed by de Groote [33] who called them ‘quasi-
points’. In particular, T |ψ〉 is a, so-called, ‘atomic’ quasi-point in P(H). Ev-
ery pure state |ψ〉 gives rise to an atomic quasi-point, T |ψ〉, and vice versa.
We will return to these entities in Section 8.4.
6.4.2 Using Pseudo-States in Lieu of Truth Objects
The equation (6.29) from classical physics suggests that, in the quantum
case, we look at the set-valued function on Ob(V(H)) defined by
V 7→
∧
{αˆ ∈ T |ψ〉V } =
∧
{αˆ ∈ OV | |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ} (6.33)
where we have used (6.30) as the definition of T |ψ〉. It is easy to check that
this is a global element of O; in fact, the right hand side of (6.33) is nothing
but the outer daseinisation δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) of the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ| !
Evidently, the quantity
w |ψ〉 := δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) = V 7→
∧
{αˆ ∈ OV | |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ} (6.34)
is of considerable interest. We shall refer to it as a ‘pseudo-state’ for reasons
that appear below.
Note that w |ψ〉 is defined by (6.34) as an element of ΓO. However, because
of the monic O → PclΣ we can also regard w |ψ〉 as an element of Γ(PclΣ) ≃
Subcl(Σ). The corresponding (clopen) sub-object of Σ will be denoted w
|ψ〉 :=
δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ).
We know that the map |ψ〉 7→ T |ψ〉 is injective. What can be said about
the map |ψ〉 7→ w |ψ〉? In this context, we note that T |ψ〉 is readily recoverable
from w |ψ〉 ∈ ΓO as
T
|ψ〉
V = {αˆ ∈ OV | αˆ  w |ψ〉V } (6.35)
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for all contexts V . From these relations it follows that is |ψ〉 7→ w |ψ〉 is
injective.
Note that, (6.35) essentially follows from the fact that, for each V , the
collection, T
|ψ〉
V of projectors in OV is an upper set (in fact, as remarked
earlier, it is a filter). In this respect, the projectors/clopen subsets T
|ψ〉
V
behave like the filter of clopen neighbourhoods of a subset in a topological
space. This remark translates globally to the relation of the collection, ΓT |ψ〉,
of sub-objects of Σ to the specific sub-object w |ψ〉.
It follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between truth objects,
T |ψ〉, and pseudo-states, w |ψ〉. However, the former is (a representation of)
a term of type P (PΣ), whereas the latter is of type PΣ. So how is this
reflected in the assignment of generalised truth values?
Note first that, from the definition of w |ψ〉, it follows that if αˆ ∈ T |ψ〉V
then αˆ  w |ψ〉V . On the other hand, from (6.35) we have that if αˆ  w |ψ〉V
then αˆ ∈ T |ψ〉V . Thus we have the simple, but important, result:
αˆ ∈ T |ψ〉V if, and only if αˆ  w |ψ〉V (6.36)
In particular, for any projector Pˆ we have δ(Pˆ )V ∈ T |ψ〉V if, and only if δ(Pˆ )V 
w
|ψ〉
V .
In terms of sub-objects of Σ, we have δ(Pˆ )V  w |ψ〉V if and only if δ(Pˆ )V ⊇
w
|ψ〉
V . Hence, (6.36) can be rewritten as
δ(Pˆ )V ∈ T |ψ〉V if, and only if δ(Pˆ )V ⊇ wV (6.37)
and so (6.25) can be written as
ν
(
δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T )
V
= {V ′ ⊆ V | δ(Pˆ )
V
⊇ w |ψ〉V } (6.38)
However, the right hand side of (6.38) is just the topos truth value,
ν(w |ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Pˆ )). It follows that
“δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉” is equivalent to “w |ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Pˆ )” (6.39)
and hence we can use the generalised truth values ν
(
δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉 ) or ν(w |ψ〉 ⊆
δ(Pˆ )
)
interchangeably.
Thus, if desired, a truth object in quantum theory can be regarded as
a sub-object of Σ, rather than a sub-object of PΣ. In a sense, these sub-
objects, w |ψ〉, of Σ are the ‘closest’ we can get to global elements of Σ. This
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is why we call them ‘pseudo-states’. However, note that a pseudo-state is not
a minimal element of the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) since these will include
stalks that are empty sets, something that is not possible for a pseudo-state.
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6.4.3 Linguistic Implications
The result (6.39) is very suggestive for a more general development. In our
existing treatment, in the formal language L(S) we have concentrated on
propositions of the form “J˜ ∈ T˜” which, in a representation φ, maps to the
arrow [[ J˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ : PΣφ×P (PΣφ)→ Ωτφ . Here J˜ and T˜ are variables of type
PΣ and P (PΣ) respectively.
What is suggested by the discussion above is that we could
equally focus on terms of the form “w˜ ⊆ J˜”, where both w˜
and J˜ are variables of type PΣ.
Note that, in general, the φ-representation of such a term is of the form
[[ w˜ ⊆ J˜ ]]φ : PΣφ × PΣφ → Ωτφ (6.40)
where the ‘first slot’ on the right hand side of the pairing in (6.40) is a truth-
object (in pseudo-state form), and the second correspond to a proposition
represented by a sub-object of Σφ.
However, this raises the rather obvious question “What is a pseudo-
state?”. More precisely, we would like to know a generic set of characteristic
properties of those sub-objects of Σφ that can be regarded as ‘pseudo-states’.
A first step would be to answer this question in the case of quantum theory.
In particular, are there any quantum pseudo-states that are not of the form
w |ψ〉 for some vector |ψ〉 ∈ H?
In this context the localisation property expressed by (6.31) is rather
suggestive. In the case that H has infinite dimension, de Groote has shown
that there exist quasi-points in P(H) that are not of the form T |ψ〉 for some
|ψ〉 ∈ H [33].71 If T is any such quasi-point, (6.31) suggests strongly that we
70Note that the sub-objects w |ψ〉 do not have any global elements since any such would
give a global element of Σ and, of course, there are none. Thus if one is seeking examples
of presheaves with no global elements, the collection w |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H, afford many such.
71However, he has also shown that, in an appropriate topology, the set of all atomic
quasi-points is dense in the set of all quasi-points. Of course, none of these intriguing
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define an associated presheaf, T , by
T V = T ∩ V (6.41)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)). This construction seems natural enough from a math-
ematical perspective, but we are not yet clear of the physical significance of
the existence of such ‘quasi truth-objects’. The same applies to the associated
‘quasi pseudo-state’, wT , defined by
wTV :=
∧
{αˆ ∈ T V } =
∧
{αˆ ∈ T ∩ V } (6.42)
6.4.4 Time-Dependence and the Truth Object.
As emphasised at the end of Section 3.2, the question of time dependence
depends on the theory-type being considered. The structure of the language
L(S) that has been used so far is such that the time variable lies outside
the language. In this situation, the time dependence of the system can be
implemented in several ways.
For example, we can make the truth object time dependent, giving a fam-
ily of truth objects, t 7→ Tt, t ∈ R. In the case of classical physics, with the
truth objects Ts, s ∈ Σσ, the time evolution comes from the time depen-
dence, t 7→ st, of the microstate in accordance with the classical equations of
motion. This gives the family t 7→ Tst of truth objects.
Something very similar happens in quantum theory, and we acquire a fam-
ily, t 7→ T |ψ〉t , of truth objects, where the states |ψ〉t satisfy the usual time-
dependent Schro¨dinger equation. Thus both classical and quantum truth
objects belong to a ‘Schro¨dinger picture’ of time evolution. Of course, there
is a pseudo-state analogue of this in which we get a one-parameter family,
t 7→ w |ψ〉t , of clopen sub-objects of Σ.
It is also possible to construct a ‘Heisenberg picture’ where the truth
object is constant but the physical quantities and associated propositions
are time dependent. We will return to this in Section 10 when we discuss the
use of unitary operators.
structures arise in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space in anything other than a trivial way.
So, in that sense, it is unlikely that they will play any fundamental role in explicating the
topos representation of quantum theory.
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6.5 The Presheaf Pcl(Σ).
6.5.1 The Definition of Pcl(Σ).
We must now show that there really is a presheaf PclΣ.
The easiest way of defining PclΣ is to start with the concrete expression
for the normal power object PΣ [29]. First, if F is any presheaf over V(H),
define the restriction of F to V to be the functor F ↓V from the category72
↓V to Sets that assigns to each V1 ⊆ V , the set F V1 , and with the obvious
induced presheaf maps.
Then, at each stage V , PΣV is the set of natural transformations from
Σ↓V to Ω↓V . These are in one-to-one correspondence with families of maps
σ := {σV1 : ΣV1 → ΩV1 | V1 ⊆ V }, with the following commutative diagram
for all V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V : 73
ΣV2 ΩV2
-
σV2
ΣV1 ΩV1
-σV1
?
Σ(iV2V1)
?
Ω(iV2V1)
The presheaf maps are defined by
PΣ(iV1V ) : PΣV → PΣV1 (6.43)
σ 7→ {σV2 | V2 ⊆ V1} (6.44)
and the evaluation arrow ev : PΣ× Σ→ Ω, has the form, at each stage V :
evV : PΣV × ΣV → ΩV (6.45)
(σ, λ) 7→ σV (λ) (6.46)
Moreover, in general, given a map χ : ΣV → ΩV , the subset of ΣV
associated with the corresponding sub-object is χ−1(1), where 1 is the unit
(‘truth’) in the Heyting algebra ΩV .
This suggests strongly that an object, PclΣ, in Sets
V(H)op can be defined
using the same definition of PΣ as above, except that the family of maps
72The notation ↓V means the partially-ordered set of all sub-algebras V ′ ⊆ V .
73Note that any sub-object, J of Σ, gives rise to such a natural transformation from
Σ↓V to Ω↓V for all stages V . Namely, for all V1 ⊆ V , σV1 : ΣV1 → ΩV1 is defined to be
the characteristic arrow χJV1 : ΣV1 → ΩV1 of the sub-object J of Σ.
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σ := {σV1 : ΣV1 → ΩV1 | V1 ⊆ V } must be such that, for all V1 ⊆ V , σ−1V1 (1)
is a clopen subset of the (extremely disconnected) Hausdorff space ΣV1 . It
is straightforward to check that such a restriction is consistent, and that
Subcl(Σ) ≃ Γ(PclΣ) as required.
6.5.2 The Monic Arrow From O to Pcl(Σ).
We define ι : O × Σ → Ω, with the power transpose pιq : O → PclΣ, as
follows. First recall that in any topos, τ there is a bijection Homτ (A,C
B) ≃
Homτ (A× B,C), and hence, in particular, (using PΣ = ΩΣ)
HomSetsV(H)op (O,PΣ) ≃ HomSetsV(H)op (O × Σ,Ω). (6.47)
Now let αˆ ∈ P(V ), and let Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1} be the clopen
subset of ΣV that corresponds to the projector αˆ via the spectral theorem;
see (5.30). Then we define ι : O × Σ→ Ω at stage V by
ιV (αˆ, λ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | Σ(iV ′ V )(λ) ∈ SO(iV ′ V )(αˆ)} (6.48)
for all (αˆ, λ) ∈ OV × ΣV .
On the other hand, the basic result relating coarse-graining to subsets of
Σ is
SO(iV ′ V )(δ(αˆ)V ) = Σ(iV ′ V )(Sδ(αˆ)V ) (6.49)
for all V ′ ⊆ V and for all αˆ ∈ OV . It follows that
ιV (αˆ, λ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | Σ(iV ′ V )(λ) ∈ Σ(iV ′ V )(Sαˆ)} (6.50)
for all (αˆ, λ) ∈ OV × ΣV . In this form is is clear that ιV (αˆ, λ) is indeed a
sieve on V ; i.e., an element of ΩV .
The next step is to show that the collection of maps ιV : OV ×ΣV → ΩV
defined in (6.48) constitutes a natural transformation from the object O×Σ
to the object Ω in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. This involves chasing around a
few commutative squares, and we will spare the reader the ordeal. There is
some subtlety, since we really want to deal with HomSetsV(H)op (O,PclΣ), not
HomSetsV(H)op (O,PΣ); but all works in the end.
To prove that pιq : O → PclΣ is monic, it suffices to show that the map
pιqV : OV → PclΣV is injective at all stages V . This is a straightforward
exercise and the details will not be given here.
The conclusion of this exercise is that, since pιq : O → PclΣ is monic, the
truth sub-objects T |ψ〉 of O can also be regarded as sub-objects of PclΣ, and
hence the truth value assignment in (6.25) is well-defined.
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Finally then, for any given quantum state |ψ〉 the basic proposition
“Aε∆” can be assigned a generalised truth value ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉) in ΓΩ, where
τ := SetsV(H)
op
is the topos of presheaves over V(H). This is defined at each
stage/context V as
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉)
V
:= ν
(
δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) ∈ T |ψ〉 )
V
= {V ′ ⊆ V | δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])
V ′
∈ T |ψ〉V ′ } (6.51)
6.6 Yet Another Perspective on the K-S Theorem
In classical physics, the pseudo-state ws ⊆ S associated with the microstate
s ∈ S is just ws := {s}. This gives the diagram
{∗} PS-
pwsq
ws S-
?
π
(6.52)
where pwsq(∗) := {s} and π is the canonical map
π : S −→ PS
s 7→ {s} (6.53)
The singleton {∗} is the terminal object in the category, Sets, of sets, and
the subset embedding ws → S in (6.52) is the categorical pull-back by π of
the monic pwsq : {∗} → PS.
In the quantum case, the analogue of the diagram (6.52) is
1 PΣ-
pw |ψ〉q
w |ψ〉 Σ-
?
π
(6.54)
where the arrow π : Σ → PΣ has yet to be defined. To proceed further, let
us first return to the set-theory map
X → PX (6.55)
x 7→ {x}
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where X is any set.
We can think of (6.55) as the power transpose, pβq : X → PX, of the
map β : X ×X → {0, 1} defined by
β(x, y) :=
{
1 if x = y;
0 otherwise.
(6.56)
In our topos case, the obvious definition for the arrow π : Σ → PΣ is the
power transpose pβq : Σ→ PΣ, of the arrow β : Σ× Σ→ Ω, defined by
βV (λ1, λ2) := {V ′ ⊆ V | λ1|V ′ = λ2|V ′} (6.57)
for all stages V . Note that, in linguistic terms, the arrow defined in (6.57) is
just the representation in the quantum topos SetsV(H)
op
, of the term‘σ˜1 = σ˜2’,
where σ˜1 and σ˜2 are terms of type Σ; i.e.,[[ σ˜1 = σ˜2 ]] : Σ× Σ→ Ω.
With this definition of π, the diagram in (6.54) becomes meaningful: in
particular the monic w |ψ〉 →֒ Σ is the categorical pull-back by π of the monic
pw |ψ〉q : 1→ PΣ.
There is, however, a significant difference between (6.54) and its classical
analogue (6.52). In the latter case, the function pwsq : {∗} → PS can be
‘lifted’ to a function pwsq↑ : {∗} → S to give a commutative diagram: i.e.,
such that
π ◦ pwsq↑ = pwsq. (6.58)
Indeed, simply define
pwsq↑(∗) := s (6.59)
However, in the quantum case there can be no ‘lift’ pw |ψ〉q↑ : 1 → Σ, as
this would correspond to a global element of the spectral presheaf Σ, and
of course there are none. Thus, from this perspective, the Kochen-Specker
theorem can be understood as asserting the existence of an obstruction to
lifting the arrow pw |ψ〉q : 1→ PΣ.
Lifting problems of the type
C B-
φ
A
?
π
(6.60)
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occur in many places in mathematics. A special, but very well-known, ex-
ample of (6.60) arises when trying to construct cross-sections of a non-trivial
principle fiber bundle π : P →M . In diagrammatic terms we have
M M-
id
P
?
π
(6.61)
A cross-section of this bundle corresponds to a lifting of the map id : M →M .
The obstructions to lifting id : M → M through π can be studied in
various ways. One technique is to decompose the bundle π : P → M into a
series of interpolating fibrations P → P1 → P2 → · · ·M where each fibration
Pi → Pi+1 has the special property that the fiber is a particular Eilenberg-
McLane space (this is known as a ‘Postnikov tower’). One then studies the
sequential lifting of the function id :M → M , i.e., first try to lift it through
the fibration P1 → M ; if that is successful try to lift it through P2 → P1; and
so on. Potential obstructions to performing these liftings appear as elements
of the cohomology groups Hk(M ; πk−1(F )), k = 1, 2, . . ., where F is the fiber
of the bundle.
We have long felt that it should possible to describe the non-existence
of global elements of Σ (i.e., the Kochen-Specker theorem) in some cohomo-
logical way, and the remark above suggests one possibility. Namely, per-
haps there is some analogue of a ‘Postnikov factorisation’ for the arrow
π : Σ→ PΣ that could give a cohomological description of the obstructions
to a global element of Σ, i.e., to the lifting of a pseudo-state pw |ψ〉q : 1→ PΣ
through the arrow π : Σ→ PΣ to give an arrow 1→ Σ.
Related to this is the question of if there is a ‘pseudo-state object’, W,
with the defining property that ΓW is equal to the set of all pseudo-states.
Of course, to do this properly requires a definition of a pseudo-state that goes
beyond the specific constructions of the objects w |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H. In particular,
are there pseudo-states that are not of the form w |ψ〉?
If such an object, W can be found then W will be a sub-object of PΣ,
and in the diagram in (6.54) one could then look to replace PΣ with W.
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7 The de Groote Presheaves of Physical Quan-
tities
7.1 Background Remarks
Our task now is to consider the representation of the local language, L(S), in
the case of quantum theory. We assume that the relevant topos is the same
as that used for the propositional language PL(S), i.e., SetsV(H)op , but the
emphasis is very different.
From a physics perspective, the key symbols in L(S) are (i) the ground-
type symbols, Σ and R—the linguistic precursors of the state object and the
quantity-value object respectively—and (ii) the function symbols A : Σ →
R, which are the precursors of physical quantities. In the quantum-theory
representation, φ, of L(S), the representation, Σφ, of Σ is defined to be the
spectral presheaf Σ in the topos SetsV(H)
op
.
The critical question is to find the object, Rφ (provisionally denoted as a
presheaf R), in SetsV(H)op that represents R, and is hence the quantity-value
object. One might anticipate that R is just the real-number object in the
topos SetsV(H)
op
, but that turns out to be quite wrong, and the right answer
cannot just be guessed. In fact, the correct choice for R is found indirectly
by considering a related question: namely, how to represent each function
symbol A : Σ→ R, with a concrete arrow Aφ : Σφ → Rφ in SetsV(H)op , i.e.,
with a natural transformation A˘ : Σ→ R between the presheaves Σ and R.
Critical to this task are the daseinisation operations on projection oper-
ators that were defined earlier as (5.9) and (5.57), and which are repeated
here for convenience:
Definition 7.1 If Pˆ is a projection operator, and V ∈ Ob(V(H)) is any
context/stage, we define:
1. The ‘outer daseinisation’ operation is
δo(Pˆ )V :=
∧{
αˆ ∈ P(V ) | Pˆ  αˆ}. (7.1)
where ‘’ denotes the usual ordering of projection operators, and where
P(V ) is the set of all projection operators in V .
2. Similarly, the ‘inner daseinisation’ operation is defined in the context
V as (c.f. (5.57))
δi(Pˆ )V :=
∨{
βˆ ∈ P(V ) | βˆ  Pˆ}. (7.2)
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Thus δo(Pˆ )V is the best approximation to Pˆ in V from ‘above’, being the
smallest projection in V that is larger than or equal to Pˆ . Similarly, δi(Pˆ )V
is the best approximation to Pˆ from ‘below’, being the largest projection in
V that is smaller than or equal to Pˆ .
In Section 6.5, we showed that the outer presheaf is a sub-object of the
power object PclΣ (in the category Sets
V(H)op), and hence that the global
element δo(Pˆ ) of O determines a (clopen) sub-object, δo(Pˆ ), of the spectral
presheaf Σ. By these means, the quantum logic of the lattice P(H) is mapped
into the Heyting algebra of the set, Subcl(Σ), of clopen sub-objects of Σ.
Our task now is to perform the second stage of the programme: namely
(i) identify the quantity-value presheaf, R; and (ii) show that any physical
quantity can be represented by an arrow from Σ to R.
7.2 The Daseinisation of an Arbitrary Self-Adjoint Op-
erator
7.2.1 Spectral Families and Spectral Order
We now want to extend the daseinisation operations from projections to arbi-
trary (bounded) self-adjoint operators. To this end, consider first a bounded,
self-adjoint operator, Aˆ, whose spectrum is purely discrete. Then the spec-
tral theorem can be used to write Aˆ =
∑∞
i=1 aiPˆi where a1, a2, . . . are the
eigenvalues of Aˆ, and Pˆ1, Pˆ2, . . . are the spectral projection operators onto
the corresponding eigenspaces.
A construction that comes immediately to mind is to use the daseinisation
operation on projections to define
δo(Aˆ)V :=
∞∑
i=1
ai δ
o(Pˆi)V (7.3)
for each stage V . However, this procedure is rather unnatural. For one thing,
the projections, Pˆi, i = 1, 2, . . . form a complete orthonormal set:
∞∑
i=1
Pˆi = 1ˆ, (7.4)
PˆiPˆj = δijPˆi, (7.5)
whereas, in general, the collection of daseinised projections, δo(Pˆi)V , 1 =
1, 2, . . . will not satisfy either of these conditions. In addition, it is hard
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to see how the expression δo(Aˆ)V :=
∑∞
i=1 ai δ
o(Pˆi)V can be generalised to
operators, Aˆ, with a continuous spectrum.
The answer to this conundrum lies in the work of de Groote. He realised
that although it is not useful to daseinise the spectral projections of an
operator Aˆ, it is possible to daseinise the spectral family of Aˆ [32].
Spectral families. We first recall that a spectral family is a family of
projection operators Eˆλ, λ ∈ R, with the following properties:
1. If λ2 ≤ λ1 then Eˆλ2  Eˆλ1 .
2. The net λ 7→ Eˆλ of projection operators in the lattice P(H) is bounded
above by 1ˆ, and below by 0ˆ. In fact,
lim
λ→∞
Eˆλ = 1ˆ, (7.6)
lim
λ→−∞
Eˆλ = 0ˆ. (7.7)
3. The map λ 7→ Eˆλ is right-continuous:74∧
ǫ↓0
Eˆλ+ǫ = Eˆλ (7.8)
for all λ ∈ R.
The spectral theorem asserts that for any self-adjoint operator Aˆ, there exists
a spectral family, λ 7→ EˆAλ , such that
Aˆ =
∫
R
λ dEˆAλ (7.9)
We are only concerned with bounded operators, and so the (weak Stieljes)
integral in (7.9) is really over the bounded spectrum of Aˆ which, of course, is a
compact subset of R. Conversely, given a bounded spectral family {Eˆλ}λ∈R,75
there is a bounded self-adjoint operator Aˆ such that Aˆ =
∫
R
λ dEˆλ.
74It is a matter of convention whether one chooses right-continuous or left-continuous.
75I.e., there are a, b ∈ R such that Eˆλ = 0ˆ for all λ ≤ a and Eˆλ = 1ˆ for all λ ≥ b.
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The spectral order. A key element for our work is the so-called spectral
order that was introduced in [63].76 It is defined as follows. Let Aˆ and
Bˆ be (bounded) self-adjoint operators with spectral families {EˆAλ }λ∈R and
{EˆBλ }λ∈R, respectively. Then define:
Aˆ s Bˆ if and only if EˆBλ  EˆAλ for all λ ∈ R. (7.10)
It is easy to see that (7.10) defines a genuine partial ordering on B(H)sa (the
self-adjoint operators in B(H)). In fact, B(H)sa is a ‘boundedly complete’
lattice with respect to the spectral order, i.e., each bounded set S of self-
adjoint operators has a minimum
∧
S ∈ B(H)sa and a maximum
∨
S ∈
B(H)sa with respect to this order.
If Pˆ , Qˆ are projections, then
Pˆ s Qˆ if and only if Pˆ  Qˆ, (7.11)
so the spectral order coincides with the usual partial order on P(H). To
ensure this, the ‘reverse’ relation in (7.10) is necessary, since the spectral
family of a projection Pˆ is given by
EPˆλ =


0ˆ if λ < 0
1ˆ− Pˆ if 0 ≤ λ < 1
1ˆ if λ ≥ 1.
(7.12)
If Aˆ, Bˆ are self-adjoint operators such that (i) either Aˆ or Bˆ is a projection,
or (ii) [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0ˆ, then Aˆ s Bˆ if and only if Aˆ  Bˆ. Here ‘’ denotes the
usual ordering on B(H)sa.77
Moreover, if Aˆ, Bˆ are arbitrary self-adjoint operators, then Aˆ s Bˆ im-
plies Aˆ  Bˆ, but not vice versa in general. Thus the spectral order is a
partial order on B(H)sa that is coarser than the usual one.
7.2.2 Daseinisation of Self-Adjoint Operators.
De Groote’s crucial observation was the following. Let λ 7→ Eˆλ be a spectral
family in P(H) (or, equivalently, a self-adjoint operator Aˆ). Then, for each
stage V , the following maps:
λ 7→
∧
µ>λ
δo(Eˆµ)V (7.13)
λ 7→ δi(Eˆλ)V (7.14)
76The spectral order was later reinvented by de Groote, see [31].
77The ‘usual’ ordering is Aˆ  Bˆ if 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 ≤ 〈ψ| Bˆ |ψ〉 for all vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H.
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also define spectral families.78 These spectral families lie in P(V ) and hence,
by the spectral theorem, define self-adjoint operators in V . This leads to the
definition of the two daseinisations of an arbitrary self-adjoint operator:
Definition 7.2 Let Aˆ be an arbitrary self-adjoint operator. Then the outer
and inner daseinisations of Aˆ are defined at each stage V as:
δo(Aˆ)V :=
∫
R
λ d
(
δiV (Eˆ
A
λ )
)
, (7.15)
δi(Aˆ)V :=
∫
R
λ d
( ∧
µ>λ
δoV (Eˆ
A
µ )
)
, (7.16)
respectively.
Note that for all λ ∈ R, and for all stages V , we have
δi(Eˆλ)V 
∧
µ>λ
δo(Eˆµ)V (7.17)
and hence, for all V ,
δi(Aˆ)V s δo(Aˆ)V . (7.18)
This explains why the ‘i’ and ‘o’ superscripts in (7.15–7.16) are defined the
way round that they are.
Both outer daseinisation (7.15) and inner daseinisation (7.16) can be used
to ‘adapt’ a self-adjoint operator Aˆ to contexts V ∈ Ob(V(H)) that do not
contain Aˆ. (On the other hand, if Aˆ ∈ V , then δo(Aˆ)V = δi(Aˆ)V = Aˆ.)
7.2.3 Properties of Daseinisation.
We will now list some useful properties of daseinisation.
1. It is clear that the outer, and inner, daseinisation operations can be
extended to situations where the self-adjoint operator Aˆ does not belong
to B(H)sa, or where V is not an abelian sub-algebra of B(H). Specifically,
let N be an arbitrary von Neumann algebra, and let S ⊂ N be a proper
von Neumann sub-algebra such that 1ˆN = 1ˆS = 1ˆ. Then outer and inner
78The reason (7.13) and (7.14) have a different form is that λ 7→ δi(Eˆλ)V is right
continuous whereas λ 7→ δo(Eˆλ)V is not. On the other hand, the family λ 7→
∧
µ>λ δ
o(Eˆµ)V
is right continuous.
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daseinisation can be defined as the mappings
δo : Nsa → Ssa
Aˆ 7→
∫
R
λ d
(
δiS(Eˆ
A
λ )
)
, (7.19)
δi : Nsa → Ssa
Aˆ 7→
∫
R
λ d
( ∧
µ>λ
δoS(Eˆ
A
µ )
)
. (7.20)
A particular case is N = V and S = V ′ for two contexts V, V ′ such that
V ′ ⊂ V . Hence, a self-adjoint operator can be restricted from one context to
a sub-context.
For the moment, we will let N be an arbitrary von Neumann algebra,
with S ⊂ N .
2. By construction,
δo(Aˆ)S =
∧
{Bˆ ∈ Ssa | Bˆ s Aˆ}, (7.21)
where the minimum is taken with respect to the spectral order; i.e., δo(Aˆ)S
is the smallest self-adjoint operator in S that is spectrally larger than (or
equal to) Aˆ. This implies δo(Aˆ)S  Aˆ in the usual order. Likewise,
δi(Aˆ)S =
∨
{Bˆ ∈ Ssa | Bˆ s Aˆ}, (7.22)
so δi(Aˆ)S is the largest self-adjoint operator in S spectrally smaller than (or
equal to) Aˆ, which implies δi(Aˆ)S  Aˆ.
3. In general, neither δo(Aˆ)S nor δ
i(Aˆ)S can be written as Borel functions
of the operator Aˆ, since daseinisation changes the elements of the spectral
family, while a function merely ‘shuffles them around’.
4. Let Aˆ ∈ N be self-adjoint. The spectrum, sp(Aˆ), consists of all λ ∈ R
such that the spectral family {EˆAλ }λ∈R is non-constant on any neighbourhood
of λ. By definition, outer daseinisation of Aˆ acts on the spectral family of
Aˆ by sending EˆAλ to Eˆ
δo(Aˆ)S
λ = δ
i(EˆAλ )S . If {EˆAλ }λ∈R is constant on some
neighbourhood of λ, then the spectral family {Eˆδo(Aˆ)Sλ }λ∈R of δo(Aˆ)S is also
constant on this neighbourhood. This shows that
sp(δo(Aˆ)S) ⊆ sp(Aˆ) (7.23)
for all self-adjoint operators Aˆ ∈ Nsa and all von Neumann sub-algebras S.
Analogous arguments apply to inner daseinisation.
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Heuristically, this result implies that the spectrum of the operator δo(Aˆ)S
is more degenerate than that of Aˆ; i.e., the effect of daseinisation is to ‘col-
lapse’ eigenvalues.
5. Outer and inner daseinisation are both non-linear mappings. We
will show this for projections explicitly. For example, let Qˆ := 1ˆ− Pˆ . Then
δo(Qˆ+Pˆ )S = δ
o(1ˆ)S = 1ˆ, while δ
o(1ˆ−Pˆ )S ≻ 1ˆ−Pˆ and δo(Pˆ )S ≻ Pˆ in general,
so δo(1ˆ−Pˆ )S+δo(Pˆ )S is the sum of two non-orthogonal projections in general
(and hence not equal to 1ˆ). For inner daseinisation, we have δi(1ˆ−Pˆ )S ≺ 1ˆ−Pˆ
and δi(Pˆ )S ≺ Pˆ in general, so δi(1ˆ− Pˆ )S + δi(Pˆ )S ≺ 1ˆ = δi(1ˆ− Pˆ + Pˆ )S in
general.
6. If a ≥ 0, then δo(aAˆ)S = aδo(Aˆ)S and δi(aAˆ)S = aδi(Aˆ)S . If a < 0,
then δo(aAˆ)S = aδ
i(Aˆ)S and δ
i(aAˆ)S = aδ
o(Aˆ)S . This is due the behaviour
of spectral families under the mapping Aˆ 7→ −Aˆ.
7. Let Aˆ be a self-adjoint operator, and let Eˆ[A ≤ λ] = EˆAλ be an element
of the spectral family of Aˆ. From (7.15) we get
Eˆ[δoS(A) ≤ λ] = δiS
(
Eˆ[A ≤ λ]) (7.24)
and then
Eˆ[δo(Aˆ)S > λ] = 1ˆ− Eˆ[δo(Aˆ)S ≤ λ] (7.25)
= 1ˆ− δiS
(
Eˆ[A ≤ λ]) (7.26)
= δoS
(
1ˆ− Eˆ[A ≤ λ]) (7.27)
where we have used the general result that, for any projection Pˆ , we have
1ˆ− δi(Pˆ )S = δoS(1ˆ− Pˆ ). Then, (7.27) gives
Eˆ[δo(Aˆ)S > λ] = δ
o
(
Eˆ[A > λ]
)
S
. (7.28)
7.2.4 The de Groote Presheaves
We know that V 7→ δo(Pˆ )V and V 7→ δi(Pˆ )V are global elements of the
outer presheaf, O, and inner presheaf, I, respectively. Using the daseinisa-
tion operation for self-adjoint operators, it is straightforward to construct
analogous presheaves for which V 7→ δo(Aˆ)V and V 7→ δi(Aˆ)V are global ele-
ments. One of these presheaves was briefly considered in [32]. We call these
the ‘de Groote presheaves’ in recognition of the importance of de Groote’s
work.
Definition 7.3 The outer de Groote presheaf, |O, is defined as follows:
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(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): We define |OV := Vsa, the collection of
self-adjoint members of V .
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping |O(iV ′ V ) : |OV → |OV ′ is
given by
|O(iV ′ V )(Aˆ) := δ
o(Aˆ)V ′ (7.29)
=
∫
R
λ d
(
δi(EˆAλ )V ′
)
(7.30)
=
∫
R
λ d
(
I(iV ′ V )(Eˆ
A
λ )
)
(7.31)
for all Aˆ ∈ |OV .
Here we used the fact that the restriction mapping I(iV ′ V ) of the inner
presheaf I is the inner daseinisation of projections δi : P(V )→ P(V ′).
Definition 7.4 The inner de Groote presheaf, II, is defined as follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): We define IIV := Vsa, the collection of
self-adjoint members of V .
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping II(iV ′ V ) : IIV → IIV ′ is
given by
II(iV ′ V )(Aˆ) := δ
i(Aˆ)V ′ (7.32)
=
∫
R
λ d
( ∧
µ>λ
(δo(EˆAµ )V ′
)
(7.33)
=
∫
R
λ d
( ∧
µ>λ
(O(iV ′ V )(Eˆ
A
µ )
)
(7.34)
for all Aˆ ∈ |OV (where O(iV ′ V ) = δo : P(V )→ P(V ′)).
It is now clear that, by construction, δo(Aˆ) := V 7→ δo(Aˆ)V is a global
element of |O, and δi(Aˆ) := V 7→ δi(Aˆ)V is a global element of II.
De Groote found an example of an element of Γ |O that is not of the form
δo(Aˆ) (as mentioned in [32]). The same example can be used to show that
there are global elements of the outer presheaf O that are not of the form
δo(Pˆ ) for any projection Pˆ ∈ P(H).
On the other hand, we have:
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Theorem 7.1 The mapping
δi : B(H)sa → ΓII (7.35)
Aˆ 7→ δi(Aˆ) (7.36)
from self-adjoint operators in B(H) to global sections of the outer de Groote
presheaf is injective. Likewise,
δo : B(H)sa → Γ |O (7.37)
Aˆ 7→ δo(Aˆ) (7.38)
is injective.
Proof. By construction, Aˆ ≥s δi(Aˆ)V for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Since Aˆ is
contained in at least one context, so
Aˆ =
∨
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δi(Aˆ)V , (7.39)
where the maximum is taken with respect to the spectral order. If δi(Aˆ) =
δi(Bˆ), then we have
Aˆ =
∨
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δi(Aˆ)V =
∨
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δi(Bˆ)V = Bˆ. (7.40)
Analogously, Aˆ ≤s δo(Aˆ)V for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), so
Aˆ =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δo(Aˆ)V . (7.41)
If δo(Aˆ) = δo(Bˆ), then we have
Aˆ =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δo(Aˆ)V =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δo(Bˆ)V = Bˆ. (7.42)
The same argument also holds more generally for arbitrary von Neumann
algebras, not just B(H).
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8 The Presheaves sp(Aˆ), R and R↔
8.1 Background to the Quantity-Value Presheaf R.
Our goal now is to construct a ‘quantity-value’ presheaf R with the property
that inner and/or outer daseinisation of an self-adjoint operator Aˆ can be
used to define an arrow, i.e., a natural transformation, from Σ to R.79
The arrow corresponding to a self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ B(H) is denoted
for now by A˘ : Σ→R. At each stage V , we need a mapping
A˘V : ΣV → RV (8.1)
λ 7→ A˘V (λ), (8.2)
and we make the basic assumption that this mapping is given by evaluation.
More precisely, λ ∈ ΣV is a spectral element80 of V and hence can be evalu-
ated on operators lying in V . And, while Aˆ will generally not lie in V , both
the inner daseinisation δi(Aˆ)V and the outer daseinisation δ
o(Aˆ)V do.
Let us start by considering the operators δo(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Each
of these is a self-adjoint operator in the commutative von Neumann algebra
V , and hence, by the spectral theorem, can be represented by a function,
(the Gel’fand transform81) δo(Aˆ)V : ΣV → sp(δo(Aˆ)V ), with values in the
spectrum sp(δo(Aˆ)V ) of the self-adjoint operator δ
o(Aˆ)V . Since the spectrum
of a self-adjoint operator is a subset of R, we can also write δo(Aˆ)V : ΣV → R.
The question now is whether the collection of maps δo(Aˆ)V : ΣV → R,
V ∈ Ob(V(H)), can be regarded as an arrow from Σ to some presheaf R.
To answer this we need to see how these operators behave as we go ‘down
a chain’ of sub-algebras V ′ ⊆ V . The first remark is that if V ′ ⊆ V then
δo(Aˆ)V ′  δo(Aˆ)V . When applied to the Gel’fand transforms, this leads to
the equation
δo(Aˆ)V ′(λ|V ′) ≥ δo(Aˆ)V (λ) (8.3)
for all λ ∈ ΣV , where λ|V ′ denotes the restriction of the spectral element
λ ∈ ΣV to the sub-algebra V ′ ⊆ V . However, the definition of the spectral
79In fact, we will define several closely related presheaves that can serve as a quantity-
value object.
80A ‘spectral element’, λ ∈ ΣV of V , is a multiplicative, linear functional λ : V → |C
with 〈λ, 1ˆ〉 = 1, see also Def. 5.4.
81This use of the ‘overline’ symbol for the Gel’fand transform should not be confused
with our later use of the same symbol to indicate a co-presheaf.
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presheaf is such that λ|V ′ = Σ(iV ′ V )(λ), and hence (8.3) can be rewritten as
δo(Aˆ)V ′
(
Σ(iV ′ V )(λ)
) ≥ δo(Aˆ)V (λ) (8.4)
for all λ ∈ ΣV .
It is a standard result that the Dedekind real number object, R, in a
presheaf topos SetsC
op
is the constant functor from Cop to R [56]. It follows
that the family of Gel’fand transforms, δo(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), of the da-
seinised operators δo(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), does not define an arrow from Σ
to R, as this would require an equality in (8.4), which is not true. Thus the
quantity-value presheaf, R, in the topos SetsV(H)op is not the real-number
object R, although clearly R has something to do with the real numbers. We
must take into account the growth of these real numbers as we go from V to
smaller sub-algebras V ′. Similarly, if we consider inner daseinisation, we get
a series of falling real numbers.
The presheaf, R, that we will choose, and which will be denoted by R↔,
incorporates both aspects (growing and falling real numbers).
8.2 Definition of the Presheaves sp(Aˆ), R and R↔.
The inapplicability of the real-number object R may seem strange at first,82
but actually it is not that surprising. Because of the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem, we do not expect to be able to assign (constant) real numbers as values
of physical quantities, at least not globally. Instead, we draw on some recent
results of M. Jackson [47], obtained as part of his extensive study of mea-
sure theory on a topos of presheaves. Here, we use a single construction in
Jackson’s thesis: the presheaf of ‘order-preserving functions’ over a partially
ordered set—in our case, V(H). In fact, we will need both order-reversing
and order-preserving functions.
Definition 8.1 Let (Q,) and (P,) be partially ordered sets. A function
µ : Q → P (8.5)
is order-preserving if q1  q2 implies µ(q1)  µ(q2) for all q1, q2 ∈ Q. It is
order-reversing if q1  q2 implies µ(q1)  µ(q2). We denote by OP(Q,P)
the set of order-preserving functions µ : Q → P, and by OR(Q,P) the set
of order-reversing functions.
82Indeed, it puzzled us for a while!
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We note that if µ is order-preserving, then −µ is order-reversing, and vice
versa.
Adapting Jackson’s definitions slightly, if P is any partially-ordered set,
we have the following.
Definition 8.2 The P-valued presheaf, P, of order-reversing functions
over V(H) is defined as follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)):
PV := {µ :↓V → P | µ ∈ OR(↓V,P)} (8.6)
where ↓V ⊂ Ob(V(H)) is the set of all von Neumann sub-algebras of
V .
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping P(iV ′ V ) : PV → PV ′ is
given by
P(iV ′ V )(µ) := µ|V ′ (8.7)
where µ|V ′ denotes the restriction of the function µ to ↓V ′ ⊆↓V .
Jackson uses order-preserving functions with P := [0,∞) (the non-negative
reals), with the usual order ≤.
Clearly, there is an analogous definition of the P-valued presheaf, P, of
order-preserving functions from ↓V to P. It can be shown that P and P
are isomorphic objects in SetsV(H)
op
.
Let us first consider P. For us, the key examples for the partially ordered
set P are (i) R, the real numbers with the usual order ≤, and (ii) sp(Aˆ) ⊂ R,
the spectrum of some bounded self-adjoint operator Aˆ, with the order ≤
inherited from R. Clearly, the associated presheaf sp(Aˆ) is a sub-object of
the presheaf R.
Now let Aˆ ∈ B(H)sa, and let V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Then to each λ ∈ ΣV there
is associated the function
δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) :↓V → sp(Aˆ), (8.8)
given by (
δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ)
)
(V ′) := δo(Aˆ)V ′(Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) (8.9)
= δo(Aˆ)V ′(λ|V ′) (8.10)
= 〈λ|V ′, δo(Aˆ)V ′〉 (8.11)
= 〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V ′〉 (8.12)
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for all V ′ ⊆ V . We note that as V ′ becomes smaller, δo(Aˆ)V ′ becomes larger
(or stays the same) in the spectral order, and hence in the usual order on
operators. Therefore, δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) :↓V → sp(Aˆ) is an order-reversing function,
for each λ ∈ ΣV .
It is worth noting that daseinisation of Aˆ, i.e., the approximation of
the self-adjoint operator Aˆ in the spectral order, allows to define a func-
tion δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) (for each λ ∈ ΣV ) with values in the spectrum of Aˆ, since
we have sp(δo(Aˆ)V ) ⊆ sp(Aˆ), see (7.23). If we had chosen an approximation
in the usual linear order on B(H)sa, then the approximated operators would
not have a spectrum that is contained in sp(Aˆ) in general.
Let
δ˘o(Aˆ)V : ΣV → sp(Aˆ)V (8.13)
λ 7→ δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) (8.14)
denote the set of order-reversing functions from ↓V to sp(Aˆ) obtained in this
way. We then have the following, fundamental, result which can be regarded
as a type of ‘non-commutative’ spectral theorem in which each bounded,
self-adjoint operator Aˆ is mapped to an arrow from Σ to R:
Theorem 8.1 The mappings δ˘o(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), are the components
of a natural transformation/arrow δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ→ sp(Aˆ).
Proof. We only have to prove that, whenever V ′ ⊂ V , the diagram
ΣV ′ sp(Aˆ)

V ′
-
δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′
ΣV sp(Aˆ)

V
-δ˘
o(Aˆ)V
? ?
commutes. Here, the vertical arrows are the restrictions of the relevant
presheaves from the stage V to V ′ ⊆ V .
In fact, the commutativity of the diagram follows directly from the defi-
nitions. For each λ ∈ ΣV , the composition of the upper arrow and the right
vertical arrow gives
(δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ))|V ′ = δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′(λ|V ′), (8.15)
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which is the same function that we get by first restricting λ from ΣV to ΣV ′
and then applying δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′.
In this way, to each physical quantity Aˆ in quantum theory there is as-
signed a natural transformation δ˘o(Aˆ) from the state object Σ to the presheaf
sp(Aˆ). Since sp(Aˆ) is a sub-object of R for each Aˆ, δ˘o(Aˆ) can also be
seen as a natural transformation/arrow from Σ to R. Hence the presheaf
R in the topos SetsV(H)
op
is one candidate for the quantity-value object of
quantum theory. Note that it follows from Theorem 7.1 that the mapping
θ : B(H)sa → HomSetsV(H)op (Σ,R) (8.16)
Aˆ 7→ δ˘o(Aˆ) (8.17)
is injective. 83
If S denotes our quantum system, then, on the level of the formal language
L(S), we expect the mapping A → Aˆ to be injective, where A is a function
symbol of signature Σ → R. It follows that we have obtained a a faithful
representation of these function symbols by arrows δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ → R in the
topos SetsV(H)
op
.
Similarly, there is an order-preserving function
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ) : ↓V → sp(Aˆ), (8.18)
that is defined for all V ′ ⊆ V by(
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ)
)
(V ′) = δi(Aˆ)V ′(Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) (8.19)
= 〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V ′〉. (8.20)
Since δi(Aˆ)V ′ becomes smaller (or stays the same) as V
′ gets smaller, δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ)
indeed is an order-preserving function from ↓V to sp(Aˆ) for each λ ∈ ΣV .
Again, approximation in the spectral order (in this case from below) allows
us to define a function with values in sp(Aˆ), which would not be possible
when using the linear order.
Clearly, we can use the functions δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), λ ∈ ΣV , to define a natural
transformation δ˘i(Aˆ) : Σ→ R from the spectral presheaf, Σ, to the presheaf
83Interestingly, these results all carry over to an arbitrary von Neumann algebra N ⊆
B(H). In this way, the formalism is flexible enough to adapt to situations where we have
symmetries (which can described mathematically by a von Neumann algebra N that has
a non-trivial commutant) and super-selection rules (which corresponds to N having a
non-trivial centre).
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R of real-valued, order-preserving functions on ↓V . The components of
δ˘i(Aˆ) are
δ˘i(Aˆ)V : ΣV → sp(Aˆ)V (8.21)
λ 7→ δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ). (8.22)
It follows from Theorem 7.1 that the mapping from self-adjoint operators to
natural transformations δ˘i(Aˆ) is injective.
The functions obtained from inner and outer daseinisation can be com-
bined to give yet another presheaf, and one that will be particularly useful
for the physical interpretation of these constructions. The general definition
is the following.
Definition 8.3 Let P be a partially-ordered set. The P-valued presheaf,
P↔, of order-preserving and order-reversing functions on V(H) is defined as
follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)):
P↔V := {(µ, ν) | µ ∈ OP(↓V,P), ν ∈ OR(↓V,P), µ ≤ ν} (8.23)
where ↓V ⊂ Ob(V(H)) is the set of all sub-algebras V ′ of V . Note that we
introduce the condition µ ≤ ν, i.e., for all V ′ ∈↓V we demand µ(V ′) ≤ ν(V ′).
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V :
P↔(iV ′V ) : P↔V −→ P↔V ′ (8.24)
(µ, ν) 7−→ (µ|V ′ , ν|V ′), (8.25)
where µ|V ′ denotes the restriction of µ to ↓V ′ ⊆↓V , and analogously for ν|V ′.
Note that since we have the condition µ ≤ ν in (i), the presheaf P↔ is not
simply the product of the presheaves P and P.
As we will discuss shortly, the presheaf, R↔, of order-preserving and
order-reversing, real-valued functions is closely related to the ‘k-extension’ of
the presheaf R (see the Appendix for details of the k-extension procedure).
Now let
δ˘(Aˆ)V :=
(
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (·), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (·)
)
: ΣV → R↔V (8.26)
denote the set of all pairs of order-preserving and order-reversing functions
from ↓V to R that can be obtained from inner and outer daseinisation. It is
easy to see that we have the following result:
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Theorem 8.2 The mappings δ˘(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), are the components of
a natural transformation δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ→ R↔.
Again from Theorem 7.1, the mapping from self-adjoint operators to natural
transformations, Aˆ→ δ˘(Aˆ), is injective.
Since δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ) ≤ δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) for all λ ∈ ΣV , we can interpret each pair
(δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘
o(Aˆ)V (λ)) of values as an interval, which gives a first hint at the
physical interpretation.
8.3 Inner and Outer Daseinisation from Functions on
Filters
There is a close relationship between inner and outer daseinisation, and cer-
tain functions on the filters in the projection lattice P(H) of B(H). We give
a summary of these results here: details can be found in de Groote’s work
[32, 34], the article [20], and a forthcoming paper [26]. This subsection serves
as a preparation for the physical interpretation of the arrows δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ→ R↔.
Filter bases, filters and ultrafilters. We first need some basic defini-
tions. Let L be a lattice with zero element 0. A subset f of L is called a filter
base if (i) 0 6= f and (ii) for all a, b ∈ f , there is a c ∈ f such that c ≤ a ∧ b.
A subset F of a lattice L with zero element 0 is a (proper) filter (or dual
ideal) if (i) 0 /∈ F , (ii) a, b ∈ F implies a ∧ b ∈ F and (iii) a ∈ F and b ≥ a
imply b ∈ F . In other words, a filter is an upper set in the lattice L that is
closed under finite minima.
By Zorn’s lemma, every filter is contained in a maximal filter. Obviously,
such a maximal filter is also a maximal filter base.
Let L′ be a sublattice of L (with common 0), and let F ′ be a filter in L′.
Then F ′, seen as a subset of L, is a filter base in L. The smallest filter in L
that contains F ′ is the cone over F ′ in L:
CL(F ′) := {b ∈ L | ∃a ∈ F ′ : a ≤ b}. (8.27)
This is nothing but the upper set ↑F ′ of F ′ in L.
In our applications, L typically is the lattice P(H) of projections in B(H),
and L′ is the lattice P(V ) of projections in an abelian sub-algebra V .
If L is a Boolean lattice, i.e., if it is a distributive lattice with minimal
element 0 and maximal element 1, and a complement (negation) ¬ : L → L
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such that a ∨ ¬a = 1 for all a ∈ L, then we define an ultrafilter F˜ to be
a maximal filter in L. An ultrafilter F˜ is characterised by the following
property: for all a ∈ L, either a ∈ F˜ or ¬a ∈ F˜ . This can easily be seen:
we have a∨¬a = 1 by definition. Let us assume that F˜ is an ultrafilter and
a /∈ F˜ . This means that there is some b ∈ F˜ such that b ∧ a = 0. Using
distributivity of the lattice L, we get
b = b ∧ (a ∨ ¬a) = (b ∧ a) ∨ (b ∧ ¬a) = b ∧ ¬a, (8.28)
so b ≤ ¬a. Since b ∈ F˜ and F˜ is a filter, this implies ¬a ∈ F˜ . Conversely, if
¬a /∈ F˜ , we obtain a ∈ F˜ .
The projection lattice P(V ) of an abelian von Neumann algebra V is a
Boolean lattice. The maximal element is the identity operator 1̂ and, as we
saw earlier, the complement of a projection is given as ¬αˆ = 1ˆ − αˆ. Each
ultrafilter F˜ in P(V ) hence contains either αˆ or 1ˆ− αˆ for all αˆ ∈ P(V ).
Spectral elements and ultrafilters. Let V ∈ Ob(V(H)), and let λ ∈ ΣV
be a spectral element of the von Neumann algebra V . This means that λ is
a multiplicative state of V . For all projections αˆ ∈ P(V ), we have
〈λ, αˆ〉 = 〈λ, αˆ2〉 = 〈λ, αˆ〉〈λ, αˆ〉, (8.29)
and so 〈λ, αˆ〉 ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, 〈λ, 0ˆ〉 = 0, 〈λ, 1ˆ〉 = 1, and if 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 0,
then 〈λ, 1ˆ − αˆ〉 = 1 (since 〈λ, αˆ〉 + 〈λ, 1ˆ − αˆ〉 = 〈λ, 1ˆ〉). Hence, for each
αˆ ∈ P(V ) we have either 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1 or 〈λ, 1ˆ− αˆ〉 = 1. This shows that the
family
Fλ := {αˆ ∈ P(V ) | 〈λ, αˆ〉 = 1} (8.30)
of projections is an ultrafilter in P(V ). Conversely, each λ ∈ ΣV is uniquely
determined by the set {〈λ, αˆ〉 | αˆ ∈ P(V )} and hence by an ultrafilter in
P(V ). This shows that there is a bijection between the setQ(V ) of ultrafilters
in P(V ) and the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV .
Observable and antonymous functions. Let N be a von Neumann
algebra, and let F(N ) be the set of filters in the projection lattice P(N ) of
N . De Groote has shown [34] that to each self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ N , there
corresponds a, so-called, ‘observable function’ fAˆ : F(N ) → sp(Aˆ). If N is
abelian, N = V , then fAˆ|Q(V ) is just the Gel’fand transform of Aˆ. However,
it is striking that fAˆ can be defined even if N is non-abelian; for us, the
important example is N = B(H).
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If {EˆAµ }µ∈R is the spectral family of Aˆ, then fAˆ is defined as
fAˆ : F(N ) → sp(Aˆ)
F 7→ inf{µ ∈ R | EˆAµ ∈ F}. (8.31)
Conversely, given a bounded function f : D(H)→ R with certain properties,
one can find a unique self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ B(H) such that f = fAˆ.
It can be shown that each observable function is completely determined
by its restriction to the space of maximal filters [34]. Let Q(N ) denote the
space of maximal filters in P(N ). The sets
QPˆ (N ) := {F ∈ Q(N ) | Pˆ ∈ F}, Pˆ ∈ P(N ), (8.32)
form the base of a totally disconnected topology on Q(N ). Following de
Groote, this space is called the Stone spectrum of N . If N is abelian, N = V ,
then, upon the identification of maximal filters (which are ultrafilters) in
P(V ) and spectral elements in ΣV , the Stone spectrum Q(V ) is the Gel’fand
spectrum ΣV of V .
This shows that for an arbitrary von Neumann algebra N , the Stone
spectrumQ(N ) is a generalisation of the Gel’fand spectrum (the latter is only
defined for abelian algebras). The observable function fAˆ is a generalisation
of the Gel’fand transform of Aˆ.
We want to show that the observable function fδo(Vˆ )A of the outer da-
seinisation of Aˆ to V can be expressed by the observable function fAˆ of Aˆ
directly. Since this works for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), we obtain a nice encoding
of all the functions fδo(Aˆ)V and hence of the self-adjoint operators δ
o(Aˆ)V .
The result (already shown in [32]) is that, for all stages V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and
all filters F in F(V ),
fδo(Aˆ)V (F ) = fAˆ(CB(H)(F )). (8.33)
We want to give an elementary proof of this. We need
Lemma 8.3 Let N be a von Neumann algebra, S a von Neumann sub-
algebra of N , and let δiS : P(N ) → P(S) be the inner daseinisation map
on projections. Then, for all filters F ∈ F(S),
(δiS)
−1(F ) = CN (F ). (8.34)
Proof. If Qˆ ∈ F ⊂ P(S), then (δiS)−1(Qˆ) = {Pˆ ∈ P(N ) | δi(Pˆ )S = Qˆ}.
Let Pˆ ∈ P(N ) be such that there is a Qˆ ∈ F with Qˆ ≤ Pˆ , i.e., Pˆ ∈ CN (F ).
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Then δi(Pˆ )S ≥ Qˆ, which implies δi(Pˆ )S ∈ F , since F is a filter in P(S).
This shows that CN (F ) ⊆ (δiS)−1(F ). Now let Pˆ ∈ P(N ) be such that there
is no Qˆ ∈ F with Qˆ ≤ Pˆ . Since δi(Pˆ )S ≤ Pˆ , there also is no Qˆ ∈ F with
Qˆ ≤ δi(Pˆ )S , so Pˆ /∈ (δiS)−1(F ). This shows that (δiS)−1(F ) ⊆ CN (F ).
We now can prove
Theorem 8.4 Let Aˆ ∈ Nsa. For all von Neumann sub-algebras S ⊆ N and
all filters F ∈ F(S), we have
fδo(Aˆ)S (F ) = fAˆ(CN (F )). (8.35)
Proof. We have
fδo(Aˆ)S(F ) = inf{λ ∈ R | Eˆ
δo(Aˆ)S
λ ∈ F}
= inf{λ ∈ R | δi(EˆAλ )S ∈ F}
= inf{λ ∈ R | EˆAλ ∈ (δiS)−1(F )}
= inf{λ ∈ R | EˆAλ ∈ CN (F )}
= fAˆ(CN (F )).
The second equality is the definition of outer daseinisation (on the level of
spectral projections, see (7.14)). In the penultimate step, we used Lemma
8.3.
This clearly implies (8.33). We saw above that to each λ ∈ ΣV there cor-
responds a unique ultrafilter Fλ ∈ Q(V ). Since δo(Aˆ)V ∈ Vsa, the observable
function fδo(Aˆ)V is the Gel’fand transform of δ
o(Aˆ)V , and so, upon identifying
the ultrafilter Fλ with the spectral element λ, we have
fδo(Aˆ)V (Fλ) = δ
o(Aˆ)V (λ) = 〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V 〉. (8.36)
From (8.33) we have
〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V 〉 = fδo(Aˆ)V (Fλ) = fAˆ(CB(H)(Fλ)) (8.37)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and for all λ ∈ ΣV . In this sense, the observable
function fAˆ encodes all the outer daseinisations δ
o(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), of
Aˆ.
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There is also a function, gAˆ, on the filters in P(H) that encodes all the
inner daseinisations δi(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)). This function is given for an
arbitrary von Neumann algebra N by
gAˆ : F(N ) → sp(Aˆ) (8.38)
F 7→ sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ− EˆAλ ∈ F} (8.39)
and is called the antonymous function of Aˆ [20]. If N is abelian, then gAˆ|Q(V )
is the Gel’fand transform of Aˆ and coincides with fAˆ on the space Q(V ) of
maximal filters, i.e., ultrafilters in P(V ). As functions on F(V ), fAˆ and gAˆ
are different also in the abelian case. For an arbitrary von Neumann algebra
N , the antonymous function gAˆ is another generalisation of the Gel’fand
transform of Aˆ.
There is a close relationship between observable and antonymous func-
tions [34, 20]: for all von Neumann algebras N and all self-adjoint operators
Aˆ ∈ Nsa, it holds that
−fAˆ = g−Aˆ. (8.40)
There is a relation analogous to (8.33) for antonymous functions: for all
V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and all filters F in F(V ),
gδi(Aˆ)V (F ) = gAˆ(CB(H)(F )). (8.41)
This follows from
Theorem 8.5 Let Aˆ ∈ Nsa. For all von Neumann sub-algebras S ⊆ N and
all filters F ∈ F(S), we have
gδi(Aˆ)S (F ) = gAˆ(CN (F )). (8.42)
Proof. We have
gδi(Aˆ)S (F ) = sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ− Eˆ
δi(Aˆ)S
λ ∈ F}
=sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ−
∧
µ>λ
δo(EˆAµ )S ∈ F}
=sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ− δo(EˆAλ )S ∈ F}
=sup{λ ∈ R | δi(1ˆ− EˆAλ )S ∈ F}
=sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ− EˆAλ ∈ (δiS)−1(F )}
=sup{λ ∈ R | 1ˆ− EˆAλ ∈ CN (F )}
=gAˆ(CN (F )),
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where in the penultimate step we used Lemma 8.3.
Let λ ∈ ΣV , and let Fλ ∈ Q(V ) be the corresponding ultrafilter. Since
δi(Aˆ)V ∈ V , the antonymous function gδi(Aˆ)V is the Gel’fand transform of
δi(Aˆ)V , and we have
gδi(Aˆ)V (Fλ) = δ
i(Aˆ)V (λ) = 〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V 〉. (8.43)
From (8.41), we get
〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V 〉 = gδi(Aˆ)V (Fλ) = gAˆ(CB(H)(Fλ)) (8.44)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and all λ ∈ ΣV . Thus the antonymous function gAˆ
encodes all the inner daseinisations δi(Aˆ)V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), of Aˆ.
8.4 A Physical Interpretation of the Arrow δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ→
R↔
Let |ψ〉 ∈ H be a unit vector in the Hilbert space of the quantum system.
The expectation value of a self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ B(H) in the state |ψ〉
is given by
〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 =
∫ ||Aˆ||
−||Aˆ||
λ d〈ψ| EˆAλ |ψ〉. (8.45)
In the discussion of truth objects in section 6, we introduced the maximal
filter T |ψ〉 in P(H),84 given by (cf. (6.31))
T |ψ〉 := {αˆ ∈ P(H) | αˆ  |ψ〉〈ψ| }, (8.46)
where |ψ〉〈ψ| is the projection onto the one-dimensional subspace of H gen-
erated by |ψ〉. As shown in [20], the expectation value 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 can be
written as
〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 =
∫ f
Aˆ
(T |ψ〉)
g
Aˆ
(T |ψ〉)
λ d〈ψ| EˆAλ |ψ〉. (8.47)
In an instrumentalist interpretation,85 one would interpret gAˆ(T
|ψ〉), resp.
fAˆ(T
|ψ〉), as the smallest, resp. largest, possible result of a measurement of
84Since P(H) is not distributive, T |ψ〉 is not an ultrafilter; i.e., there are projections
Pˆ ∈ P(H) such that neither Pˆ ∈ T |ψ〉 nor 1ˆ− Pˆ ∈ T |ψ〉.
85Which we avoid in general, of course!
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the physical quantity A when the state is |ψ〉. If |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of
Aˆ, then 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 is an eigenvalue of Aˆ, and in this case, 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 ∈ sp(Aˆ);
moreover,
〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 = gAˆ(T |ψ〉) = fAˆ(T |ψ〉). (8.48)
If |ψ〉 is not an eigenstate of Aˆ, then
gAˆ(T
|ψ〉) < 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 < fAˆ(T |ψ〉). (8.49)
For details, see [20].
Let V be an abelian sub-algebra of B(H) such that ΣV contains the
spectral element, λ |ψ〉, associated with |ψ〉.86 The corresponding ultrafilter
in P(V ) consists of those projections αˆ ∈ P(V ) such that αˆ  |ψ〉〈ψ| . This
is just the evaluation, T
|ψ〉
V , at stage V of our truth object, T
|ψ〉; see (6.30).
Hence the cone C(T |ψ〉V ) := CB(H)(T |ψ〉V ) consists of all projections Rˆ ∈
P(H) such that Rˆ  |ψ〉〈ψ| ; and so, for all stages V such that |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈
P(V ) we have
C(T |ψ〉V ) = T |ψ〉. (8.50)
This allows us to write the expectation value as
〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 =
∫ f
Aˆ
(C(T
|ψ〉
V
)
g
Aˆ
(C(T
|ψ〉
V
)
λ d〈ψ| EˆAλ |ψ〉 (8.51)
=
∫ f
δo(Aˆ)V
(T
|ψ〉
V
)
g
δi(Aˆ)V
(T
|ψ〉
V
)
λ d〈ψ| EˆAλ |ψ〉 (8.52)
for these stages V .
Equations (8.36) and (8.43) show that fδo(Aˆ)V (T
|ψ〉
V ) = 〈ψ| δo(Aˆ)V |ψ〉
and gδi(Aˆ)V (T
|ψ〉
V ) = 〈ψ| δi(Aˆ)V |ψ〉. In the language of instrumentalism, for
stages V for which λ |ψ〉 ∈ ΣV , the value 〈ψ| δi(Aˆ)V |ψ〉 ∈ sp(Aˆ) is the
smallest possible measurement result for Aˆ in the quantum state |ψ〉; and
〈ψ| δo(Aˆ)V |ψ〉 ∈ sp(Aˆ) is the largest possible result.
These results depend on the fact that we use (inner and outer) daseini-
sation, i.e., approximations in the spectral, not the linear order.
If λ ∈ ΣV is not of the form λ = λ |ψ〉, for some |ψ〉 ∈ H, then the cone
C(Fλ) over the ultrafilter Fλ corresponding to λ cannot be identified with a
86This is the element defined by λ |ψ〉(Aˆ) := 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉 for all Aˆ ∈ V . It is characterised by
the fact that λ |ψ〉( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) = 1 and λ |ψ〉(Qˆ) = 0 for all Qˆ ∈ P(V ) such that Qˆ |ψ〉〈ψ| = 0ˆ.
We have λ |ψ〉 ∈ ΣV if and only if |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ P(V ).
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vector in H. Nevertheless, the quantity C(Fλ) is well-defined, and (8.33) and
(8.41) hold. If we go from V to a sub-algebra V ′ ⊆ V , then δi(Aˆ)V ′  δi(Aˆ)V
and δo(Aˆ)V ′  δo(Aˆ)V , hence
〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V ′〉 ≤ 〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V 〉, (8.53)
〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V ′〉 ≥ 〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V 〉 (8.54)
for all λ ∈ ΣV .
We can interpret the function
δ˘(Aˆ)V : ΣV → R↔V (8.55)
λ 7→ δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ) =
(
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘
o(Aˆ)V (λ)
)
(8.56)
as giving the ‘spread’ or ‘range’ of the physical quantity A at stages V ′ ⊆ V .
Each element λ ∈ ΣV gives its own ‘spread’ δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ) :↓V → sp(Aˆ)× sp(Aˆ).
The intuitive idea is that at stage V , given a point λ ∈ ΣV , the physical
quantity A ‘spreads over’ the subset of the spectrum, sp(Aˆ), of Aˆ given by
the closed interval of sp(Aˆ) ⊂ R defined by
[δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ)(V ), δ˘
o(Aˆ)V (λ)(V )] ∩ sp(Aˆ) = [〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V 〉, 〈λ, δo(Aˆ))V 〉] ∩ sp(Aˆ),
(8.57)
For a proper sub-algebra V ′ ⊂ V , the spreading is over the (potentially
larger) subset
[δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ)(V
′), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ)(V
′)] ∩ sp(Aˆ) = [〈λ, δi(Aˆ)V ′〉, 〈λ, δo(Aˆ)V ′〉] ∩ sp(Aˆ).
(8.58)
All this is local in the sense that these expressions are defined at a stage V
and for sub-algebras, V ′, of V , where λ ∈ ΣV . No similar global construction
or interpretation is possible, since the spectral presheaf Σ has no global
elements, i.e., no points (while the set ΣV does have points).
As we go down to smaller sub-algebras V ′ ⊆ V , the spread gets larger.
This comes from the fact that Aˆ has to be adapted more and more as we go
to smaller sub-algebras V ′. More precisely, Aˆ is approximated from below
by δi(Aˆ)V ′ ∈ V ′ and from above by δo(Aˆ)V ′ ∈ V ′. This approximation gets
coarser as V ′ gets smaller, which basically means that V ′ contains less and
less projections.
It should be remarked that δ˘(Aˆ) does not assign actual values to the
physical quantity A, but rather the possible range of such values; and these
are independent of any state |ψ〉. This is analogous to the classical case
where physical quantities are represented by real-valued functions on state
space. The range of possible values is state-independent, but the actual value
possessed by a physical quantity does depend on the state of the system.
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The quantity-value presheaf R↔ as the interval domain. Spitters
and Heunen observed [38] that the presheaf R↔ is the interval domain in
out topos. This object has mainly been considered in theoretical computer
science [28] and can be used to systematically encode situations where real
numbers are only known—or can only be defined—up to a certain degree of
accuracy. Approximation processes can be well described using the math-
ematics of domain theory. Clearly, this has close relations to our physical
situation, where the real numbers are spectral values of self-adjoint opera-
tors and coarse-graining (or rather the inverse process of fine-graining) can
be understood as a process of approximation.
8.5 The value of a physical quantity in a quantum state
We now want to discuss how physical quantities, represented by natural
transformations δ˘(Aˆ), acquire ‘values’ in a given quantum state. Of course,
this is not as straightforward as in the classical case, since from the Kochen-
Specker theorem, we know that physical quantities do not have real numbers
as their values. As we saw, this is related to the fact that there are no
microstates, i.e., the spectral presheaf has no global elements.
In classical physics, a physical quantity A is represented by a function
A˘ : S → R from the state space S to the real numbers. A point s ∈ S is a
microstate, and the physical quantity A has the value A˘(s) in this state.
We want to mimic this as closely as possible in the quantum case. In
order to do so, we take a pseudo-state
w |ψ〉 := δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) = V 7→
∧
{αˆ ∈ OV | |ψ〉〈ψ|  αˆ} (8.59)
(see (6.34)) and consider it as a sub-object of Σ. This means that at each
stage V ∈ Ob(V(H)), we consider the set
w
|ψ〉
V := {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 = 1} ⊆ ΣV . (8.60)
Of course, the sub-object of Σ that we get simply is δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| ). Sub-objects
of this kind are as close to microstates as we can get, see the discussion in
section 6.3 and [25]. We can then form the composition
w |ψ〉 → Σ δ˘(Aˆ)−→ R↔, (8.61)
which is also denoted by δ˘(Aˆ)(w |ψ〉). One can think of this arrow as being
the ‘value’ of the physical quantity A in the state described by w |ψ〉.
115
The first question is if we actually obtain a sub-object of R↔ in this way.
Let V, V ′ ∈ Ob(V(H)), V ′ ⊆ V . We have to show that
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (w
|ψ〉
V )) ⊆ δ˘(Aˆ)V ′(w |ψ〉V ′ ). (8.62)
Let λ ∈ w |ψ〉V , then
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ)) = (δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ))|V ′ = δ˘(Aˆ)V ′(λ|V ′). (8.63)
By definition, we have
w
|ψ〉
V ′ = Σ(iV ′V )(w
|ψ〉
V ) = {λ|V ′ | λ ∈ w |ψ〉V }, (8.64)
that is, every λ′ ∈ w |ψ〉V ′ is given as the restriction of some λ ∈ w |ψ〉V . This
implies that we even obtain the equality
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (w
|ψ〉
V )) = δ˘(Aˆ)V ′(w
|ψ〉
V ′ ), (8.65)
so δ˘(Aˆ)(w |ψ〉) is indeed a sub-object of R↔.
Values as pairs of functions and eigenvalues. At each stage V ∈
Ob(V(H)), we have pairs of order-preserving and order-reversing functions
δ˘(Aˆ)(λ), one function for each λ ∈ w |ψ〉V . If |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of Aˆ and
V is an abelian sub-algebra that contains Aˆ, then δi(Aˆ)V = δ
o(Aˆ)V = Aˆ.
Moreover, w
|ψ〉
V contains the single element λ |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ ΣV , which is the pure
state that assigns 1 to |ψ〉〈ψ| and 0 to all projections in P(V ) orthogonal
to |ψ〉〈ψ| .
Evaluating δ˘(Aˆ)(w |ψ〉) at V hence gives a pair, consisting of an order-
preserving function δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ |ψ〉〈ψ| ) :↓ V → sp(Aˆ) and an order-reversing
function δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ |ψ〉〈ψ| ) :↓V → sp(Aˆ):
δ˘(Aˆ)V (w
|ψ〉
V ) = (δ˘
i(Aˆ)V (λ |ψ〉〈ψ| ), δ˘
o(Aˆ)V (λ |ψ〉〈ψ| )). (8.66)
The value of both functions at stage V is Aˆ(λ |ψ〉〈ψ| ) = 〈λ |ψ〉〈ψ| , Aˆ〉, which is
the eigenvalue of Aˆ in the state |ψ〉. In this sense, we get back the ordinary
eigenvalue of Aˆ when the system is in the eigenstate ψ.
A simple example. We consider the value of the self-adjoint projection
operator |ψ〉〈ψ| , seen as (the representative of) a physical quantity, in the
(pseudo-)state w |ψ〉. We remark that sp( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) = {0, 1}. By definition,
δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) = (δ˘i( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ), δ˘o( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ)) (8.67)
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for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and all λ ∈ ΣV . In particular, the function
δ˘o( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) :↓V → {0, 1} (8.68)
is given as (see (8.12), for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
δ˘o( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ)(V ′) = 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′〉. (8.69)
If λ ∈ w |ψ〉V , then 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 = 1, see (8.60). Hence, for all λ ∈ w |ψ〉V ,
we obtain, for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
δ˘o( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ)(V ′) = 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′〉 = 1. (8.70)
If we denote the constant function on ↓V with value 1 as 1↓V , then we can
write
δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) = (δ˘i( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ), 1↓V ) (8.71)
for all V and all λ ∈ w |ψ〉V . The constant function 1↓V trivially is an order-
reversing function from ↓V to sp( |ψ〉〈ψ| ). We now consider the function
δ˘i( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) :↓V → {0, 1}. (8.72)
It is given as (see (8.20), for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
δ˘i( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ)(V ′) = 〈λ, δi( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′〉. (8.73)
If |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ P(V ′), then, for all λ ∈ w |ψ〉V ′ , we have 〈λ, δi( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′〉 =
〈λ, |ψ〉〈ψ| 〉 = 1. If |ψ〉〈ψ| /∈ P(V ′), then δi( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′ = 0ˆ, since δi( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 
|ψ〉〈ψ| and |ψ〉〈ψ| is a projection onto a one-dimensional subspace, so δi( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V ′
must project onto the zero-dimensional subspace.
Thus we get, for all V , for all λ ∈ w |ψ〉V and all V ′ ⊆ V :
δ˘i( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ)(V ′) =
{
1 if |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ V ′
0 if |ψ〉〈ψ| /∈ V ′ (8.74)
Summing up, we have completely described the ‘value’ δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )(w |ψ〉) of
the physical quantity described by |ψ〉〈ψ| in the pseudo-state given by w |ψ〉.
There is an immediate generalisation of one part of this result: Consider
an arbitrary non-zero projection Pˆ ∈ V(H),87 the corresponding sub-object
δo(Pˆ ) of Σ obtained from outer daseinisaion, and the sub-object δ˘(Pˆ )(δo(Pˆ ))
87Of course, if Pˆ is not a projection onto a one-dimensional subspace, then it cannot be
identified with a state.
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of R↔. For all V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and all λ ∈ δo(Pˆ )
V
, a completely analogous
argument to the one given above shows that for the order-reversing functions
δ˘o(Pˆ )V (λ) :↓V → {0, 1}, we always obtain the constant function 1↓V .
The behaviour of the order-preserving functions δ˘i(Pˆ )V (λ) :↓V → {0, 1}
is more complicated than in the case that Pˆ projects onto a one-dimensional
subspace. In general, Pˆ /∈ V ′ does not imply δ˘i(Pˆ )V ′(λ)(V ′) = 0 for λ ∈
δo(Pˆ )
V
, so the analogue of (8.74) does not hold in general.
8.6 Properties of R↔.
From the perspective of our overall programme, Theorem 8.2 is a key result
and shows that R↔ is a possible choice for the quantity-value object for
quantum theory. To explore this further, we start by noting some elementary
properties of the presheaf R↔. Analogous arguments apply to the presheaves
R and R.
1. The presheaf R↔ has global elements: namely, pairs of order-preserving
and order-reversing functions on the partially-ordered set Ob(V(H)) of
objects in the category V(H); i.e., pairs of functions (µ, ν) : Ob(V(H))→
R such that:
∀V1, V2 ∈ Ob(V(H)), V2 ⊆ V1 : µ(V2) ≤ µ(V1), ν(V2) ≥ ν(V1). (8.75)
2. (a) Elements of ΓR↔ can be added: i.e., if (µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2) ∈ ΓR↔,
define (µ1, ν1) + (µ2, ν2) at each stage V by
((µ1, ν1) + (µ2, ν2))(V
′) := (µ1(V
′) + µ2(V
′), ν1(V
′) + ν2(V
′))
(8.76)
for all V ′ ⊆ V . Note that if V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V , then µ1(V2) ≤ µ1(V1)
and µ2(V2) ≤ µ2(V1), and so µ1(V2) + µ2(V2) ≤ µ1(V1) + µ(V1).
Likewise, ν1(V2) + ν2(V2) ≥ ν1(V1) + ν2(V1). Thus the definition
of (µ1, ν1) + (µ2, ν2) in (8.76) makes sense. Obviously, addition is
commutative and associative.
(b) However, it is not possible to define ‘(µ1, ν1) − (µ2, ν2)’ in this
way since the difference between two order-preserving functions
may not be order-preserving, nor need the difference of two order-
reversing functions be order-reversing. This problem is addressed
in Section 9.
(c) A zero/unit element can be defined for the additive structure on
ΓR↔ as 0(V ) := (0, 0) for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), where (0, 0) de-
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notes a pair of two copies of the function that is constantly 0 on
Ob(V(H)).
It follows from (a) and (c) that ΓR↔ is a commutative monoid
(i.e., a semi-group with a unit).
The commutative monoid structure for ΓR↔ is a reflection of the stronger
fact that R↔ is a commutative-monoid object in the topos SetsV(H)
op
.
Specifically, there is an arrow
+ : R↔ × R↔ → R↔, (8.77)
+V ((µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2)) := (µ1 + µ2, ν1 + ν2) (8.78)
for all (µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2) ∈ R↔V , and for all stages V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Here,
(µ1 + µ2, ν1 + ν2) denotes the real-valued function on ↓V defined by
(µ1 + µ2, ν1 + ν2)(V
′) := (µ1(V
′) + µ2(V
′), ν1(V
′) + ν2(V
′)) (8.79)
for all V ′ ⊆ V .
3. The real numbers, R, form a ring, and so it is natural to see if a
multiplicative structure can be put on ΓR↔. The obvious ‘definition’
would be, for all V ,
(µ1, ν1)(µ2, ν2)(V ) := (µ1(V )µ2(V ), ν1(V )ν2(V )) (8.80)
for (µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2) ∈ ΓR↔. However, this fails because the right hand
side of (8.80) may not be a pair consisting of an order-preserving and
an order-reversing function. This problem arises, for example, if ν1(V )
and ν2(V ) become negative: then, as V gets smaller, the product
ν1(V )ν2(V ) gets larger and thus defines an order-preserving function.
8.7 The Representation of Propositions From Inverse
Images
In Section 3.2, we introduced a simple propositional language, PL(S), for
each system S, and discussed its representations for the case of classical
physics. Then, in Section 5 we analysed the, far more complicated, quantum-
theoretical representation of this language in the set of clopen subsets of the
spectral presheaf, Σ, in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. This gives a representation of
the primitive propositions “Aε∆” as sub-objects of Σ:
πqt(Aε∆) := δ
o
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) (8.81)
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where ‘δo’ is the (outer) daseinisation operation, and Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] is the spectral
projection corresponding to the subset ∆∩ sp(Aˆ) of the spectrum, sp(Aˆ), of
the self-adjoint operator Aˆ.
We now want to remark briefly on the nature, and representation, of
propositions using the ‘local’ language L(S).
In any classical representation, σ, of L(S) in Sets, the representation, Rσ,
of the quantity-value symbol R is always just the real numbers R. There-
fore, it is simple to take a subset ∆ ⊆ R of R, and construct the propositions
“Aε∆”. In fact, if Aσ : Σσ → R is the representation of the function symbol
A with signature Σ→R, then A−1σ (∆) is a subset of the symplectic manifold
Σσ (the representation of the ground type Σ). This subset, A
−1
σ (∆) ⊆ Σσ,
represents the proposition “Aε∆” in the Boolean algebra of all (Borel) sub-
sets of Σσ.
We should consider the analogue of these steps in the representation, φ,
of the same language, L(S), in the topos τφ := SetsV(H)
op
. In fact, the issues
to be discussed apply to a representation in any topos.
We first note that if Ξ is a sub-object of Rφ, and if Aφ : Σφ → Rφ,
then there is an associated sub-object of Σφ, denoted A
−1
φ (Ξ). Specifically, if
χΞ : Rφ → Ωτφ is the characteristic arrow of the sub-object Ξ, then A−1φ (Ξ)
is defined to be the sub-object of Σφ whose characteristic arrow is χΞ ◦ Aφ :
Σφ → Ωτφ . These sub-objects are analogues of the subsets, A−1σ (∆), of
the classical state space Σσ: as such, they can represent propositions. In
this spirit, we could denote by “AεΞ” the proposition which the sub-object
A−1φ (Ξ) represents, although, of course, it would be a mistake to interpret
“AεΞ” as asserting that the value of something lies in something else: in a
general topos, there are no such values.
In the case of quantum theory, the arrows Aφ : Σφ → Rφ are of the form
δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ → R↔ where Rφ := R↔. It follows that the propositions in our
L(S)-theory are represented by the sub-objects δ˘(Aˆ)−1(Ξ) of Σ, where Ξ is
a sub-object of R↔.
To interpret such propositions, note first that in the PL(S)-propositions
“Aε∆”, the range ‘∆’ belongs to the world that is external to the language.
Consequently, the meaning of ∆ is given independently of PL(S). This
‘externally interpreted’ ∆ is then inserted into the quantum representation
of PL(S) via the daseinisation of propositions discussed in Section 5.
However, the situation is very different for the L(S)-propositions “AεΞ”.
Here, the quantity ‘Ξ’ belongs to the particular topos τφ, and hence it is
representation dependent. The implication is that the ‘meaning’ of “AεΞ”
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can only be discussed from ‘within the topos’ using the internal language
that is associated with τφ, which, we recall, carries the translation of L(S)
given by the topos-representation φ.
From a conceptual perspective, this situation is ‘relational’, with the
meanings of the various propositions being determined by their relations
to each other as formulated in the internal language of the topos. Concomi-
tantly, the meaning of ‘truth’ cannot be understood using the correspondence
theory (much favoured by instrumentalists) for there is nothing external to
which a proposition can ‘correspond’. Instead, what is needed is more like a
coherence theory of truth in which a whole body of propositions is considered
together [30]. This is a fascinating subject, but further discussion must be
deferred to later work.
8.8 The relation between the formal languages L(S)
and PL(S)
In the propositional language PL(S), we have symbols “Aε∆” representing
primitive propositions. In the quantum case, such a primitive proposition is
represented by the outer daseinisation δo(Pˆ ) of the projection corresponding
to the proposition. (The spectral theorem gives the link between propositions
and projections.)
We now want to show that the sub-objects of Σ of the form δo(Pˆ ) for
Pˆ ∈ P(H) also are part of the language L(S). More precisely, we will show
that δo(Pˆ ) can be obtained as the inverse image of a certain sub-object of
R↔.
The sub-object of R↔ that we consider is δ˘(Pˆ )(δo(Pˆ )). We take the
inverse image of this sub-object under the natural transformation δ˘(Pˆ ) :
Σ → R↔. This means that we assume that the language L(S) contains a
function symbol P : Σ→R that is represented by the natural transformation
δ˘(Pˆ ).
One more remark: although it may look as if we put in from the start
the sub-object δo(Pˆ ) that we want to construct, this is not the case: we can
take the inverse of an arbitrary sub-object of R↔, and we happen to choose
δ˘(Pˆ )(δo(Pˆ )). Forming the inverse image of a sub-object of R↔ under the
natural transformation δ˘(Pˆ ) is analogous to taking the inverse image f−1{r}
of some real value r under some real-valued function f . The real value r
can be given as the value r = f(x) of the function at some element x of its
domain. This does not imply that f−1{r} = {x}: the inverse image may
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contain more elements than just {x}. Likewise, we have to discuss whether
the inverse image δ˘(Pˆ )−1(δ˘(Pˆ )(δo(Pˆ ))) equals δo(Pˆ ) or is some larger sub-
object of Σ.
We start with the case that Pˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ| , i.e., Pˆ is the projection onto a
one-dimensional subspace.
Theorem 8.6 The inverse image δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )−1(δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )(w |ψ〉)) is w |ψ〉.
Proof. Let S := δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )−1(δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )(w |ψ〉)). In any case, we have
S ⊇ w |ψ〉. (8.82)
Let us assume that the inclusion is proper. Then there exists some V ∈
Ob(V(H)) such that
S(V ) ⊃ w |ψ〉V = {λ ∈ ΣV | 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 = 1}, (8.83)
which is equivalent to the existence of some λ0 ∈ SV such that
〈λ0, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 = 0. (8.84)
By definition, we have S(V ) = {λ ∈ ΣV | δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) ∈ δ˘( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (w |ψ〉)}.
For all λ˜ ∈ w |ψ〉V , it holds that
〈λ˜, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 = 1, (8.85)
see (8.70). This implies that for all λ ∈ S(V ), we must have 〈λ, δo( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V 〉 =
1, which contradicts (8.84). Hence there cannot be a proper inclusion S ⊃
w |ψ〉, and we rather have equality
S(V ) = w
|ψ〉
V (8.86)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
The proof is based on the fact that the order-reversing functions of the
form δ˘o( |ψ〉〈ψ| )V (λ) : ↓V → {0, 1}, where V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and λ ∈ w |ψ〉V , are
constant functions 1↓V . The remark at the end of Section 8.5 shows that this
holds more generally for arbitrary non-zero projections Pˆ . Hence we obtain:
Corollary 8.7 The inverse image δ˘(Pˆ )−1(δ˘(Pˆ )(δo(Pˆ ))) is δo(Pˆ ).
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9 Extending the Quantity-Value Presheaf to
an Abelian Group Object
9.1 Preliminary Remarks
We have shown how each self-adjoint operator, Aˆ, on the Hilbert space H
gives rise to an arrow δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ → R↔ in the topos SetsV(H)op . Thus, in
the topos representation, φ, of L(S) for the theory-type ‘quantum theory’,
the arrow δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ → R↔ is one possible choice88 for the representation,
Aφ : Σφ → Rφ, of the function symbol, A : Σ→R.
This implies that the quantity-value object, Rφ, is the presheaf, R↔.
However, although such an identification is possible, it does impose certain
restrictions on the formalism. These stem from the fact that R↔ is only
a monoid -object in SetsV(H)
op
, and ΓR↔ is only a monoid, whereas the
real numbers of standard physics are an abelian group; indeed, they are
a commutative ring.
In standard classical physics, HomSets
(
Σσ,R
)
is the set of real-valued
functions on the manifold Σσ; as such, it possesses the structure of a commu-
tative ring. On the other hand, the set of arrows HomSetsV(H)op
(
Σ,R↔
)
has
only the structure of an additive monoid. This additive structure is defined
locally in the following way. Let α, β ∈ HomSetsV(H)op
(
Σ,R↔
)
. At each stage
V ∈ Ob(V(H)), αV is a pair (µ1,V , ν1,V ), consisting of a function µ1,V from
ΣV to R

V , and a function ν1,V from ΣV to R

V . For each λ ∈ ΣV , one
has an order-preserving function µ1,V (λ) :↓V → R, and an order-reversing
function ν1,V (λ) :↓V → R. We use the notation αV (λ) := (µ1,V (λ), ν1,V (λ)).
Similarly, β is given at each stage V by a pair of functions (µ2,V , ν2,V ),
and for all λ ∈ ΣV , we write βV (λ) := (µ2,V (λ), ν2,V (λ))
We define, for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), and all λ ∈ ΣV , (c.f. (8.79))
(α+ β)V (λ) = ((µ1,V (λ), ν1,V (λ)) + (µ2,V (λ), ν2,V (λ))) (9.1)
:= (µ1,V (λ) + µ2,V (λ), ν1,V (λ) + ν2,V (λ)) (9.2)
= αV (λ) + βV (λ), (9.3)
It is clear that (α + β)V (λ) is a pair consisting of an order-preserving and
an order-reversing function for all V and all λ ∈ ΣV , so that α + β is well
defined.89
88Another choice is to use the presheaf R as the quantity-value object, or the isomor-
phic presheaf R.
89To avoid confusion we should emphasise that, in general, the sum δ(Aˆ) + δ(Bˆ) is not
equal to δ(Aˆ+ Bˆ).
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Arguably, the fact that HomSetsV(H)op
(
Σ,R↔
)
is only a monoid90 is a
weakness in so far as we are trying to make quantum theory ‘look’ as much
like classical physics as possible. Of course, in more obscure applications such
as Planck-length quantum gravity, the nature of the quantity-value object is
very much open for debate. But when applied to regular physics, we might
like our formalism to look more like classical physics than the monoid-only
structure of HomSetsV(H)op
(
Σ,R↔
)
.
The need for a subtraction, i.e. some sort of abelian group structure
on R↔, brings to mind the well-known Grothendieck k-construction that is
much used in algebraic topology and other branches of pure mathematics.
This gives a way of ‘extending’ an abelian semi-group to become an abelian
group, and this technique can be adapted to the present situation. The
goal is to construct a ‘Grothendieck completion’, k(R↔), of R↔ that is an
abelian-group object in the topos SetsV(H)
op
.91
Of course, we can apply the k-construction also to the presheaf R (or R,
if we like). This comes with an extra advantage: it is then possible to define
the square of an arrow δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ→ R, as is shown in the Appendix. Hence,
given arrows δ˘o(Aˆ) and δ˘o(Aˆ2), we can define an ‘intrinsic dispersion’:92
∇(Aˆ) := δ˘o(Aˆ2)− δ˘o(Aˆ)2. (9.4)
Since the whole k-construction is quite complicated and is not used in this
paper beyond the present section, we have decided to put all the relevant
definitions into the Appendix where it can be read at leisure by anyone who
is interested.
Interestingly, there is a close relation between R↔ and k(R), as shown
in the next subsection.
90An internal version of this result would show that the exponential object R↔ Σ is a
monoid object in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. This could well be true, but we have not studied
it in detail.
91Ideally, we might like k(R) or k(R↔) to be a commutative-ring object, but this is
not true.
92The notation used here is potentially a little misleading. We have not given any
meaning to ‘A2’ in the language L(S); i.e., in its current form, the language does not give
meaning to the square of a function symbol. Therefore, when we write δ˘o(Aˆ2) this must
be understood as being the Gel’fand transform of the outer daseinisation of the operator
Aˆ2.
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9.2 The relation between R↔ and k(R).
In Section 8.2, we considered the presheaf R↔ of order-preserving and order-
reversing functions as a possible quantity-value object. The advantage of this
presheaf is the symmetric utilisation of inner and outer daseinisation, and
the associated physical interpretation of arrows from Σ to R↔.
It transpires that R↔ is closely related to k(R). Namely, for each V , we
can define an equivalence relation ≡ on R↔V by
(µ1, ν1) ≡ (µ2, ν2) iff µ1 + ν1 = µ2 + ν2. (9.5)
Then R↔/ ≡ is isomorphic to k(R) under the mapping
[µ, ν] 7→ [ν,−µ] ∈ k(R)V (9.6)
for all V and all [µ, ν] ∈ (R↔/ ≡)V .93
However, there is a difference between the arrows that represent physical
quantities. The arrow [δ˘o(Aˆ)] : Σ → k(R) is given by first sending Aˆ ∈
B(H)sa to δ˘o(Aˆ) and then taking k-equivalence classes—a construction that
only involves outer daseinisation. On the other hand, there is an arrow
[δ˘(Aˆ)] : Σ → R↔/ ≡, given by first sending Aˆ to δ˘(Aˆ) and then taking
the equivalence classes defined in (9.5). This involves both inner and outer
daseinisation.
We can show that [δ˘o(Aˆ)] uniquely determines Aˆ as follows: Let
[δ˘o(Aˆ)] : Σ→ k(R) (9.7)
denote the natural transformation from the spectral presheaf to the abelian
group-object k(R), given by first sending Aˆ to δ˘o(Aˆ) and then taking the
k-equivalence classes at each stage V . The monoid R is embedded into
k(R) by sending ν ∈ RV to [ν, 0] ∈ k(R)V for all V , which implies that
Aˆ is also uniquely determined by [δ˘o(Aˆ)].94 We note that, currently, it is an
open question if [δ˘(Aˆ)] also fixes Aˆ uniquely.
We now have constructed several presheaves that are abelian group ob-
jects within SetsV(H)
op
, namely k(R↔), k(R) and R↔/ ≡. The latter two
are isomorphic presheaves, as we have shown. All three presheaves can serve
93This identification also explains formula (9.5), which may look odd at first sight.
Recall that [µ, ν] ∈ (R↔/ ≡)V means that µ is order-preserving and ν is order-reversing.
94In an analogous manner, one can show that the arrows δ˘i(Aˆ) : Σ→ R and [δ˘i(Aˆ)] :
Σ → k(R) uniquely determine Aˆ, and that the arrow δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ → R↔ also uniquely
determines Aˆ.
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as the quantity-value presheaf if one wants to have an abelian-group object
for this purpose. Intuitively, if the quantity-value object is only an abelian-
monoid object like R↔, then the ‘values’ can only be added, while in the case
of an abelian-group object, they can be added and subtracted.
9.3 Algebraic properties of the potential quantity-value
presheaves
As matters stand, we have several possible choices for the quantity-value
presheaf, which is the representation for quantum theory of the symbol R
of the formal language L(S) that describes our physical system. In this
sub-section, we want to compare the algebraic properties of these various
presheaves. In particular, we will consider the presheaves R, k(R), R↔
and k(R↔).95
Global elements. We first note that all these presheaves have global el-
ements. For example, a global element of R is given by an order-reversing
function ν : V(H) → R. As remarked in the Appendix, we have Γk(R) ≃
k(ΓR). Global elements of R↔ are pairs (µ, ν) consisting of an order-
preserving function µ : V(H) → R and an order-reversing function ν :
V(H)→ R. Finally, it is easy to show that Γk(R↔) ≃ k(ΓR↔).
The real number object as a sub-object. In a presheaf topos SetsC
op
,
the Dedekind real number object R is the constant functor from Cop to R.
The presheaf R is an internal field object (see e.g. [48]).
The presheaf R contains the constant presheaf R as a sub-object: let
V ∈ Ob(V(H)) and r ∈ RV ≃ R. Then the function cr,V :↓V → R that
has the constant value r is an element of RV since it is an order-reversing
function. Moreover, the global sections of R are given by constant functions
r : V(H)→ R, and such functions are also global sections of R.
The presheaf R can be seen as a sub-object of k(R): let V ∈ V(H)
and ν ∈ RV , then [ν, 0] ∈ k(R)V . Thus the real number object R is also a
sub-object of k(R).
A real number r ∈ RV defines the pair (cr,V , cr,V ) consisting of two copies
of the constant function cr,V :↓V → R. Since cr,V is both order-preserving
and order-reversing, (cr,V , cr,V ) is an element of R
↔
V and hence R is a sub-
95The presheaf R is isomorphic to R and hence will not be considered separately.
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object of R↔. Since R↔ is a sub-object of k(R↔), the latter presheaf also
contains the real number object R as a sub-object.
Multiplying with real numbers and vector space structure. Let
cr ∈ ΓR be the constant function on V(H) with value r. The global element
cr of R defines locally, at each V ∈ V(H), a constant function cr,V : ↓V → R.
We want to consider if, and how, multiplication with these constant functions
is defined in the various presheaves. We will call this ‘multiplying with a real
number’.
Let µ ∈ RV . For all V ′ ∈↓V , we define the product
(cr,V µ)(V
′) := cr,V (V
′)µ(V ′) = rµ(V ′). (9.8)
If r ≥ 0, then rµ :↓V → R is an order-reversing function again. However,
if r < 0, then rµ is order-preserving and hence not an element of RV .
This shows that for the presheaf R only multiplication by non-negative real
numbers is well-defined.
However, if we consider k(R) then multiplication with an arbitrary real
number is well-defined. For simplicity, we first consider r = −1, i.e., negation.
Let [ν, κ] ∈ RV , then, for all V ′ ∈↓V ,
(c−1,V [ν, κ])(V
′) := c−1,V (V
′)[ν(V ′), κ(V ′)] (9.9)
= −[ν(V ′), κ(V ′)] (9.10)
= [κ(V ′), ν(V ′)], (9.11)
so we have
c−1,V [ν, κ] = −[ν, κ] = [κ, ν]. (9.12)
This multiplication with the real number −1 is, of course, defined in such a
way that it fits in with the additive group structure on k(R).
It follows that multiplying an element [ν, κ] of k(R)V with an arbitrary
real number r can be defined as
cr,V [ν, κ] :=
{
[cr,V ν, cr,V κ] = [rν, rκ] if r ≥ 0
−[c−r,V ν, c−r,V κ] = [−rκ,−rν] if r < 0. (9.13)
Remark 9.1 In this way, the group object k(R) in SetsV(H)
op
becomes a
vector space object, with the field object R as the scalars.
Interestingly, one can define multiplication with arbitrary real numbers
also for R↔, although this presheaf is not a group object in SetsV(H)
op
. Let
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(µ, ν) ∈ R↔V , so that µ :↓ V → R is an order-preserving function and
ν :↓V → R is order-reversing. Let r be an arbitrary real number. We define
cr,V (µ, ν) :=
{
(cr,V µ, cr,V ν) = (rµ, rν) if r ≥ 0
(cr,V ν, cr,V µ) = (rν, rµ) if r < 0.
(9.14)
This is well-defined since if µ is order-preserving, then −µ is order-reversing,
and if ν is order-reversing, then −ν is order-preserving. For r = −1, we
obtain
c−1,V (µ, ν) = −(µ, ν) = (−ν,−µ). (9.15)
But this does not mean that −(µ, ν) is an additive inverse of (µ, ν). Such
inverses do not exist in R↔, since it is not a group object. Rather, we get
(µ, ν) + (−(µ, ν)) = (µ, ν) + (−ν,−µ) = (µ− ν, ν − µ). (9.16)
If, for all V ′ ∈↓V , we interpret the absolute value |(µ− ν)(V ′)| as a measure
of uncertainty as given by the pair (µ, ν) at stage V ′, then we see from (9.16)
that adding (µ, ν) and (−ν,−µ) gives a pair (µ−ν, ν−µ) ∈ R↔V concentrated
around (0, 0), but with an uncertainty twice as large (for all stages V ′). We
call −(µ, ν) = (−ν,−µ) the pseudo-inverse of (µ, ν) ∈ R↔.
More generally, we can define a second monoid structure (besides addi-
tion) on R↔, called pseudo-subtraction and given by
(µ1, ν1)− (µ2, ν2) := (µ1, ν1) + (−ν2,−µ2) = (µ1 − ν2, ν1 − µ2). (9.17)
This operation has a neutral element, namely (c0,V , c0,V ), for all stages V ∈
V(H), which of course is also the neutral element for addition. In this sense,
R↔ is close to being a group object. Taking equivalence classes as described
in (9.5) makes R↔ into a group object, R↔/ ≡, isomorphic to k(R).
Since multiplication with arbitrary real numbers is well-defined, the presheaf
R↔ is ‘almost a vector space object’ over R.
Elements of k(R↔)V are of the form [(µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2)]. Multiplication
with an arbitrary real number r is defined in the following way:
cr,V [(µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2)] :=
{
[(rµ1, rν1), (rµ2, rν2)] if r ≥ 0
[(−rµ2,−rν2), (−rµ1,−rν1)] if r < 0. (9.18)
The additive group structure on k(R↔) implies
−[(µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2)] = [(µ2, ν2), (µ1, ν1)], (9.19)
so the multiplication with the real number −1 fits in with the group structure.
On the other hand, this negation is completely different from the negation on
R↔ (where −(µ, ν) = (−ν,−µ) for all (µ, ν) ∈ R↔V and all V ∈ Ob(V(H))).
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Remark 9.2 The presheaf k(R↔) is a vector space object in SetsV(H)
op
, with
R as the scalars.
10 The Role of Unitary Operators
10.1 The Daseinisation of Unitary Operators
Unitary operators play an important role in the formulation of quantum the-
ory, and we need to understand the analogue of this in our topos formalism.
Unitary operators arise in the context of both ‘covariance’ and ‘invari-
ance’. In elementary quantum theory, the ‘covariance’ aspect comes the fact
that if we have made the associations
Physical state 7→ state vector |ψ〉 ∈ H
Physical observable A 7→ self-adjoint operator Aˆ acting on H
then the same physical predictions will be obtained if the following associa-
tions are used instead
Physical state 7→ state vector Uˆ |ψ〉 ∈ H (10.1)
Physical observable A 7→ self-adjoint operator UˆAˆUˆ−1 acting on H
for any unitary operator Uˆ . Thus the mathematical representatives of phys-
ical quantities are defined only up to arbitrary transformations of the type
above. In non-relativistic quantum theory, this leads to the canonical com-
mutation relations; the angular-momentum commutator algebra; and the
unitary time displacement operator. Similar considerations in relativistic
quantum theory involve the Poincare´ group.
The ‘invariance’ aspect of unitary operators arises when the operator
commutes with the Hamiltonian, giving rise to conserved quantities.
Daseinisation of unitary operators. As a side remark, we first consider
the question if daseinisation can be applied to a unitary operator Uˆ . The
answer is clearly ‘yes’, via the spectral representation:
Uˆ =
∫
R
eiλdEˆUλ (10.2)
where λ 7→ EUˆλ is the spectral family for Uˆ . Then, in analogy with (7.15–7.16)
we have the following:
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Definition 10.1 The outer daseinisation, δo(Uˆ), resp. the inner daseinisa-
tion, δi(Uˆ), of a unitary operator Uˆ are defined as follows:
δo(Uˆ)V :=
∫
R
eiλ d
(
δiV (Eˆ
U
λ )
)
, (10.3)
δi(Uˆ)V :=
∫
R
eiλ d
( ∧
µ>λ
δoV (Eˆ
U
µ )
)
, (10.4)
at each stage V .
To interpret these entities96 we need to introduce a new presheaf defined
as follows.
Definition 10.2 The outer, unitary de Groote presheaf, |U, is defined by:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): |UV := Vun, the collection of unitary opera-
tors in V .
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping |U(iV ′ V ) : |UV → |UV ′ is
given by
|U(iV ′ V )(αˆ) := δ
o(αˆ)V ′ (10.5)
=
∫
R
eiλ d
(
δi(Eˆαλ )V ′
)
(10.6)
=
∫
R
eiλ d
(
I(iV ′ V )(Eˆ
α
λ )
)
(10.7)
for all αˆ ∈ |UV .
Clearly, (i) there is an analogous definition of an ‘inner’, unitary de Groote
presheaf; and (ii) the map V 7→ δo(Uˆ)V defines a global element of |U.
This definition has the interesting consequence that, at each stage V ,
δo(eiAˆ)V = e
iδo(Aˆ)V (10.8)
A particular example of this construction is the one-parameter family of
unitary operators, t 7→ eitHˆ , where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the system.
Of course, in our case everything commutes. Thus suppose g 7→ Uˆg is a
representation of a Lie group G on the Hilbert spaceH. Then these operators
96It would be possible to ‘complexify’ the presheaf k(R) in order to represent uni-
tary operators as arrows from Σ to |Ck(R). Similar remarks apply to the presheaf R↔.
However, there is no obvious physical use for this procedure.
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can be daseinised to give the map g 7→ δo(Uˆg), but generally this is not a
representation of G (or of its Lie algebra) since, at each stage V we have
δo(Uˆg1)V δ
o(Uˆg2)V = δ
o(Uˆg2)V δ
o(Uˆg1)V (10.9)
for all g1, g2 ∈ G. Clearly, there is an analogous result for inner daseinisation.
10.2 Unitary Operators and Arrows in SetsV(H)
op
.
10.2.1 The Definition of ℓUˆ : Ob(V(H))→ Ob(V(H))
In classical physics, the analogue of unitary operators are ‘canonical trans-
formations’; i.e., symplectic diffeomorphisms from the state space S to itself.
This suggests that should try to associate arrows in SetsV(H)
op
with each
unitary operator Uˆ .
Thus we want to see if unitary operators can act on the objects in
SetsV(H)
op
. In fact, if U(H) denotes the group of all unitary operators in
H, we would like to find a realisation of U(H) in the topos SetsV(H)op .
As a first step, if Uˆ ∈ U(H) and V ∈ Ob(V(H)) is an abelian von
Neumann sub-algebra of B(H), let us define
ℓUˆ(V ) := {UˆAˆUˆ−1 | Aˆ ∈ V }. (10.10)
It is clear that ℓUˆ(V ) is a unital, abelian algebra of operators, and that self-
adjoint operators are mapped into self-adjoint operators. Furthermore, the
map Aˆ 7→ Uˆ AˆUˆ−1 is continuous in the weak-operator topology, and hence, if
{Aˆi}i∈I is a weakly-convergent net of operators in V , then {UˆAˆiUˆ−1}i∈I is a
weakly-convergent net of operators in ℓUˆ(V ), and vice versa.
It follows that ℓUˆ(V ) is an abelian von Neumann algebra (i.e., it is weakly
closed), and hence ℓUˆ can be viewed as a map ℓUˆ : Ob(V(H))→ Ob(V(H)).
We note the following:
1. Clearly, for all Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ U(H),
ℓUˆ1 ◦ ℓUˆ2 = ℓUˆ1Uˆ2 (10.11)
Thus Uˆ 7→ ℓUˆ is a realisation of the group U(H) as a group of trans-
formations of Ob(V(H)).
2. For all U ∈ U(H), V and ℓUˆ(V ) are isomorphic sub-algebras of B(H),
and ℓ−1
Uˆ
= ℓUˆ−1 .
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3. If V ′ ⊆ V , then, for all Uˆ ∈ U(H),
ℓUˆ(V
′) ⊆ ℓUˆ(V ). (10.12)
Hence, each transformation ℓUˆ preserves the partial-ordering of the
poset category V(H).
From this it follows that each ℓUˆ : Ob(V(H))→ Ob(V(H)) is a functor
from the category V(H) to itself.
4. One consequence of the order-preserving property of ℓUˆ is as follows.
Let S be a sieve of arrows on V , i.e., a collection of sub-algebras of V
with the property that if V ′ ∈ S, then, for all V ′′ ⊆ V ′ we have V ′′ ∈ S.
Then
ℓUˆ(S) := {ℓUˆ(V ′) | V ′ ∈ S} (10.13)
is a sieve of arrows on ℓUˆ(V ).
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10.2.2 The Effect of ℓUˆ on Daseinisation
We recall that if Pˆ is any projection, then the (outer) daseinisation, δo(Pˆ )V ,
of Pˆ at stage V is ((5.9))
δo(Pˆ )V :=
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ  Pˆ} (10.14)
where we have resorted once more to using the propositional language PL(S).
Thus
Uˆδo(Pˆ )V Uˆ
−1 = Uˆ
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ  Pˆ}Uˆ−1
=
∧{
UˆQˆUˆ−1 ∈ P(ℓUˆ(V )) | Qˆ  Pˆ
}
=
∧{
UˆQˆUˆ−1 ∈ P(ℓUˆ(V )) | UˆQˆUˆ−1  Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1
}
= δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1)ℓ
Uˆ
(V ) (10.15)
where we used the fact that the map Qˆ 7→ UˆQˆUˆ−1 is weakly continuous.
Thus we have the important result
Uˆδo(Pˆ )V Uˆ
−1 = δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1)ℓ
Uˆ
(V ) (10.16)
for all unitary operators Uˆ , and for all stages V . There is an analogous result
for inner daseinisation.
97In the partially ordered set V(H), an arrow from V ′ to V can be identified with the
sub-algebra V ′ ⊆ V , since there is exactly one arrow from V ′ to V .
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Equation (10.16) can be applied to the de Groote presheaf |O to give
Uˆδo(Aˆ)V Uˆ
−1 = δo(UˆAˆUˆ−1)ℓ
Uˆ
(V ) (10.17)
for unitary operators Uˆ , and all stages V .
We recall that the truth sub-object, T |ψ〉, of the outer presheaf, O, is
defined at each stage V by (cf (5.57))
T
|ψ〉
V := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉) = 1}
= {αˆ ∈ OV | 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.18)
The neo-realist, physical interpretation of T |ψ〉 is that the ‘truth’ of the propo-
sition represented by Pˆ is
ν
(
δo(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉 )
V
:= {V ′ ⊆ V | δo(Pˆ )V ′ ∈ T |ψ〉V ′ } (10.19)
= {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δo(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.20)
for all stages V . We then get
ℓUˆ
(
ν
(
δo(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉 )
V
= ℓUˆ{V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δo(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.21)
= {ℓUˆ(V ′) ⊆ ℓUˆ(V ) | 〈ψ| δo(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.22)
= {ℓUˆ(V ′) ⊆ ℓUˆ(V ) | 〈ψ| Uˆ−1Uˆδo(Pˆ )V ′Uˆ−1Uˆ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.23)
= {ℓUˆ(V ′) ⊆ ℓUˆ(V ) | 〈ψ| Uˆ−1δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1)ℓUˆ (V )Uˆ |ψ〉 = 1} (10.24)
= ν
(
δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1) ∈ TUˆ |ψ〉 )
ℓ
Uˆ
(V ).
(10.25)
Thus we get the important result
ν
(
δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1) ∈ TUˆ |ψ〉 )
ℓ
Uˆ
(V )
= ℓUˆ
(
ν
(
δo(Pˆ ) ∈ T |ψ〉 )
V
)
. (10.26)
This can be viewed as the topos analogue of the statement in (10.1) about
the invariance of the results of quantum theory under the transformations
|ψ〉 7→ Uˆ |ψ〉, Aˆ 7→ Uˆ AˆUˆ−1. Of course, there is a pseudo-state analogue of all
these expressions involving the sub-objects w |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H.
10.2.3 The Uˆ-twisted Presheaf
Let us return once more to the definition (10.10) of the functor ℓUˆ : V(H)→
V(H). As we shall see later, any such functor induces a ‘geometric morphism’
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from SetsV(H)
op
to SetsV(H)
op
. The exact definition is not needed here: it
suffices to remark that part of this geometric morphism is an arrow ℓ∗
Uˆ
:
SetsV(H)
op → SetsV(H)op defined by
F 7→ ℓ∗
Uˆ
F := F ◦ ℓUˆ . (10.27)
Note that, if Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ U(H) then, for all presheaves F ,
ℓ∗
Uˆ2
(ℓ∗
Uˆ1
F ) = (ℓ∗
Uˆ1
F ) ◦ ℓUˆ2 = (F ◦ ℓUˆ1) ◦ ℓUˆ2
= F ◦ (ℓUˆ1 ◦ ℓUˆ2) = F ◦ ℓUˆ1Uˆ2
= ℓ∗
Uˆ1Uˆ2
F. (10.28)
Since this is true for all functors F in SetsV(H)
op
, we deduce that
ℓ∗
Uˆ2
◦ ℓ∗
Uˆ1
= ℓ∗
Uˆ1Uˆ2
(10.29)
and hence the map Uˆ 7→ ℓ∗
Uˆ
is an (anti-)representation of the group U(H) by
arrows in the topos SetsV(H)
op
.
Of particular interest to us are the presheaves ℓ∗
Uˆ
Σ and ℓ∗Uk(R
). We de-
note them by ΣUˆ and k(R)Uˆ respectively and say that they are ‘Uˆ -twisted’.
Theorem 10.1 For each Uˆ ∈ U(H), there is a natural isomorphism ι : Σ→
ΣUˆ as given in the following diagram
ΣV ′ Σ
Uˆ
V ′
-
ιUˆV ′
ΣV Σ
Uˆ
V
-ι
Uˆ
V
?
Σ(iV ′V )
?
ΣUˆ(iV ′V )
where, at each stage V ,
(ιUV (λ))(Aˆ) := 〈λ, Uˆ−1AˆUˆ〉 (10.30)
for all λ ∈ ΣV , and all Aˆ ∈ Vsa.
The proof, which just involves chasing round the diagram above using
the basic definitions, is not included here.
Even simpler is the following theorem:
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Theorem 10.2 For each Uˆ ∈ U(H), there is a natural isomorphism κUˆ :
R → (R)Uˆ whose components κUˆV : RV → (R)UˆV are given by
κUˆV (µ)(ℓUˆ(V
′)) := µ(V ′) (10.31)
for all V ′ ⊆ V .
Here, we recall µ ∈ RV is a function µ :↓V → R such that if V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V
then µ(V2) ≥ µ(V1), i.e., an order-reversing function. In (10.31) we have used
the fact that there is a bijection between the sets ↓ℓUˆ(V ) and ↓V .
Finally,
Theorem 10.3 We have the following commutative diagram:
R R
Uˆ
.-
κUˆ
Σ ΣUˆ-
ιUˆ
?
δ˘(Aˆ)
?
δ˘(Uˆ−1AˆUˆ)
The analogue of unitary operators for a general topos. It is inter-
esting to reflect on the analogue of the above constructions for a general
topos. It soon becomes clear that, once again, we encounter the antithetical
concepts of ‘internal’ and ‘external’.
For example, in the discussion above, the unitary operators and the group
U(H) lie outside the topos SetsV(H)op and enter directly from the under-
lying, standard quantum formalism. As such, they are external to both
the languages PL(S) and L(S). We anticipate that notions of ‘covariance’
and ‘symmetry’ have applications well beyond those in classical physics and
quantum physics. However, at the very least, in a general topos one would
presumably replace the external U(H) with an internal group object in the
topos concerned. And, of course, the notion of ‘symmetry’ is closely related
to the concept to time, and time development, which opens up a Pandora’s
box of possible speculation. These issues are important, and await further
development.
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11 The Category of Systems
11.1 Background Remarks
We now return to the more general aspects of our theory, and study its
application to a collection of systems, each one of which may be associated
with a different topos. For example, if S1, S2 is a pair of systems, with
associated topoi τ(S1) and τ(S2), and if S1 is a sub-system of S2, then we
wish to consider how τ(S1) is related to τ(S2). Similarly, if a composite
system is formed from a pair of systems S1, S2, what relations are there
between the topos of the composite system and the topoi of the constituent
parts?
Of course, in one sense, there is only one true ‘system’, and that is the
universe as a whole. Concomitantly, there is just one local language, and
one topos. However, in practice, the science community divides the universe
conceptually into portions that are sufficiently simple to be amenable to
theoretical and/or empirical discussion. Of course, this division is not unique,
but it must be such that the coupling between portions is weak enough that,
to a good approximation, their theoretical models can be studied in isolation
from each other. Such an essentially isolated98 portion of the universe is called
a ‘sub-system’. By an abuse of language, sub-systems of the universe are
usually called ‘systems’ (so that the universe as a whole is one super-system),
and then we can talk about ‘sub-systems’ of these systems; or ‘composites’
of them; or sub-systems of the composite systems, and so on.
In practice, references by physicists to systems and sub-systems99 do not
generally signify actual sub-systems of the real universe but rather idealisa-
tions of possible systems. This is what a physics lecturer means when he
or she starts a lecture by saying “Consider a point particle moving in three
dimensions.....”.
To develop these ideas further we need mathematical control over the
systems of interest, and their interrelations. To this end, we start by focussing
on some collection, Sys, of physical systems to which a particular theory-type
is deemed to be applicable. For example, we could consider a collection of
systems that are to be discussed using the methodology of classical physics;
98The ideal monad has no windows.
99The word ‘sub-system’ does not only mean a collection of objects that is spatially
localised. One could also consider sub-systems of field systems by focussing on a just
a few modes of the fields as is done, for example, in the Robertson-Walker model for
cosmology. Another possibility would be to use fields localised in some fixed space, or
space-time region provided that this is consistent with the dynamics.
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or systems to be discussed using standard quantum theory; or whatever. For
completeness, we require that every sub-system of a system in Sys is itself a
member of Sys, as is every composite of members of Sys.
We shall assume that the systems in Sys are all associated with local
languages of the type discussed earlier, and that they all have the same set
of ground symbols which, for the purposes of the present discussion, we take
to be just Σ and R. It follows that the languages L(S), S ∈ Sys, differ from
each other only in the set of function symbols FL(S)
(
Σ,R); i.e., the set of
physical quantities.
As a simple example of the system-dependence of the set of function
symbols let system S1 be a point particle moving in one dimension, and
let the set of physical quantities be FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) = {x, p,H}. In the lan-
guage L(S1), these function-symbols represent the position, momentum, and
energy of the system respectively. On the other hand, if S2 is a parti-
cle moving in three dimensions, then in the language L(S2) we could have
FL(S2)
(
Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, H} to allow for three-dimensional position
and momentum. Or, we could decide to add angular momentum as well, to
give the set FL(S2)
(
Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}.
11.2 The Category Sys
11.2.1 The Arrows and Translations for the Disjoint Sum S1 ⊔ S2.
The use of local languages is central to our overall topos scheme, and therefore
we need to understand, in particular, (i) the relation between the languages
L(S1) and L(S2) if S1 is a sub-system of S2; and (ii) the relation between
L(S1), L(S2) and L(S1 ⋄ S2), where S1 ⋄S2 denotes the composite of systems
S1 and S2.
These discussions can be made more precise by regarding Sys as a cate-
gory whose objects are the systems.100 The arrows in Sys need to cover two
basic types of relation: (i) that between S1 and S2 if S1 is a ‘sub-system’ of
S2; and (ii) that between a composite system, S1 ⋄ S2, and its constituent
systems, S1 and S2.
This may seem straightforward but, in fact, care is needed since although
the idea of a ‘sub-system’ seems intuitively clear, it is hard to give a physically
acceptable definition that is universal. However, some insight into this idea
can be gained by considering its meaning in classical physics. This is very
100To control the size of Sys we assume that the collection of objects/systems is a set
rather than a more general class.
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relevant for the general scheme since one of our main goals is to make all
theories ‘look’ like classical physics in the appropriate topos.
To this end, let S1 and S2 be classical systems whose state spaces are
the symplectic manifolds S1 and S2 respectively. If S1 is deemed to be a
sub-system of S2, it is natural to require that S1 is a sub-manifold of S2,
i.e., S1 ⊆ S2. However, this condition cannot be used as a definition of a
‘sub-system’ since the converse may not be true: i.e., if S1 ⊆ S2, this does
not necessarily mean that, from a physical perspective, S1 could, or would,
be said to be a sub-system of S2.
101
On the other hand, there are situations where being a sub-manifold clearly
does imply being a physical sub-system. For example, suppose the state
space S of a system S is a disconnected manifold with two components S1
and S2, so that S is the disjoint union, S1
∐S2, of the sub-manifolds S1 and
S2. Then it seems physically appropriate to say that the system S itself is
disconnected, and to write S = S1 ⊔ S2 where the symplectic manifolds that
represent the sub-systems S1 and S2 are S1 and S2 respectively.
One reason why it is reasonable to call S1 and S2 ‘sub-systems’ in this
particular situation is that any continuous dynamical evolution of a state
point in S ≃ S1⊔S2 will always lie in either one component or the other. This
suggests that perhaps, in general, a necessary condition for a sub-manifold
S1 ⊆ S2 to represent a physical sub-system is that the dynamics of the
system S2 must be such that S1 is mapped into itself under the dynamical
evolution on S2; in other words, S1 is a dynamically-invariant sub-manifold
of S2. This correlates with the idea mentioned earlier that sub-systems are
weakly-coupled with each other.
However, such a dynamical restriction is not something that should be
coded into the languages, L(S1) and L(S2): rather, the dynamics is to be as-
sociated with the representation of these languages in the appropriate topoi.
Still, this caveat does not apply to the disjoint sum S1 ⊔ S2 of two sys-
tems S1, S2, and we will assume that, in general, (i.e., not just in classi-
cal physics) it is legitimate to think of S1 and S2 as being sub-systems of
S1 ⊔ S2; something that we indicate by defining arrows i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2,
and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 in Sys.
To proceed further it is important to understand the connection between
the putative arrows in the category Sys, and the ‘translations’ of the as-
101For example, consider the diagonal sub-manifold ∆(S) ⊂ S × S of the symplectic
manifold S×S that represents the composite S ⋄S of two copies of a system S. Evidently,
the states in ∆(S) correspond to the situation in which both copies of S ‘march together’.
It is doubtful if this would be recognised physically as a sub-system.
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sociated languages. The first step is to consider what can be said about
the relation between L(S1 ⊔ S2), and L(S1) and L(S2). All three languages
share the same ground-type symbols, and so what we are concerned with
is the relation between the function symbols of signature Σ → R in these
languages.
By considering what is meant intuitively by the disjoint sum, it seems
plausible that each physical quantity for the system S1⊔S2 produces a phys-
ical quantity for S1, and another one for S2. Conversely, specifying a pair of
physical quantities—one for S1 and one for S2—gives a physical quantity for
S1 ⊔ S2. In other words,
FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) ≃ FL(S1)(Σ,R)× FL(S2)(Σ,R) (11.1)
However, it is important not to be too dogmatic about statements of this type
since in non-classical theories new possibilities can arise that are counter to
intuition.
Associated with (11.1) are the maps L(i1) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R)→ FL(S1)(Σ,R)
and L(i2) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S2)(Σ,R), defined as the projection maps
of the product. In the theory of local languages, these transformations are es-
sentially translations [8] of L(S1 ⊔ S2) in L(S1) and L(S2) respectively; a sit-
uation that we denote L(i1) : L(S1 ⊔ S2)→ L(S1), and L(i2) : L(S1 ⊔ S2)→
L(S2).
To be more precise, these operations are translations if, taking L(i1) as
the explanatory example, the map L(i1) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R)→ FL(S1)(Σ,R) is
supplemented with the following map from the ground symbols of L(S1 ⊔ S2)
to those of L(S1):
L(i1)(Σ) := Σ, (11.2)
L(i1)(R) := R, (11.3)
L(i1)(1) := 1, (11.4)
L(i1)(Ω) := Ω. (11.5)
Such a translation map is then extended to all type symbols using the defi-
nitions
L(i1)(T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn) = L(i1)(T1)× L(i1)(T2)× · · · × L(i1)(Tn),(11.6)
L(i1)(PT ) = P [L(i1)(T )] (11.7)
for all finite n and all type symbols T, T1, T2, . . . , Tn. This, in turn, can be
extended inductively to all terms in the language. Thus, in our case, the
translations act trivially on all the type symbols.
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Arrows in Sys are translations. Motivated by this argument we now
turn everything around and, in general, define an arrow j : S1 → S in
the category Sys to mean that there is some physically meaningful way of
transforming the physical quantities in S to physical quantities in S1. If, for
any pair of systems S1, S there is more than one such transformation, then
there will be more than one arrow from S1 to S.
To make this more precise, let Loc denote the collection of all (small102)
local languages. This is a category whose objects are the local languages, and
whose arrows are translations between languages. Then our basic assumption
is that the association S 7→ L(S) is a covariant functor from Sys to Locop,
which we denote as L : Sys→ Locop.
Note that the combination of a pair of arrows in Sys exists in so far as
the associated translations can be combined.
11.2.2 The Arrows and Translations for the Composite System
S1 ⋄ S2.
Let us now consider the composition S1 ⋄S2 of a pair of systems. In the case
of classical physics, if S1 and S2 are the symplectic manifolds that represent
the systems S1 and S2 respectively, then the manifold that represents the
composite system is the cartesian product S1 × S2. This is distinguished
by the existence of the two projection functions pr1 : S1 × S2 → S1 and
pr2 : S1 × S2 → S2.
It seems reasonable to impose the same type of structure on Sys: i.e., to
require there to be arrows p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 in Sys.
However, bearing in mind the definition above, these arrows p1, p2 exist if,
and only if, there are corresponding translations L(p1) : L(S1)→ L(S1 ⋄ S2),
and L(p2) : L(S2)→ L(S1 ⋄ S2). But there are such translations: for if A1 is
a physical quantity for system S1, then L(p1)(A1) can be defined as that same
physical quantity, but now regarded as pertaining to the combined system
S1 ⋄ S2; and analogously for system S2.103 We shall denote this translated
quantity, L(p1)(A1), by A1 ⋄ 1.
Note that we do not postulate any simple relation between FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R)
and FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) and FL(S2)(Σ,R); i.e., there is no analogue of (11.1) for
102This means that the collection of symbols is a set, not a more general class.
103For example, if A is the energy of particle 1, then we can talk about this energy in the
combination of a pair of particles. Of course, in—for example—classical physics there is
no reason why the energy of particle 1 should be conserved in the composite system, but
that, dynamical, question is a different matter.
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combinations of systems.
The definitions above of the basic arrows suggest that we might also want
to impose the following conditions:
1. The arrows i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2, and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 are monic in Sys.
2. The arrows p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 are epic arrows in
Sys.
However, we do not require that S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 are the co-product and
product, respectively, of S1 and S2 in the category Sys.
11.2.3 The Concept of ‘Isomorphic’ Systems.
We also need to decide what it means to say that two systems S1 and S2
are isomorphic, to be denoted S1 ≃ S2. As with the concept of sub-system,
the notion of isomorphism is to some extent a matter of definition rather
than obvious physical structure, albeit with the expectation that isomorphic
systems in Sys will correspond to isomorphic local languages, and be repre-
sented by isomorphic mathematical objects in any concrete realisation of the
axioms: for example, by isomorphic symplectic manifolds in classical physics.
To a considerable extent, the physical meaning of ‘isomorphism’ depends
on whether one is dealing with actual physical systems, or idealisations of
them. For example, an electron confined in a box in Cambridge is presumably
isomorphic to one confined in the same type of box in London, although they
are not the same physical system. On the other hand, when a lecturer says
“Consider an electron trapped in a box....”, he/she is referring to an idealised
system.
One could, perhaps, say that an idealised system is an equivalence class
(under isomorphisms) of real systems, but even working only with idealisa-
tions does not entirely remove the need for the concept of isomorphism.
For example, in classical mechanics, consider the (idealised) system S of
a point particle moving in a box, and let 1 denote the ‘trivial system’ that
consists of just a single point with no internal or external degrees of freedom.
Now consider the system S ⋄ 1. In classical mechanics this is represented by
the symplectic manifold S × {∗}, where {∗} is a single point, regarded as a
zero-dimensional manifold. However, S × {∗} is isomorphic to the manifold
S, and it is clear physically that the system S ⋄1 is isomorphic to the system
S. On the other hand, one cannot say that S ⋄ 1 is literally equal to S, so
the concept of ‘isomorphism’ needs to be maintained.
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One thing that is clear is that if S1 ≃ S2 then FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) ≃ FL(S2)(Σ,R),
and if any other non-empty sets of function symbols are present, then they
too must be isomorphic.
Note that when introducing a trivial system, 1, it necessary to specify its
local language, L(1). The set of function symbols FL(1)
(
Σ,R) is not com-
pletely empty since, in classical physics, one does have a preferred physical
quantity, which is just the number 1. If one asks what is meant in general by
the ‘number 1’ the answer is not trivial since, in the reals R, the number 1 is
the multiplicative identity. It would be possible to add the existence of such
a unit to the axioms forR but this would involve introducing a multiplicative
structure and we do not know if there might be physically interesting topos
representations that do not have this feature.
For the moment then, we will say that the trivial system has just a single
physical quantity, which in classical physics translates to the number 1. More
generally, for the language L(1) we specify that FL(1)
(
Σ,R) := {I}, i.e.,
FL(1)
(
Σ,R) has just a single element, I, say. Furthermore, we add the axiom
: ∀s˜1∀s˜2, I(s˜1) = I(s˜2), (11.8)
where s˜1 and s˜2 are variables of type Σ. In fact, it seems natural to add such
a trivial quantity to the language L(S) for any system S, and from now on
we will assume that this has been done.
A related issue is that, in classical physics, if A is a physical quantity,
then so is rA for any r ∈ R. This is because the set of classical quantities
Aσ : Σσ → Rσ ≃ R forms a ring whose structure derives from the ring
structure of R. It would be possible to add ring axioms for R to the language
L(S), but this is too strong, not least because, as shown earlier, it fails in
quantum theory. Clearly, the general question of axioms for R needs more
thought: a task for later work.
If desired, an ‘empty ’ system, 0, can be added too, with FL(0)
(
Σ,R) := ∅.
This, so called, ‘pure language’, L(0), is an initial object in the category Loc.
11.2.4 An Axiomatic Formulation of the Category Sys
Let us now summarise, and clarify, our list of axioms for a category Sys:
1. The collection Sys is a small category whose objects are the systems of
interest (or, if desired, isomorphism classes of such systems) and whose
arrows are defined as above.
Thus the fundamental property of an arrow j : S1 → S in Sys is that
it induces, and is essentially defined by, a translation L(j) : L(S) →
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L(S1). Physically, this corresponds to the physical quantities for system
S being ‘pulled-back’ to give physical quantities for system S1.
Arrows of particular interest are those associated with ‘sub-systems’
and ‘composite systems’, as discussed above.
2. The axioms for a category are satisfied because:
(a) Physically, the ability to form composites of arrows follows from
the concept of ‘pulling-back’ physical quantities. From a math-
ematical perspective, if j : S1 → S2 and k : S2 → S3, then the
translations give functions L(j) : FL(S2)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R)
and L(k) : FL(S3)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S2)(Σ,R). Then clearly L(j) ◦
L(k) : FL(S3)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R), and this can thought of as
the translation corresponding to the arrow k ◦ j : S1 → S3.
The associativity of the law of arrow combination can be proved
in a similar way.
(b) We add by hand a special arrow idS : S → S which is defined to
correspond to the translation L(idS) that is given by the identity
map on FL(S)
(
Σ,R). Clearly, idS : S → S acts an an identity
morphism should.
3. For any pair of systems S1, S2, there is a disjoint sum, denoted S1⊔S2.
The disjoint sum has the following properties:
(a) For all systems S1, S2, S3 in Sys:
(S1 ⊔ S2) ⊔ S3 ≃ S1 ⊔ (S2 ⊔ S3). (11.9)
(b) For all systems S1, S2 in Sys:
S1 ⊔ S2 ≃ S2 ⊔ S1. (11.10)
(c) There are arrows in Sys:
i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2 and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 (11.11)
that are associated with translations in the sense discussed in Sec-
tion 11.2.1. These are associated with the decomposition
FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) ≃ FL(S1)(Σ,R)× FL(S2)(Σ,R). (11.12)
We assume that if S1, S2 belong to Sys, then Sys also contains S1⊔S2.
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4. For any given pair of systems S1, S2, there is a composite system in
Sys, denoted104 S1 ⋄ S2, with the following properties:
(a) For all systems S1, S2, S3 in Sys:
(S1 ⋄ S2) ⋄ S3 ≃ S1 ⋄ (S2 ⋄ S3). (11.13)
(b) For all systems S1, S2 in Sys:
S1 ⋄ S2 ≃ S2 ⋄ S1. (11.14)
(c) There are arrows in Sys:
p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 (11.15)
that are associated with translations in the sense discussed in Sec-
tion 11.2.2.
We assume that if S1, S2 belong to Sys, then Sys also contains the
composite system S1 ⋄ S2.
5. It seems physically reasonable to add the axiom
(S1 ⊔ S2) ⋄ S ≃ (S1 ⋄ S) ⊔ (S2 ⋄ S) (11.16)
for all systems S1, S2, S. However, physical intuition can be a dangerous
thing, and so, as with most of these axioms, we are not dogmatic, and
feel free to change them as new insights emerge.
6. There is a trivial system, 1, such that for all systems S, we have
S ⋄ 1 ≃ S ≃ 1 ⋄ S (11.17)
7. It may be convenient to postulate an ‘empty system’, 0, with the prop-
erties
S ⋄ 0 ≃ 0 ⋄ S ≃ 0 (11.18)
S ⊔ 0 ≃ 0 ⊔ S ≃ S (11.19)
for all systems S.
Within the meaning given to arrows in Sys, 0 is a terminal object in
Sys. This is because the empty set of function symbols of signature
Σ→ R is a subset of any other set of function symbols of this signature.
104The product operation in a monoidal category is often written ‘⊗’. However, a different
symbol has been used here to avoid confusion with existing usages in physics of the tensor
product sign ‘⊗’.
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It might seem tempting to postulate that composition laws are well-
behaved with respect to arrows. Namely, if j : S1 → S2, then, for any
S, there is an arrow S1 ⋄ S → S2 ⋄ S and an arrow S1 ⊔ S → S2 ⊔ S.105
In the case of the disjoint sum, such an arrow can be easily constructed us-
ing (11.12). First split the function symbols in FL(S1⊔S)
(
Σ,R) into FL(S1)(Σ,R)×
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) and the function symbols in FL(S2⊔S)(Σ,R) into FL(S2)(Σ,R)×
FL(S)
(
Σ,R). Since there is an arrow j : S1 → S2, there is a transla-
tion L(j) : L(S2) → L(S1), given by a mapping L(j) : FL(S2)
(
Σ,R) →
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R). Of course, then there is also a mapping L(j) × L(idS) :
FL(S2)
(
Σ,R) × FL(S)(Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R) × FL(S)(Σ,R), i.e., a transla-
tion between L(S2 ⊔ S) and L(S1 ⊔ S). Since we assume that there is an
arrow in Sys whenever there is a translation (in the opposite direction),
there is indeed an arrow S1 ⊔ S → S2 ⊔ S.
In the case of the composition, however, this would require a translation
L(S2 ⋄ S)→ L(S1 ⋄ S), and this cannot be done in general since we have no
prima facie information about the set of function symbols FL(S2⋄S)
(
Σ,R).
However, if we restrict the arrows in Sys to be those associated with sub-
systems, combination of systems, and compositions of such arrows, then it
is easy to see that the required translations exist (the proof of this makes
essential use of (11.16)).
If we make this restriction of arrows, then the axioms (11.14), (11.17–
11.20), mean that, essentially, Sys has the structure of a symmetric monoidal106
category in which the monoidal product operation is ‘⋄’, and the left and
right unit object is 1. There is also a monoidal structure associated with the
disjoint sum ‘⊔’, with 0 as the unit object.
We say ‘essentially’ because in order to comply with all the axioms of a
monoidal category, Sys must satisfy certain additional, so-called, ‘coherence’
axioms. However, from a physical perspective these are very plausible state-
ments about (i) how the unit object 1 intertwines with the ⋄-operation; how
the null object intertwines with the ⊔-operation; and (iii) certain properties
of quadruple products (and disjoint sums) of systems.
105A more accurate way of capturing this idea is to say that the operation Sys×Sys →
Sys in which
〈S1, S2〉 7→ S1 ⋄ S2 (11.20)
is a bi-functor from Sys×Sys to Sys. Ditto for the operation in which 〈S1, S2〉 7→ S1⊔S2.
106In the actual definition of a monoidal category the two isomorphisms in (11.17) are
separated from each other, whereas we have identified them. Further more, these iso-
morphism are required to be natural. This seems a correct thing to require in our case,
too.
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A simple example of a category Sys. It might be helpful at this point
to give a simple example of a category Sys. To that end, let S denote a
point particle that moves in three dimensions, and let us suppose that S has
no sub-systems other than the trivial system 1. Then S ⋄ S is defined to be
a pair of particles moving in three dimensions, and so on. Thus the objects
in our category are 1, S, S ⋄ S, . . ., S ⋄ S ⋄ · · ·S . . . where the ‘⋄’ operation
is formed any finite number of times.
At this stage, the only arrows are those that are associated with the
constituents of a composite system. However, we could contemplate adding
to the systems the disjoint sum S ⊔ (S ⋄ S) which is a system that is either
one particle or two particles (but, of course, not both at the same time).
And, clearly, we could extend this to S ⊔ (S ⋄ S) ⊔ (S ⋄ S ⋄ S), and so on.
Each of these disjoint sums comes with its own arrows, as explained above.
Note that this particular category of systems has the property that it can
be treated using either classical physics or quantum theory.
11.3 Representations of Sys in Topoi
We assume that all the systems in Sys are to be treated with the same theory
type. We also assume that systems in Sys with the same language are to be
represented in the same topos. Then we define:107
Definition 11.1 A topos realisation of Sys is an association, φ, to each
system S in Sys, of a triple φ(S) = 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉 where:
(i) τφ(S) is the topos in which the theory-type applied to system S is to be
realised.
(ii) L(S) is the local language in Loc that is associated with S. This is not
dependent on the realisation φ.
(iii) ρφ,S is a representation of the local language L(S) in the topos τφ(S).
As a more descriptive piece of notation we write ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S).
The key part of this representation is the map
ρφ,S : FL(S)
(
Σ,R)→ Homτφ(S)(Σφ,S,Rφ,S) (11.21)
107As emphasised already, the association S 7→ L(S) is generally not one-to-one: i.e.,
many systems may share the same language. Thus, when we come discuss the represen-
tation of the language L(S) in a topos, the extra information about the system S is used
in fixing the representation.
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where Σφ,S and Rφ,S are the state object and quantity-value object, re-
spectively, of the representation φ in the topos τφ(S). As a convenient
piece of notation we write Aφ,S := ρφ,S(A) for all A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R).
This definition is only partial; the possibility of extending it will be discussed
shortly.
Now, if j : S1 → S is an arrow in Sys, then there is a translation
arrow L(j) : L(S)→ L(S1). Thus we have the beginnings of a commutative
diagram
S 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉-
φ
S1 〈ρφ,S1,L(S1), τφ(S1)〉-φ
?
j
6
?× L(j)×?
(11.22)
However, to be useful, the arrow on the right hand side of this diagram
should refer to some relation between (i) the topoi τφ(S1) and τφ(S); and (ii)
the realisations ρφ,S1 : L(S1)  τφ(S1) and ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S): this is the
significance of the two ‘?’ symbols in the arrow written ‘?× L(j)×?’.
Indeed, as things stand, Definition 11.1 says nothing about relations be-
tween the topoi representations of different systems in Sys. We are particu-
larly interested in the situation where there are two different systems S1 and
S with an arrow j : S1 → S in Sys.
We know that the arrow j is associated with a translation L(j) : L(S)→
L(S1), and an attractive possibility, therefore, would be to seek, or postulate,
a ‘covering’ map φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
) → Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1)
to be construed as a topos representation of the translation L(j) : L(S) →
L(S1), and hence of the arrow j : S1 → S in Sys.
This raises the questions of what properties these ‘translation representa-
tions’ should possess in order to justify saying that they ‘cover’ the transla-
tions. A minimal requirement is that if k : S2 → S1 and j : S1 → S, then the
map φ(L(j ◦ k)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S2)(Σφ,S2 ,Rφ,S2) factorises
as
φ(L(j ◦ k)) = φ(L(k)) ◦ φ(L(j)). (11.23)
We also require that
φ(L(idS)) = id : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S)(Σφ,S,Rφ,S) (11.24)
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for all systems S.
The conditions (11.23) and (11.24) seem eminently plausible, and they
are not particularly strong. A far more restrictive axiom would be to require
the following diagram to commute:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)-ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S)(Σφ,S,Rφ,S)-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(11.25)
At first sight, this requirement seems very appealing. However, caution is
needed when postulating ‘axioms’ for a theoretical structure in physics. It
is easy to get captivated by the underlying mathematics and to assume,
erroneously, that what is mathematically elegant is necessarily true in the
physical theory.
The translation φ(L(j)) maps an arrow from Σφ,S to Rφ,S to an arrow
from Σφ,S1 to Rφ,S1 . Intuitively, if Σφ,S1 is a ‘much larger’ object than Σφ,S
(although since they lie in different topoi, no direct comparison is available),
the translation can only be ‘faithful’ on some part of Σφ,S1 that can be iden-
tified with (the ‘image’ of) Σφ,S. A concrete example of this will show up in
the treatment of composite quantum systems, see Subsection 13.3. As one
might expect, a form of entanglement plays a role here.
11.4 Classical Physics in This Form
11.4.1 The Rules so Far.
Constructing maps φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)
is likely to be complicated when τφ(S) and τφ(S1) are different topoi, and so
we begin with the example of classical physics, where the topos is always
Sets.
In general, we are interested in the relation(s) between the representations
ρφ,S1 : L(S1)  τφ(S1) and ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S) that is associated with an
arrow j : S1 → S in Sys. In classical physics, we only have to study the
relation between the representations ρσ,S1 : L(S1) Sets and ρσ,S : L(S) 
Sets.
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Let us summarise what we have said so far (with σ denoting the Sets-
realisation of classical physics):
1. For any system S in Sys, a representation ρσ,S : L(S) Sets consists
of the following ingredients.
(a) The ground symbol Σ is represented by a symplectic manifold,
Σσ,S := ρσ,S(Σ), that serves as the classical state space.
(b) For all systems S, the ground symbol R is represented by the real
numbers R, i.e., Rσ,S = R, where Rσ,S := ρσ,S(R).
(c) Each function symbol A : Σ → R in FL(S)
(
Σ,R) is represented
by a function Aσ,S = ρσ,S(A) : Σσ,S → R in the set of functions108
C(Σσ,S,R).
2. The trivial system is mapped to a singleton set {∗} (viewed as a zero-
dimensional symplectic manifold):
Σσ,1 := {∗}. (11.26)
The empty system is represented by the empty set:
Σσ,0 := ∅. (11.27)
3. Propositions about the system S are represented by (Borel) subsets of
the state space Σσ,S .
4. The composite system S1 ⋄ S2 is represented by the Cartesian product
Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 ; i.e.,
Σσ, S1⋄S2 ≃ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 . (11.28)
The disjoint sum S1⊔S2 is represented by the disjoint union Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 ;i.e.,
Σσ,S1⊔S2 ≃ Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 . (11.29)
5. Let j : S1 → S be an arrow in Sys. Then
(a) There is a translation map L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R)→ FL(S1)(Σ,R).
(b) There is a symplectic function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S from the sym-
plectic manifold Σσ,S1 to the symplectic manifold Σσ,S.
108In practice, these functions are required to be measurable with respect to the Borel
structures on the symplectic manifold Σσ and R. Many of the functions will also be
smooth, but we will not go into such details here.
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The existence of this function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S follows directly from
the properties of sub-systems and composite systems in classical physics. It
is discussed in detail below in Section (11.4.2). As we shall see, it underpins
the classical realisation of our axioms.
These properties of the arrows stem from the fact that the linguistic
function symbols in FL(S)
(
Σ,R) are represented by real-valued functions
in C(Σσ,S,R). Thus we can write ρσ,S : FL(S)
(
Σ,R) → C(Σσ,S ,R), and
similarly ρσ,S1 : FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) → C(Σσ,S1 ,R). The diagram in (11.25) now
becomes
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) C(Σσ,S1 ,R)-ρσ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) C(Σσ,S,R)-ρσ,S
?
L(j)
?
σ(L(j))
(11.30)
and, therefore, the question of interest is if there is a ‘translation represen-
tation’ function σ(L(j)) : C(Σσ,S ,R) → C(Σσ,S1 ,R) so that this diagram
commutes.
Now, as stated above, a physical quantity, A, for the system S is repre-
sented in classical physics by a real-valued function Aσ,S = ρσ,S(A) : Σσ,S →
R. Similarly, the representation of L(j)(A) for S1 is given by a function
Aσ,S1 := ρσ,S1(A) : Σσ,S1 → R. However, in this classical case we also have
the function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S, and it is clear that we can use it to define
[ρσ,S1(L(j)(A)](s) := ρσ,S(A)
(
σ(j)(s)
)
for all s ∈ Σσ,S1 . In other words
ρσ,S1
(L(j)(A)) = ρσ,S(A) ◦ σ(j) (11.31)
or, in simpler notation (
(L(j)(A))
σ,S1
= Aσ,S ◦ σ(j). (11.32)
But then it is clear that a translation-representation function σ(L(j)) :
C(Σσ,S ,R)→ C(Σσ,S1 ,R) with the desired property of making (11.30) com-
mute can be defined by
σ(L(j))(f) := f ◦ σ(j) (11.33)
for all f ∈ C(Σσ,S ,R); i.e., the function σ(L(j))(f) : Σσ,S1 → R is the usual
pull-back of the function f : Σσ,S → R by the function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S.
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Thus, in the case of classical physics, the commutative diagram in (11.22)
can be completed to give
S 〈ρσ,S ,L(S),Sets〉-σ
S1 〈ρσ,S1 ,L(S1),Sets〉-σ
?
j
6
σ(L(j))× L(j)× id
(11.34)
11.4.2 Details of the Translation Representation.
The translation representation for a disjoint sum of classical sys-
tems. We first consider arrows of the form
S1
i1→ S1 ⊔ S2 i2← S2 (11.35)
from the components S1, S2 to the disjoint sum S1 ⊔ S2. The systems
S1, S2 and S1 ⊔ S2 have symplectic manifolds Σσ,S1 , Σσ,S2 and Σσ,S1⊔S2 =
Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 . We write i := i1.
Let S be a classical system. We assume that the function symbols A ∈
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) in the language L(S) are in bijective correspondence with an
appropriate subset of the functions Aσ,S ∈ C(Σσ,S,R).109
There is an obvious translation representation. For ifA ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R),
then since Σσ,S1⊔S2 = Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S1 , the associated functionAσ,S1⊔S2 : Σσ,S1⊔S2 →
R is given by a pair of functions A1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 ,R) and A2 ∈ C(Σσ,S2 ,R); we
write Aσ,S1⊔S2 = 〈A1, A2〉. It is natural to demand that the translation
representation σ(L(i))(Aσ,S1⊔S2) is A1. Note that what is essentially being
discussed here is the classical-physics representation of the relation (11.1).
The canonical choice for σ(i) is
σ(i) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S1⊔S2 = Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 (11.36)
s1 7→ s1. (11.37)
Then the pull-back along σ(i),
σ(i)∗ : C(Σσ,S1⊔S2 ,R) → C(Σσ,S1 ,R) (11.38)
Aσ,S1⊔S2 7→ Aσ,S1⊔S2 ◦ σ(i), (11.39)
109Depending on the setting, one can assume that FL(S)
(
Σ,R) contains function symbols
corresponding bijectively to measurable, continuous or smooth functions.
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maps (or ‘translates’) the topos representative Aσ,S1⊔S2 = 〈A1, A2〉 of the
function symbol A ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) to a real-valued function Aσ,S1⊔S2 ◦σ(i)
on Σσ,S1 . This function is clearly equal to A1.
The translation in the case of a composite classical system. We
now consider arrows in Sys of the form
S1
p1← S1 ⋄ S2 p2→ S2 (11.40)
from the composite classical system S1⋄S2 to the constituent systems S1 and
S2. Here, p1 signals that S1 is a constituent of the composite system S1 ⋄ S2,
likewise p2. The systems S1, S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 have symplectic manifolds Σσ,S1 ,
Σσ,S2 and Σσ,S1⋄S2 = Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , respectively; i.e., the state space of the
composite system S1 ⋄ S2 is the cartesian product of the state spaces of the
components. For typographical simplicity in what follows we denote p := p1.
There is a canonical translation L(p) between the languages L(S1) and
L(S1 ⋄ S2) whose representation is the following. Namely, ifA is in FL(S1)
(
Σ,R),
then the corresponding function Aσ,S1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 ,R) is translated to a func-
tion σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) ∈ C(Σσ,S1⋄S2 ,R) such that
σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1)(s1, s2) = Aσ,S1(s1) (11.41)
for all (s1, s2) ∈ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 .
This natural translation representation is based on the fact that, for the
symplectic manifold Σσ,S1⋄S2 = Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , each point s ∈ Σσ,S1⋄S2 can be
identified with a pair, (s1, s2), of points s1 ∈ Σσ,S1 and s2 ∈ Σσ,S2 . This is
possible since the cartesian product Σσ,S1×Σσ,S2 is a product in the categorial
sense and hence has projections Σσ,S1 ← Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 → Σσ,S2 . Then the
translation representation of functions is constructed in a straightforward
manner. Thus, let
σ(p) : Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 → Σσ,S1
(s1, s2) 7→ s1 (11.42)
be the canonical projection. Then, if Aσ,S1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 ,R), the function
Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p) ∈ C(Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 ,R) (11.43)
is such that, for all (s1, s2) ∈ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 ,
Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p)(s1, s2) = Aσ,S1(s1). (11.44)
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Thus we can define
σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) := Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p). (11.45)
Clearly, σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) can be seen as the representation of the function
symbol A ⋄ 1 ∈ FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R).
12 Theories of Physics in a General Topos
12.1 The Pull-Back Operations
12.1.1 The Pull-Back of Physical Quantities.
Motivated by the above, let us try now to see what can be said about the
scheme in general. Basically, what is involved is the topos representation of
translations of languages. To be more precise, let j : S1 → S be an arrow in
Sys, so that there is a translation L(j) : L(S)→ L(S1) defined by the trans-
lation function L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R). Now suppose that the
systems S and S1 are represented in the topoi τφ(S) and τφ(S1) respectively.
Then, in these representations, the function symbols of signature Σ → R
in L(S) and L(S1) are represented by elements of Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
and
Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
respectively.
Our task is to find a function
φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1) (12.1)
that can be construed as the topos representation of the translation L(j) :
L(S)→ L(S1), and hence of the arrow j : S1 → S in Sys. We are particularly
interested in seeing if φ(L(j)) can be chosen so that the following diagram,
(see (11.25)) commutes:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)-ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S)(Σφ,S,Rφ,S)-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(12.2)
However, as has been emphasised already, it is not clear that one should ex-
pect to find a function φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)
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with this property. The existence and/or properties of such a function will
be dependent on the theory-type, and it seems unlikely that much can be
said in general about the diagram (12.2). Nevertheless, let us see how far we
can get in discussing the existence of such a function in general.
Thus, if µ ∈ Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
, the critical question is if there is some
‘natural’ way whereby this arrow can be ‘pulled-back’ to give an element
φ(L(j))(µ) ∈ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
.
The first pertinent remark is that µ is an arrow in the topos τφ(S), whereas
the sought-for pull-back will be an arrow in the topos τφ(S1), and so we need
a mechanism for getting from one topos to the other (this problem, of course,
does not arise in classical physics since the topos of every representation is
always Sets).
The obvious way of implementing this change of topos is via some functor,
τφ(j) from τφ(S) to τφ(S1). Indeed, given such a functor, an arrow µ : Σφ,S →
Rφ,S in τφ(S) is transformed to the arrow
τφ(j)(µ) : τφ(j)(Σφ,S)→ τφ(j)(Rφ,S) (12.3)
in τφ(S1).
To convert this to an arrow from Σφ,S1 to Rφ,S1, we need to supplement
(12.3) with a pair of arrows φ(j), βφ(j) in τφ(S1) to get the diagram:
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-τφ(j)(µ)
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
(12.4)
The pull-back, φ(L(j))(µ) ∈ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
, with respect to these
choices can then be defined as
φ(L(j))(µ) := βφ(j) ◦ τφ(j)(µ) ◦ φ(j). (12.5)
It follows that a key part of the construction of a topos representation, φ, of
Sys will be to specify the functor τφ(j) from τφ(S) to τφ(S1), and the arrows
φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) and βφ(j) : τφ(j)(Rφ,S) → Rφ,S1 in the topos
τφ(S1). These need to be defined in such a way as to be consistent with a
chain of arrows S2 → S1 → S.
When applied to the representative Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S of a physical
quantity A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R), the diagram (12.4) becomes (augmented with the
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upper half)
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1-φ(L(j))(Aφ,S)
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
τφ(j)(Aφ,S)
Σφ,S Rφ,S-Aφ,S
?
τφ(j)
?
τφ(j)
(12.6)
The commutativity of (12.2) would then require
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S) = (L(j)A)φ,S1 (12.7)
or, in a more expanded notation,
φ(L(j)) ◦ ρφ,S = ρφ,S1 ◦ L(j), (12.8)
where both the left hand side and the right hand side of (12.8) are mappings
from FL(S)
(
Σ,R) to Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1).
Note that the analogous diagram in classical physics is simply
Σσ,S1 R-σ(L(j))(Aσ,S)
Σσ,S R-
Aσ,S
6
σ(j)
?
id
(12.9)
and the commutativity/pull-back condition (12.7) becomes
σ(L(j))(Aσ,S) = (L(j)A)φ,S1 (12.10)
which is satisfied by virtue of (11.33).
It is clear from the above that the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) can
be viewed as the topos analogue of the map σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S that arises
in classical physics whenever there is an arrow j : S1 → S.
12.1.2 The Pull-Back of Propositions.
More insight can be gained into the nature of the triple 〈τφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉
by considering the analogous operation for propositions. First, consider an
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arrow j : S1 → S in Sys in classical physics. Associated with this there is (i)
a translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1); (ii) an associated translation mapping
L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R); and (iii) a symplectic function σ(j) :
Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S.
Let K be a (Borel) subset of the state space, Σσ,S ; hence K represents
a proposition about the system S. Then σ(j)∗(K) := σ(j)−1(K) is a subset
of Σσ,S1 and, as such, represents a proposition about the system S1. We
say that σ(j)∗(K) is the pull-back to Σσ,S1 of the S-proposition represented
by K. The existence of such pull-backs is part of the consistency of the
representation of propositions in classical mechanics, and it is important to
understand what the analogue of this is in our topos scheme.
Consider the general case with the two systems S1, S as above. Then let
K be a proposition, represented as a sub-object of Σφ,S, with a monic arrow
iK : K →֒ Σφ,S. The question now is if the triple 〈τφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉 can be
used to pull K back to give a proposition in τ(S1), i.e., a sub-object of Σφ,S1?
The first requirement is that the functor τφ(j) : τφ(S) → τφ(S1) should
preserve monics. In this case, the monic arrow iK : K →֒ Σφ,S in τφ(S) is
transformed to the monic arrow
τφ(j)(iK) : τφ(j)(K) →֒ τφ(j)(Σφ,S) (12.11)
in τφ(S1); thus τφ(j)(K) is a sub-object of τφ(j)(Σφ,S) in τφ(S1). It is a
property of a topos that the pull-back of a monic arrow is monic ; i.e., if
M →֒ Y is monic, and if ψ : X → Y , then ψ−1(M) is a sub-object of X.
Therefore, in the case of interest, the monic arrow τφ(j)(iK) : τφ(j)(K) →֒
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) can be pulled back along φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) (see diagram
(12.6)) to give the monic φ(j)−1(τφ(j)(K)) ⊆ Σφ,S1 . This is a candidate for
the pull-back of the proposition represented by the sub-object K ⊆ Σφ,S.
In conclusion, propositions can be pulled-back provided that the functor
τφ(j) : τφ(S) → τφ(S1) preserves monics. A sufficient way of satisfying this
requirement is for τφ(j) to be left-exact. However, this raises the question of
“where do left-exact functors come from?”.
12.1.3 The Idea of a Geometric Morphism.
It transpires that there is a natural source of left-exact functors, via the
idea of a geometric morphism. This fundamental concept in topos theory is
defined as follows [56].
Definition 12.1 A geometric morphism φ : F → E between topoi F and E
is a pair of functors φ∗ : E → F and φ∗ : F → E such that
156
(i) φ∗ ⊣ φ∗, i.e., φ∗ is left adjoint to φ∗;
(ii) φ∗ is left exact, i.e., it preserves all finite limits.
The morphism φ∗ : E → F is called the inverse image part of the geometric
morphism ϕ; φ∗ : F → E is called the direct image part.
Geometric morphisms are very important because they are the topos
equivalent of continuous functions. More precisely, if X and Y are topolog-
ical spaces, then any continuous function f : X → Y induces a geometric
morphism between the topoi Sh(X) and Sh(Y ) of sheaves on X and Y re-
spectively. In practice, just as the arrows in the category of topological
spaces are continuous functions, so in any category whose objects are topoi,
the arrows are normally defined to be geometric morphisms. In our case,
as we shall shortly see, all the examples of left-exact functors that arise in
the quantum case do, in fact, come from geometric morphisms. For these
reasons, from now on we will postulate that any arrows between our topoi
arise from geometric morphisms.
One central property of a geometric morphism is that it preserves expres-
sions written in terms of geometric logic. This greatly enhances the attrac-
tiveness of assuming from the outset that the internal logic of the system
languages, L(S), is restricted to the sub-logic afforded by geometric logic.
En passant, another key result for us is the following theorem ([56] p359):
Theorem 12.1 If ϕ : C → D is a functor between categories C and D, then
it induces a geometric morphism (also denoted ϕ)
ϕ : SetsC
op → SetsDop (12.12)
for which the functor ϕ∗ : SetsD
op → SetsCop takes a functor F : D → Sets
to the functor
ϕ∗(F ) := F ◦ ϕop (12.13)
from C to Sets.
In addition, ϕ∗ has a left adjoint ϕ!; i.e., ϕ! ⊣ ϕ∗.
We will use this important theorem in several crucial places.
12.2 The Topos Rules for Theories of Physics
We will now present our general rules for using topos theory in the mathe-
matical representation of physical systems and their theories.
157
Definition 12.2 The category M(Sys) is the following:
1. The objects ofM(Sys) are the topoi that are to be used in representing
the systems in Sys.
2. The arrows from τ1 to τ2 are defined to be the geometric morphisms
from τ2 to τ1. Thus the inverse part, ϕ
∗, of an arrow ϕ∗ : τ1 → τ2 is a
left-exact functor from τ1 to τ2.
Definition 12.3 The rules for using topos theory are as follows:
1. A topos realisation, φ, of Sys in M(Sys) is an assignment, to each
system S in Sys, of a triple φ(S) = 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉 where:
(a) τφ(S) is the topos in M(Sys) in which the physical theory of
system S is to be realised.
(b) L(S) is the local language that is associated with S. This is inde-
pendent of the realisation, φ, of Sys in M(Sys).
(c) ρφ,S : L(S) τφ(S) is a representation of the local language L(S)
in the topos τφ(S).
(d) In addition, for each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys there is a triple
〈τφ(j),φ(j), βφ(j)〉 that interpolates between ρφ,S : L(S) τφ(S)
and ρφ,S1 : L(S1) τφ(S1); for details see below.
2. (a) The representations, ρφ,S(Σ) and ρφ,S(R), of the ground symbols Σ
and R in L(S) are denoted Σφ,S and Rφ,S, respectively. They are
known as the ‘state object’ and ‘quantity-value object’ in τφ(S).
(b) The representation by ρφ,S of each function symbol A : Σ→R of
the system S is an arrow, ρφ,S(A) : Σφ,S →Rφ,S in τφ(S); we will
usually denote this arrow as Aφ,S : Σφ,S →Rφ,S.
(c) Propositions about the system S are represented by sub-objects
of Σφ,S. These will typically be of the form A
−1
φ,S(Ξ), where Ξ is a
sub-object of Rφ,S.110
3. Generally, there are no ‘microstates’ for the system S; i.e., no global
elements (arrows 1 → Σφ,S) of the state object Σφ,S; or, if there are
any, they may not be enough to determine Σφ,S as an object in τφ(S).
110Here, A−1φ,S(Ξ) denotes the sub-object of Σφ,S whose characteristic arrow is χΞ ◦Aφ,S :
Σφ,S → Ωτφ(S), where χΞ : Rφ,S → Ωτφ(S) is the characteristic arrow of the sub-object Ξ.
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Instead, the role of a state is played by a ‘truth sub-object’ T of
PΣφ,S.
111 If J ∈ Sub(Σφ,S) ≃ Γ(PΣφ,S), the ‘truth of the proposi-
tion represented by J ’ is defined to be
ν
(
J ∈ T ) = [[ J˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ ◦ 〈pJq, pTq〉 (12.14)
See Section 6.2 for full information on the idea of a ‘truth object’.
Alternatively, one may use pseudo-states rather than truth objects, in
which case the relevant truth values are of the form ν(w ⊆ J).
4. There is a ‘unit object’ 1M(Sys) in M(Sys) such that if 1Sys denotes
the trivial system in Sys then, for all topos realisations φ,
τφ(1Sys) = 1M(Sys). (12.15)
Motivated by the results for quantum theory (see Section 13.2), we
postulate that the unit object 1M(Sys) in M(Sys) is the category of
sets:
1M(Sys) = Sets. (12.16)
5. To each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys, we have the following:
(a) There is a translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1). This is speci-
fied by a map between function symbols: L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R) →
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R).
(b) With the translation L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R) → FL(S1)(Σ,R) there is
associated a corresponding function
φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1).
(12.17)
These may, or may not, fit together in the commutative diagram:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)-ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) Homτφ(S)(Σφ,S,Rφ,S)-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(12.18)
111In classical physics, the truth object corresponding to a micro-state s is the collection
of all propositions that are true in the state s.
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(c) The function φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)→ Homτφ(S1)(Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1)
is built from the following ingredients. For each topos realisation
φ, there is a triple 〈νφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉 where:
(i) νφ(j) : τφ(S1)→ τφ(S) is a geometric morphism; i.e., an arrow
in the category M(Sys) (thus νφ(j)∗ : τφ(S) → τφ(S1) is left
exact).
N.B. To simplify the notation a little we will denote νφ(j)
∗
by τφ(j). This is sensible in so far as, for the most part, only
the inverse part of νφ(j) will be used in our constructions.
(ii) φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)
(
Σφ,S
)
is an arrow in the topos τφ(S1).
(iii) βφ(j) : τφ(j)
(Rφ,S)→Rφ,S1 is an arrow in the topos τφ(S1).
These fit together in the diagram
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1-
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S)
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
τφ(j)(Aφ,S)
Σφ,S Rφ,S-Aφ,S
?
τφ(j)
?
τφ(j)
(12.19)
The arrows φ(j) and βφ(j) should behave appropriately under
composition of arrows in Sys.
The commutativity of the diagram (12.18) is equivalent to the
relation
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S) = [L(j)(A)]φ,S1 (12.20)
for allA ∈ FL(φ,S)
(
Σ,R). As we keep emphasising, the satisfaction
or otherwise of this relation will depend on the theory-type and,
possibly, the representation φ.
(d) If a proposition in τφ(S) is represented by the monic arrow, K →֒
Σφ,S, the ‘pull-back’ of this proposition to τφ(S1) is defined to be
φ(j)−1
(
τφ(j)(K)
) ⊆ Σφ,S1 .
6. (a) If S1 is a sub-system of S, with an associated arrow i : S1 → S
in Sys then, in the diagram in (12.19), the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 →
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) is a monic arrow in τφ(S1).
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In other words, Σφ,S1 is a sub-object of τφ(j)(Σφ,S), which is de-
noted
Σφ,S1 ⊆ τφ(j)(Σφ,S). (12.21)
We may also want to conjecture
Rφ,S1 ≃ τφ(j)
(Rφ,S). (12.22)
(b) Another possible conjecture is the following: if j : S1 → S is
an epic arrow in Sys, then, in the diagram in (12.19), the arrow
φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) is an epic arrow in τφ(S1).
In particular, for the epic arrow p1 : S1⋄S2 → S1, the arrow φ(p1) :
Σφ,S1⋄S2 → τφ
(
Σφ,S1
)
is an epic arrow in the topos τφ(S1 ⋄ S2).
One should not read Rule 2. above as implying that the choice of the
state object and quantity-value object are unique for any given system S.
These objects would at best be selected only up to isomorphism in the topos
τ(S). Such morphisms in the τ(S)112 can be expected to play a key role
in developing the topos analogue of the important idea of a symmetry, or
covariance transformation of the theory.
In the example of classical physics, for all systems we have τ(S) = Sets
and Σσ,S is a symplectic manifold, and the collection of all symplectic man-
ifolds is a category. It would be elegant if we could assert that, in general,
for a given theory-type the possible state objects in a given topos τ form
the objects of an internal category in τ . However, to make such a statement
would require a general theory of state-objects and, at the moment, we do
not have such a thing.
From a more conceptual viewpoint we note that the ‘similarity’ of our
axioms to those of standard classical physics is reflected in the fact that
(i) physical quantities are represented by arrows Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S; (ii)
propositions are represented by sub-objects of Σφ,S; and (iii) propositions
are assigned truth values. Thus any theory satisfying these axioms ‘looks’
like classical physics, and has an associated neo-realist interpretation.
112Care is needed not to confuse morphisms in the topos τ(S) with morphisms in the
categoryM(Sys) of topoi. An arrow from the object τ(S) to itself in the categoryM(Sys)
is a geometric morphism in the topos τ(S). However, not every arrow in τ(S) need arise in
this way, and an important role can be expected to be played by arrows of this second type.
A good example is when τ(S) is the category of sets, Sets. Typically, τφ(j) : Sets → Sets
is the identity, but there are many morphisms from an object O in Sets to itself: they are
just the functions from O to O.
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13 The General Scheme applied to Quantum
Theory
13.1 Background Remarks
We now want to study the extent to which our ‘rules’ apply to the topos
representation of quantum theory.
For a quantum system with (separable) Hilbert space H, the appropriate
topos (what we earlier called τφ(S)) is Sets
V(H)op : the category of presheaves
over the category (actually, partially-ordered set) V(H) of unital, abelian von
Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra, B(H), of bounded operators on H.
A particularly important object in SetsV(H)
op
is the spectral presheaf Σ,
where, for each V , ΣV is defined to be the Gel’fand spectrum of the abelian
algebra V . The sub-objects of Σ can be identified as the topos representations
of propositions, just as the subsets of S represent propositions in classical
physics.
In Sections 8 and 9, several closely related choices for a quantity-value
object Rφ in SetsV(H)op were discussed. In order to keep the notation sim-
pler, we concentrate here on the presheaf R of real-valued, order-reversing
functions. All results hold analogously if the presheaf R↔ (which we actually
prefer for giving a better physical interpretation) is used.113
Hence, physical quantities A : Σ → R, which correspond to self-adjoint
operators Aˆ, are represented by natural transformations/arrows δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ→
R. The mapping Aˆ 7→ δ˘o(Aˆ) is injective. For brevity, we write δ˘(Aˆ) :=
δ˘o(Aˆ).114
13.2 The Translation Representation for a Disjoint Sum
of Quantum Systems
Let Sys be a category whose objects are systems that can be treated using
quantum theory. Let L(S) be the local language of a system S in Sys whose
quantum Hilbert space is denoted HS. We assume that to each function
symbol, A : Σ → R, in L(S) there is associated a self-adjoint operator
113Since the construction of the arrows δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ → R↔ involves both inner and outer
daseinisation, we would have double work with the notation, which we avoid here.
114Note that this is not the same as the convention used earlier, where δ˘(Aˆ) denoted a
different natural transformation!
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Aˆ ∈ B(HS),115 and that the map
FL(S)
(
Σ,R) → B(H)sa (13.1)
A 7→ Aˆ (13.2)
is injective (but not necessarily surjective, as we will see in the case of a
disjoint sum of quantum systems).
We consider first arrows of the form
S1
i1→ S1 ⊔ S2 i2← S2 (13.3)
from the components S1, S2 to a disjoint sum S1 ⊔ S2; for convenience we
write i := i1. The systems S1, S2 and S1 ⊔ S2 have the Hilbert spaces H1,
H2 and H1 ⊕H2, respectively.
As always, the translation L(i) goes in the opposite direction to the arrow
i, so
L(i) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R)→ FL(S1)(Σ,R). (13.4)
Then our first step is find an ‘operator translation’ from the relevant self-
adjoint operators in H1 ⊕H2 to those in H1,
To do this, let A be a function symbol in FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R). In Section
11.2.1, we argued that FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) ≃ FL(S1)(Σ,R) × FL(S2)(Σ,R) (as
in (11.1)), and hence we introduce the notation A = 〈A1, A2〉, where A1 ∈
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) and A2 ∈ FL(S2)(Σ,R). It is then natural to assume that
the quantisation scheme is such that the operator, Aˆ, on H1 ⊕ H2 can be
decomposed as Aˆ = Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2, where the operators Aˆ1 and Aˆ2 are defined
on H1 and H2 respectively, and correspond to the function symbols A1 and
A2.
116 Then the obvious operator translation is Aˆ 7→ Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa.
We now consider the general rules in the Definition 12.2 and see to what
extent they apply in the example of quantum theory.
1. As we have stated several times, the topos τφ(S) associated with a
quantum system S is
τφ(S) = Sets
V(HS)
op
. (13.5)
Thus (i) the objects of the categoryM(Sys) are topoi of the form SetsV(HS)op,
S ∈ Ob(Sys); and (ii) the arrows between two topoi are defined to be ge-
ometric morphisms. In particular, to each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys there
115More specifically, one could postulate that the elements of FL(S)
(
Σ,R) are associated
with self-adjoint operators in some unital von Neumann sub-algebra of B(HS).
116It should be noted that our scheme does not use all the self-adjoint operators on the
direct sum H1 ⊕H2: only the ‘block diagonal’ operators of the form Aˆ = Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2 arise.
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must correspond a geometric morphism νφ(j) : τφ(S1) → τφ(S) with asso-
ciated left-exact functor τφ(j) := νφ(j)
∗ : τφ(S) → τφ(S1). Of course, the
existence of these functors in the quantum case has yet to be shown.
2. The realisation ρφ,S : L(S) τφ(S) of the language L(S) in the topos
τφ(S) is given as follows. First, we define the state object Σφ,S to be the
spectral presheaf, ΣV(HS), over V(HS), the context category of B(HS). To
keep the notation brief, we will denote117 ΣV(HS) as ΣHS .
Furthermore, we define the quantity-value object, Rφ,S, to be the presheaf
R HS that was defined in Section 8 . Finally, we define
Aφ,S := δ˘(Aˆ), (13.6)
for all A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R). Here δ˘(Aˆ) : ΣHS → RHS is constructed using the
Gel’fand transforms of the (outer) daseinisation of Aˆ, for details see later.
3. The truth object T |ψ〉 corresponding to a pure state |ψ〉 was discussed
in Section 6.3. Alternatively, we have the pseudo-state w |ψ〉.
4. Let H = |C be the one-dimensional Hilbert space, corresponding to
the trivial quantum system 1. There is exactly one abelian sub-algebra of
B( |C) ≃ |C, namely |C itself. This leads to
τφ(1Sys) = Sets
{∗} ≃ Sets = 1M(Sys). (13.7)
5. Let A ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R) be a function symbol for the system S1 ⊔ S2.
Then, as discussed above, A is of the form A = 〈A1, A2〉 (compare equation
(11.1)), which corresponds to a self-adjoint operator Aˆ1⊕Aˆ2 ∈ B(H1⊕H2)sa.
The topos representation of A is the natural transformation δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) :
ΣH1⊕H2 → R H1⊕H2 , which is defined at each stage V ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) as
δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)V : ΣH1⊕H2V → R H1⊕H2V
λ 7→ {V ′ 7→ 〈λ|V ′ , δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)V ′〉 | V ′ ⊆ V }(13.8)
where the right hand side (13.8) denotes an order-reversing function.
We will need the following:
Lemma 13.1 Let Aˆ1⊕Aˆ2 ∈ B(H1⊕H2)sa, and let V = V1⊕V2 ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2))
such that V1 ∈ Ob(V(H1)) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)). Then
δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)V = δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊕ δ(Aˆ2)V2 . (13.9)
117Presheaves are always denoted by symbols that are underlined.
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Proof. Every projection Qˆ ∈ V is of the form Qˆ = Qˆ1 ⊕ Qˆ2 for unique
projections Qˆ1 ∈ P(H1) and Qˆ2 ∈ P(H2). Let Pˆ ∈ P(H) be of the form
Pˆ = Pˆ1 ⊕ Pˆ2 such that Pˆ1 ∈ P(H1) and Pˆ2 ∈ P(H1). The largest projection
in V smaller than or equal to Pˆ , i.e., the inner daseinisation of Pˆ to V , is
δi(Pˆ )V = Qˆ1 ⊕ Qˆ2, (13.10)
where Qˆ1 ∈ P(V1) is the largest projection in V1 smaller than or equal to Pˆ1,
and Qˆ2 ∈ P(V2) is the largest projection in V2 smaller than or equal to Pˆ2,
so
δi(Pˆ )V = δ(Pˆ1)V1 ⊕ δ(Pˆ2)V2. (13.11)
This implies δ(Aˆ ⊕ Bˆ)V = δ(Aˆ)V1 ⊕ δ(Bˆ)V2, since (outer) daseinisation of a
self-adjoint operator just means inner daseinisation of the projections in its
spectral family, and all the projections in the spectral family of Aˆ⊕ Bˆ are of
the form Pˆ = Pˆ1 ⊕ Pˆ2.
As discussed in Section 12, in order to mimic the construction that we
have in the classical case, we need to pull back the arrow/natural transfor-
mation δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) : ΣH1⊕H2 → R H1⊕H2 to obtain an arrow from ΣH1 to
R H1 . Since we decided that the translation on the level of operators sends
Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2 to Aˆ1, we expect that this arrow from ΣH1 to R H1 is δ˘(Aˆ1). We
will now show how this works.
The presheaves ΣH1⊕H2 and ΣH1 lie in different topoi, and in order to
‘transform’ between them we need we need a (left-exact) functor from the
topos SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op
to the topos SetsV(H1)
op
: this is the functor τφ(j) :
τφ(S) → τφ(S1) in (12.19). One natural place to look for such a functor
is as the inverse-image part of a geometric morphism from SetsV(H1)
op
to
SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op
. According to Theorem 12.1, one source of such a geometric
morphism, µ, is a functor
m : V(H1)→ V(H1 ⊕H2), (13.12)
and the obvious choice for this is
m(V ) := V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 (13.13)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H1)). This function from Ob(V(H1)) to Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2))
is clearly order preserving, and hence m is a genuine functor.
Let µ : SetsV(H1)
op → SetsV(H1⊕H2)op denote the geometric morphism
induced by m. The inverse-image functor of µ is given by
µ∗ : SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op → SetsV(H1)op (13.14)
F 7→ F ◦mop. (13.15)
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This means that, for all V ∈ Ob(V(H1)), we have
(µ∗FH1⊕H2)V = F
H1⊕H2
m(V ) = F
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
. (13.16)
For example, for the spectral presheaf we get
(µ∗ΣH1⊕H2)V = Σ
H1⊕H2
m(V ) = Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
. (13.17)
This is the functor that is denoted τφ(j) : τφ(S1)→ τφ(S) in (12.19).
We next need to find an arrow φ(i) : ΣH1 → µ∗ΣH1⊕H2 that is the ana-
logue of the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(3Σφ,S) in (12.19).
For each V , the set (µ∗ΣH1⊕H2)V = Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
contains two types of spec-
tral elements λ: the first type are those λ such that 〈λ, 0ˆH1⊕ 1ˆH2〉 = 0. Then,
clearly, there is some λ˜ ∈ ΣH1V such that 〈λ˜, Aˆ〉 = 〈λ, Aˆ⊕ 0ˆH2〉 = 〈λ, Aˆ⊕ 1ˆH2〉
for all Aˆ ∈ Vsa. The second type of spectral elements λ ∈ ΣH1⊕H2V⊕|C1ˆH2 are such
that 〈λ, 0ˆH1 ⊕ 1ˆH2〉 = 1. In fact, there is exactly one such λ, and we denote
it by λ0. This shows that Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
≃ ΣH1V ∪ {λ0}. Accordingly, at each stage
V , the mapping φ(i) sends each λ˜ ∈ ΣH1V to the corresponding λ ∈ ΣH1⊕H2V⊕|C1ˆH2 .
The presheaf R H1⊕H2 is given at each stage W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) as
the order-reversing functions ν :↓W → R, where ↓W denotes the set of unital,
abelian von Neumann sub-algebras of W . Let W = V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 . Clearly, there
is a bijection between the sets ↓W ⊂ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) and ↓V ⊂ Ob(V(H)).
We can thus identify
(µ∗R H1⊕H2)V = R
 H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
≃ RH1V (13.18)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)). This gives an isomorphism βφ(i) : µ∗R H1⊕H2 →
R H1 , which corresponds to the arrow βφ(j) : τφ(j)(Rφ,S) → Rφ,S1 in
(12.19).
Now consider the arrow δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) : ΣH1⊕H2 → R H1⊕H2 . This is the
analogue of the arrow Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S in (12.19). At each stage W ∈
Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)), this arrow is given by the (outer) daseinisation δ(Aˆ1 ⊕
Aˆ2)W ′ for all W
′ ∈↓W . According to Lemma 13.1, we have
δ(Aˆ1⊕Aˆ2)V⊕|C1ˆH2 = δ(Aˆ1)V⊕δ(A2)|C1ˆH2 = δ(Aˆ1)V⊕max(sp(Aˆ2))1ˆH2 (13.19)
for all V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)). This makes clear how the arrow
µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) : µ∗ΣH1⊕H2 → µ∗R H1⊕H2 (13.20)
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is defined. Our conjectured pull-back/translation representation is
φ(L(i))(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) := βφ(i)◦µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉))◦φ(i) : ΣH1 → R H1 . (13.21)
Using the definitions of φ(i) and βφ(i), it becomes clear that
βφ(i) ◦ µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) ◦ φ(i) = δ˘(Aˆ1). (13.22)
Hence, the commutativity condition in (12.20) is satisfied for arrows in Sys
of the form i1,2 : S1,2 → S1 ⊔ S2.
13.3 The Translation Representation for Composite Quan-
tum Systems
We now consider arrows in Sys of the form
S1
p1← S1 ⋄ S2 p2→ S1, (13.23)
where the quantum systems S1, S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 have the Hilbert spaces H1,
H2 and H1 ⊗H2, respectively.118
The canonical translation119 L(p1) between the languages L(S1) and L(S1 ⋄ S2)
(see Section 11.2.2) is such that if A1 is a function symbol in FL(S1)
(
Σ,R),
then the corresponding operator Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa will be ‘translated’ to the
operator Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 ∈ B(H1 ⊗ H2). By assumption, this corresponds to the
function symbol A1 ⋄ 1 in FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R).
13.3.1 Operator Entanglement and Translations.
We should be cautious about what to expect from this translation when
we represent a physical quantity A : Σ → R in FL(S1)
(
Σ,R) by an arrow
between presheaves, since there are no canonical projections
H1 ←H1 ⊗H2 →H2, (13.24)
and hence no canonical projections
ΣH1 ← ΣH1⊗H2 → ΣH2 (13.25)
118As usual, the composite system S1 ⋄ S2 has as its Hilbert space the tensor product of
the Hilbert spaces of the components.
119As discussed in Section 11.2.2, this translation, L(p1), transforms a physical quantity
A1 of system S1 into a physical quantity A1 ⋄ 1, which is the ‘same’ physical quantity but
now seen as a part of the composite system S1 ⋄ S2. The symbol 1 is the trivial physical
quantity: it is represented by the operator 1ˆH2 .
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from the spectral presheaf of the composite system to the spectral presheaves
of the components.120
This is the point where a form of entanglement enters the picture. The
spectral presheaf ΣH1⊗H2 is a presheaf over the context category V(H1⊗H2)
of H1 ⊗ H2. Clearly, the context category V(H1) can be embedded into
V(H1 ⊗ H2) by the mapping V1 7→ V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2, and likewise V(H2) can be
embedded into V(H1 ⊗H2). But not every W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is of the
form V1 ⊗ V2.
This comes from the fact that not all vectors in H1 ⊗H2 are of the form
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2, hence not all projections in P(H1 ⊗H2) are of the form Pˆψ1 ⊗ Pˆψ2 ,
which in turn implies that not all W ∈ V(H1 ⊗H2) are of the form V1 ⊗ V2.
There are more contexts, or world-views, available in V(H1⊗H2) than those
coming from V(H1) and V(H2). We call this ‘operator entanglement’.
The topos representative of Aˆ1 is δ˘(Aˆ1) : Σ
H1 → R H1 , and the repre-
sentative of Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 is δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1) : ΣH1⊗H2 → R H1⊗H2 . At sub-algebras
W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) which are not of the form W = V1 ⊗ V2 for any V1 ∈
Ob(V(H1)) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)), the daseinised operator δ(Aˆ1W⊗1ˆH2) ∈Wsa
will not be of the form δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊗ δ(Aˆ1)V2.121 On the other hand, it is easy to
see that δ(Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2)W = δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 if W = V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2 .
Given a physical quantity A1, represented by the arrow δ˘(Aˆ1) : Σ
H1 →
R
H1 , we can (at best) expect that the translation of this arrow into an arrow
from ΣH1⊗H2 to R
H1⊗H2 coincides with the arrow δ˘( ˆA1 ⋄ 1) on the ‘image’
of ΣH1 in ΣH1⊗H2 . This image will be constructed below using a certain
geometric morphism. As one might expect, the image of ΣH1 is a presheaf P
on V(H1⊗H2) such that P V1⊗|C1ˆH2 ≃ Σ
H1
V1
for all V1 ∈ V(H1), i.e., the presheaf
P can be identified with ΣH1 exactly on the image of V(H1) in V(H1 ⊗H2)
under the embedding V1 7→ V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2 . At these stages, the translation of
δ˘(Aˆ1) will coincide with δ˘( ˆA1 ⋄ 1). At other stages W ∈ V(H1 ⊗ H2), the
translation cannot be expected to be the same natural transformation as
δ˘( ˆA ⋄ 1) in general.
120On the other hand, in the classical case, there are canonical projections
Σσ,S1 ← Σσ,S1⋄S2 → Σσ,S2 (13.26)
because the symplectic manifold Σσ,S1⋄S2 that represents the composite system is the
cartesian product Σσ,S1⋄S2 = Σσ,S1 ×Σσ,S2, which is a product in the categorial sense and
hence comes with canonical projections.
121Currently, it is even an open question if δ(Aˆ1W ⊗ 1ˆH2) = δ(Aˆ1)V1⊗ 1ˆH2 ifW = V1⊗V2
for a non-trivial algebra V2.
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13.3.2 A Geometrical Morphism and a Possible Translation
The most natural approach to a translation is the following. Let W ∈
Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)), and define VW ∈ Ob(V(H1)) to be the largest sub-algebra
of B(H1) such that VW ⊗ |C1ˆH2 is a sub-algebra of W . Depending on W , VW
may, or may not, be the trivial sub-algebra |C1ˆH1 . We note that if W
′ ⊆ W ,
then
VW ′ ⊆ VW , (13.27)
but W
′ ⊂W only implies VW ′ ⊆ VW .
The trivial algebra |C1ˆH1 is not an object in the category V(H1). This is
why we introduce the ‘augmented context category’ V(H1)∗, whose objects
are those of V(H1) united with |C1ˆH1 , and with the obvious morphisms ( |C1ˆH1
is a sub-algebra of all V ∈ V(H1)).
Then there is a functor n : V(H1 ⊗H2) → V(H1)∗, defined as follows.
On objects,
n : Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) → Ob(V(H1)∗)
W 7→ VW , (13.28)
and if iW ′W : W
′ → W is an arrow in V(H1 ⊗ H2), we define n(iW ′W ) :=
iVW ′VW (an arrow in V(H1)∗); if VW ′ = VW , then iVW ′VW is the identity arrow
idVW .
Now let
ν : SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op → Sets(V(H1)∗)op (13.29)
denote the geometric morphism induced by π. Then the (left-exact) inverse-
image functor
ν∗ : Sets(V(H1)∗)
op → SetsV(H1⊗H2)op (13.30)
acts on a presheaf F ∈ Sets(V(H1)∗)op in the following way. For all W ∈
Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)), we have
(ν∗F )W = F nop(W ) = F VW (13.31)
and
(ν∗F )(iW ′W ) = F (iVW ′VW ) (13.32)
for all arrows iW ′W in the category V(H1 ⊗H2).122
122We remark, although will not prove it here, that the inverse-image presheaf ν∗F coin-
cides with the direct image presheaf φ∗F of F constructed from the geometric morphism
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In particular, for all W ∈ V(H1 ⊗H2), we have
(ν∗ΣH1)W = Σ
H1
VW
, (13.34)
(ν∗R H1)W = R
 H1
VW
. (13.35)
Since VW can be |C1ˆH1, we have to extend the definition of the spectral
presheaf ΣH1 and the quantity-value presheaf R
H1 such that they become
presheaves over V(H1)∗ (and not just V(H1)). This can be done in a straight-
forward way: the Gel’fand spectrum Σ|C1ˆH1
of |C1ˆH1 consists of the single spec-
tral element λ1 such that 〈λ1, 1ˆH1〉 = 1. Moreover, |C1ˆH1 has no sub-algebras,
so the order-reversing functions on this algebra correspond bijectively to the
real numbers R.
Using these equations, we see that the arrow δ˘(Aˆ1) : Σ
H1 → R H1 that
corresponds to the self-adjoint operator Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa gives rise to the arrow
ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1)) : ν
∗ΣH1 → ν∗R H1 . (13.36)
In terms of our earlier notation, the functor τφ(p1) : Sets
V(H1)
op → SetsV(H1⊗H2)op
is ν∗, and the arrow in (13.36) is the arrow τφ(j)(Aφ,S) : τφ(j)(Σφ,S) →
τφ(j)(Rφ,S) in (12.19) with j : S1 → S being replaced by p : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1,
which is the arrow in Sys whose translation representation we are trying to
construct.
The next arrow we need is the one denoted βφ(j) : τφ(j)(Rφ,S) → Rφ,S1
in (12.19). In the present case, we define βφ(p) : ν
∗R H1 → R H1⊗H2 as
follows. Let α ∈ (ν∗R H1)W ≃ R H1VW be an order-reversing real-valued
function on ↓VW . Then we define an order-reversing function βφ(p)(α) ∈
R H1⊗H2W as follows. For all W
′ ⊆W , let
[βφ(p)(α)](W
′) := α(VW ′) (13.37)
which, by virtue of (13.27), is an order-reversing function and hence a member
of R H1⊗H2W .
We also need an arrow in SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
from ΣH1⊗H2 to ν∗ΣH1 , where
ν∗ΣH1 is defined in (13.34). This is the arrow denoted φ(j) : Σφ,S1 →
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) in (12.19).
φ induced by the functor
κ : V(H1) → V(H1 ⊗H2)
V 7→ V ⊗ |C1ˆH2 . (13.33)
Of course, the inverse image presheaf β∗F is much easier to construct.
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The obvious choice is to restrict λ ∈ ΣH1⊗H2W to the sub-algebra VW ⊗
|C1ˆH2 ⊆ W , and to identify VW ⊗ |C1ˆH1 ≃ VW ⊗ 1ˆH1 ≃ VW as von Neumann
algebras, which gives ΣH1⊗H2
VW⊗|C1ˆH2
≃ ΣH1VW . Let
φ(p)W : Σ
H1⊗H2
W → ΣH1VW
λ 7→ λ|VW (13.38)
denote this arrow at stage W . Then
βφ(p) ◦ ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1)) ◦ φ(p) : ΣH1⊗H2 → R H1⊗H2 (13.39)
is a natural transformation which is defined for all W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2))
and all λ ∈W by(
βφ(p) ◦ ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1)) ◦ φ(p)
)
W
(λ) = ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ))(λ|VW ) (13.40)
= {V ′ 7→ 〈λ|V ′, δ(Aˆ)V ′〉 | V ′ ⊆ VW}(13.41)
This is clearly an order-reversing real-valued function on the set ↓W of sub-
algebras ofW , i.e., it is an element of R H1⊗H2W . We define βφ(p)◦ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1))◦
φ(p) to be the translation representation, φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1)) of δ˘(Aˆ1) for the
composite system.
Note that, by construction, for each W , the arrow (βφ(p) ◦ ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1)) ◦
φ(p))W corresponds to the self-adjoint operator δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 ∈Wsa, since
〈λ|VW , δ(Aˆ1)VW 〉 = 〈λ, δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2〉 (13.42)
for all λ ∈ ΣH1⊗H2W .
Comments on these results. This is about as far as we can get with the
arrows associated with the composite of two quantum systems. The results
above can be summarised in the equation
φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1))W = δ˘(A1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 (13.43)
for all contexts W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)). If W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is of the
form W = V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2 , i.e., if W is in the image of the embedding of V(H1)
into V(H1 ⊗H2), then VW = V1 and the translation formula gives just what
one expects: the arrow δ˘(Aˆ1) is translated into the arrow δ˘( ˆA1 ⋄ 1) at these
stages, since δ(Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2)V1⊗|C1ˆH2 = δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊗ 1ˆH2.
123
123To be precise, both the translation φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1))W , given by (13.43), and δ˘( ˆA ⋄ 1)W
are mappings from ΣH1⊗H2W to R
H1⊗H2
W . Each λ ∈ ΣH1⊗H2W is mapped to an order-
reversing function on ↓W . The mappings φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1))W and δ˘( ˆA ⋄ 1)W coincide at all
W ′ ∈↓W that are of the form W ′ = V ′ ⊗ |C1ˆH2 .
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If W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is not of the form W = V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2, then it is
relatively easy to show that
δ(Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2)W 6= δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 (13.44)
in general. Hence
φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1)) 6= δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1), (13.45)
whereas, intuitively, one might have expected equality. Thus the ‘commuta-
tivity’ condition (12.7) is not satisfied.
In fact, there appears to be no operator Bˆ ∈ B(H1 ⊗ H2) such that
φ(L(p))(δ˘(Aˆ1)) = δ˘(Bˆ). Thus the quantity, βφ(p)◦ν∗(δ˘(Aˆ1))◦φ(p), that is our
conjectured pull-back, is an arrow in HomSetsV(H1⊗H2)op
(
ΣH1⊗H2 ,R H1⊗H2
)
that is not of the form Aφ,S1⋄S2 for any physical quantity A ∈ FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R).
Our current understanding is that this translation is ‘as good as possible’:
the arrow δ˘(Aˆ1) : Σ
H1 → RH1 is translated into an arrow from ΣH1⊗H2 to
R
H1⊗H2 that coincides with δ˘(Aˆ1) on those part of Σ
H1⊗H2 that can be
identified with ΣH1 . But ΣH1⊗H2 is much larger, and it is not simply a
product of ΣH1 and ΣH2 . The context category V(H1 ⊗ H2) underlying
ΣH1⊗H2 is much richer than a simple product of V(H1) and V(H2). This is
due to a kind of operator entanglement. A translation can at best give a
faithful picture of an arrow, but it cannot possibly ‘know’ about the more
complicated contextual structure of the larger category.
Clearly, both technical and interpretational work remain to be done.
14 Characteristic Properties of Σφ, Rφ and
T/w
14.1 The State Object Σφ
A major motivation for our work is the desire to find mathematical structures
with whose aid genuinely new types of theory can be constructed. Conse-
quently, however fascinating the ‘toposification’ of quantum theory may be,
this particular theory should not be allowed to divert us too much from the
main goal. However, it is also important to see if any general lessons can
be learnt from what has been done so far. This is likely to be crucial in the
construction of new theories.
In developing the topos version of quantum theory we have constructed
concrete objects in the topos to function as the state object and quantity-
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value object. We have also seen how each quantum vector state gives a
precise truth object, or ‘pseudo-state’.
The challenging question now is what, if anything, can be said in general
about these key ingredients in our scheme. Thus, ideally, we would be able
to specify characteristic properties for Σφ, Rφ, and the truth objects/pseudo-
states. A related problem is to understand if there is an object, Wφ, of all
truth objects/pseudo-states, and, if so, what are its defining properties. Any
such universal properties could be coded into the structure of the language,
L(S), of the system, hence ensuing that they are present in all topos repre-
sentations of S. In particular, should a symbol W be added to L(S) as the
linguistic precursor of an object of pseudo-states?
So far, we only know of two explicit examples of physically-relevant topos
representations of a system language, L(S): (i) the representation of classical
physics in Sets; and (ii) the representation of quantum physics in topoi
of the form SetsV(H)
op
. This does provide much to go on when it comes
to speculating on characteristic properties of the key objects Σφ and Rφ.
From this perspective, it would be helpful if there is an alternative way of
finding the quantum objects Σ and R↔ in addition to the one provided by the
approach that we have adopted. Fortunately, this has been done recently by
Heunen and Spitters [38]; as we shall see in Section 14.1.2, this does provide
more insight into a possible generic structure for Σφ.
14.1.1 An Analogue of a Symplectic Structure or Cotangent Bun-
dle?
Let us start with the state object Σφ. In classical physics, this is a symplec-
tic manifold; in quantum theory it is the spectral presheaf Σ in the topos
SetsV(H)
op
. Does this suggest any properties for Σφ in general?
One possibility is that the state-object, Σφ, has some sort of ‘symplec-
tic structure’. If taken literally, this phrase suggests synthetic differential
geometry (SDG): a theory that is based on the existence in certain topoi
(not Sets) of genuine ‘infinitesimals’. However, this seems unlikely for the
quantum topoi SetsV(H)
op
and we would probably need to extend these topoi
considerably in order to incorporate SDG. Thus when we say “. . . some sort
of symplectic structure”, the phrase ‘some sort’ has to be construed rather
broadly.
We suspect that, with this caveat, the state object Σ may have such a
structure, particularly for those quantum systems that come from quantising
a given classical system. However, at the moment this is still a conjecture.
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We are currently studying systems whose classical state space is the cotan-
gent bundle, T ∗Q, of a configuration space Q. We think that the quantum
analogue of this space is a certain presheaf, MQ, that is associated with
the maximal commutative sub-algebra, MQ ∈ Ob(V(H)), generated by the
smooth, real-valued functions on Q. This is currently work in progress.
But even if the quantum state-object does have a remnant ‘symplectic
structure’, it is debatable if this should be axiomatised in general. Symplec-
tic structures arise in classical physics because the underlying equations of
motion are second-order in the ‘configuration’ variables q, and hence first-
order in the pair (q, p), where p are the ‘momentum variables’.
However if, say, Newton’s equations of gravity had been third-order in q,
this would lead to triples (q, p, a) (a are ‘acceleration’ variables) and sym-
plectic structure would not be appropriate.
14.1.2 Σφ as a Spectral Object: the Work of Heunen and Spitters
Another way of understanding the state object Σφ is suggested by the recent
work of Heunen and Spitters [38]. They start with a non-commutative C∗-
algebra, A, of observables in some ‘ambient topos’, S—in our case, this is
Sets—and then proceed with the following steps:
1. Construct the poset category124 V(A) of commutative sub-algebras of
A.
2. Construct the topos, SV(A) of covariant functors (i.e., co-presheaves)
on the category/poset V(A). 125
3. Construct the ‘tautological’ co-presheaf A in which A(V ) := V for
each commutative sub-algebra, V , of A. Then if iV1V2 : V1 ⊆ V2, the
associated arrow A(iV1V2) : A(V1)→ A(V2) is just the inclusion map of
A(V1) in A(V2).
4. They show that A has the structure of a commutative (pre126) C∗-
algebra inside the topos
124This notation has been chosen to suggest more clearly the analogues with our topos
constructions that use the base category V(H). It is not that used by Heunen and Spitters.
125They affirm that the operation A 7→ SV(A) defines a functor from the category of
C∗-algebras in S to the category of elementary topoi and geometric morphisms.
126The ‘pre’ refers to the fact that the algebra is defined using only the co-presheaf, Q,
of complexified rationals. This co-presheaf is constructed from the natural-number object,
N, only. This restriction is necessary because it is not possible to define the norm of a
C∗-algebra in purely constructive terms.
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5. Using a recent, very important, result of Banacheswski and Mulvey [7],
Heunen and Spitters show that the spectrum, Σ, of the commutative
algebra A can be computed internally, and that it has the structure of
an internal locale in SV(A).
6. They then show that, in the case of quantum theory, Σ is essentially
our spectral object, Σ, but viewed as a co-presheaf of locales, rather
than as a presheaf of topological spaces.
Thus Heunen and Spitters differ from us in that (i) they work in a gen-
eral ambient topos S, whereas we use Sets; (ii) they use C∗-algebras rather
than von Neumann algebras127; and (iii) they use covariant rather than con-
travariant functors.
The fact that they recover what is (essentially) our spectral presheaf is
striking. Amongst other things, it suggests a possible axiomatisation of the
state object, Σφ. Namely, we could require that in any topos representation,
φ, the state object is (i) the spectrum of some internal, commutative (pre)
C∗-algebra; and (ii) the spectrum has the structure of an internal locale in
the topos τφ.
It is not currently clear whether or not it makes physical sense to always
require Σφ to be the spectrum of an internal algebra. However, even in
the contrary case it still makes sense to explore the possibility that Σφ has
the ‘topological’ property of being an internal locale. This opens up many
possibilities, including that of constructing the (internal) topos, Sh(Σφ), of
sheaves over Σφ.
14.1.3 Using Boolean Algebras as the Base Category
As remarked earlier, there are several possible choices for the base category
over which the set-valued functors are defined. Most of our work has been
based on the category, V(H), of commutative von Neumann sub-algebras
of B(H). As indicated above, the Heunen-Spitters constructions use the
category of commutative C∗-algebras. More abstractly, one can start with
any AW ∗-algebra or C∗-algebra.
However, as discussed briefly in Section 5.5.3, another possible choice is
the category, Bl(H), of all Boolean sub-algebras of the lattice of projection
127One problem with C∗-algebras is that they very often do not contain enough projec-
tors; and, of course, these are the entities that represent propositions. This obliges Heunen
and Spitters to move from a C∗-algebra to a AW ∗-algebra, which is just an abstract version
of a von Neumann algebra.
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operators on H. The ensuing topos, SetsBl(H)op , or SetsBl(H), is interesting
in its own right, but particularly so when combined with the ideas of Heunen
and Spitters. As applied to the category Bl(H), their work suggests that we
first construct the tautological co-presheaf Bl(H) which associates to each
B ∈ Ob(Bl(H)), the Boolean algebra B. Viewed internally in the topos
SetsBl(H), this co-presheaf is a Boolean-algebra object. We conjecture that
the spectrum of Bl(H) can be obtained in a constructive way using the
internal logic of SetsBl(H). If so, it seems clear that, after using the locale
trick of [38], this spectrum will essentially be the same as our dual presheaf
D.
Thus, in this approach, the state object is the spectrum of an internal
Boolean-algebra, and daseinisation maps the projection operators in H into
elements of this algebra. This reinforces still further our claim that quantum
theory looks like classical physics in an appropriate topos. This raises some
fascinating possibilities. For example, we make the following:
Conjecture: The subject of quantum computation is
equivalent to the study of ‘classical’ computation in the
quantum topos SetsV(H)
op
.
14.1.4 Application to Other Branches of Algebra
It is clear that the scheme discussed above could fruitfully be extended to
various branches of algebra. Thus, if A is any algebraic structure128, we can
consider the category V(A) whose objects are the commutative sub-algebras
of A, and whose arrows are algebra embeddings (or, slightly more generally,
monomorphisms). One can then consider the topos, SetsV(A)
op
, of all set-
valued, contravariant functors on V(A); alternatively, one might look at the
topos, SetsV(A), of covariant functors.
For this structure to be mathematically interesting it is necessary that the
abelian sub-objects of A have a well-defined spectral structure. For example,
let A be any locally-compact topological group. Then the spectrum of any
commutative (locally-compact) subgroup A is just the Pontryagin dual of A,
which is itself a locally-compact, commutative group. The spectral presheaf
of A can then be defined as the object, ΣA, in Sets
V(A)op that is constructed
in the obvious way (i.e., analogous to the way in which Σ was constructed)
from this collection of Pontryagin duals.
128We are assuming that the ambient topos is Sets, but other choices could be considered.
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We conjecture that a careful analysis would show that, for at least some
structures of this type:
1. There is a ‘tautological’ object, A, in the topos SetsV(A) that is asso-
ciated with the category V(A).
2. Viewed internally, this tautological object is a commutative algebra.
3. This object has a spectrum that can be constructed internally, and is
essentially the spectral presheaf, ΣA, of A.
It seems clear that, in general, the spectral presheaf, ΣA, is a potential
candidate as the basis for non-commutative spectral theory.
14.1.5 The Partial Existence of Points of Σφ
One of the many intriguing features of topos theory is that it makes sense
to talk about entities that only ‘partially exist’. One can only speculate on
what would have been Heidegger’s reaction had he been told that the answer
to “What is a thing?” is “Something that partially exists”. However, in the
realm of topos theory the notion of ‘partial existence’ lies easily with the
concept of propositions that are only ‘partly true’.
A particularly interesting example is the existence, or otherwise, of ‘points’
(i.e., global elements) of the state object Σφ. If Σφ has no global elements
(as is the case for the quantum spectral presheaf, Σ) it may still have ‘partial
elements’. A partial element is defined to be an arrow ξ : U → Σφ where
the object U in the topos τφ is a sub-object of the terminal object 1τφ . Thus
there is a monic U →֒ 1τφ with the property that the arrow ξ : U → Σφ
cannot be extended to an arrow 1τφ → Σφ. Studying the obstruction to such
extensions could be another route to finding a cohomological expression of
the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Pedagogically, it is attractive to say that the non-existence of a global
element of Σ is analogous to the non-existence of a cross-section of the fa-
miliar ‘double-circle’, helical covering of a single circle, S1. This principal
Z2-bundle over S
1 is non-trivial, and hence has no cross-sections.
However, local cross-sections do exist, these being defined as sections of
the bundle restricted to any open subset of the base space S1. In fact, this
bundle is locally trivial ; i.e., each point s ∈ S1 has a neighbourhood Us such
that the restriction of the bundle to Us is trivial, and hence sections of the
bundle restricted to Us exist.
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There is an analogue of local triviality in the topos quantum theory where
τφ = Sets
V(H)op . Thus, let V be any object in V(H) and define ↓V := {V1 ∈
Ob(V(H)) | V1 ⊆ V }. Then ↓V is like a ‘neighbourhood’ of V ; indeed, that
is precisely what it is if the poset Ob(V(H)) is equipped with the topology
generated by the lower sets. Furthermore, given any presheaf F in τφ, the
restriction, F ↓V , to V , can be defined as in Section 6.5. It is easy to see
that, for all stages V , the presheaf F ↓V does have global elements. In this
sense, every presheaf in SetsV(H)
op
is ‘locally trivial’. Furthermore, to each
V there is associated a sub-object UV of 1 such that each global element of
F ↓V corresponds to a partial element of F .
Thus, for the topos SetsV(H)
op
, there is a precise sense in which the spec-
tral presheaf has ‘local elements’, or ‘points that partially exist’. However,
it is not clear to what extent such an assertion can, or should, be made for
a general topos τφ. Certainly, for any presheaf topos, Sets
Cop , one can talk
about ‘localising’ with respect to the objects in the base category C, but the
situation for a more general topos is less clear.
14.1.6 The Work of Corbett et al
Another interesting question is whether these different ways of seeing the
state-object relate at all to the work of Corbett and his collaborators [3, 16].
For some time Corbett has been studying what he calls ‘quantum’ real
numbers, or ‘qr-numbers’, as another way of a obtaining a ‘realist’ interpre-
tation of quantum theory. The first step is to take the space of states, ES,
of a quantum system (where a state is viewed as a positive linear functional
on an appropriate C∗-algebra, A) and equip it with the weakest topology
such that the functions Aˆ 7→ tr(Aˆρˆ) are continuous for all states ρˆ ∈ ES.
Then a ‘qr-number’ is defined as a global element of the sheaf of germs of
continuous real-valued functions on ES. Put another way, a qr-number is
a (Dedekind) real number in the topos, Sh(ES), of sheaves over ES. The
fundamental physical postulate is then:
1. The ‘numerical values’ of a physical quantity, A, are given by the qr-
numbers aQ(U) := tr(Aˆρ)ρˆ∈U where U is an open subset of ES.
2. Every physical quantity has a qr-number value at all times.
3. Every physical quantity has an open subset of ES associated with it
at all times. This is the extent to which the quantity can be said to
‘exist’.
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Evidently this theory also is ‘contextual’, with the contexts now being iden-
tified with the open sets of ES.
There seems a possible link between these ideas and the work of Heunen
and Spitter. The latter construct the (internal in the topos SetsV(H)) topos,
Sh(Σ), of sheaves over the locale Σ and then show that each bounded self-
adjoint operator in H is represented by an analogue of an ‘interval domain129’
in this topos. This is their analogue of our non-commutative spectral theory
in which Aˆ is represented by an arrow δo(Aˆ) : Σ→ R (or an arrow from Σ
to R↔, if one prefers that choice of quantity-value object).
It would be interesting to see if there is any relation between the real
numbers in the Corbett presheaf, Sh(ES) and the interval domains in the
Heunen-Spitters presheaf Sh(Σ). Roughly speaking, we can say that Corbett
et al assign exact values to physical quantities by making the state ‘fuzzy’,
whereas we (and Heunen & Spitter) keep the state sharp, but ascribe ‘fuzzy’
values to physical quantities. Clearly, there are some interesting questions
here for further research.
14.2 The Quantity-Value Object Rφ
Let us turn now to the quantity-value object Rφ. This plays a key role in
the representation of any physical quantity, A, by an arrow Aφ : Σφ → Rφ.
In so far as a ‘thing’ is a bundle of properties, these properties refer to
values of physical quantities, and so the nature of these ‘values’ is of central
importance.
We anticipate that Rφ has many global elements 1τφ → Rφ, and these
can be interpreted as the possible ‘values’ for physical quantities. If Σφ also
has global elements/microstates s : 1τφ → Σφ, then these combine with any
arrow Aφ : Σφ → Rφ to give global elements of Rφ. It seems reasonable
to refer to the element, Aφ ◦ s : 1τφ → Rφ as the ‘value’ of A when the
microstate is s. However, our expectation is that, in general, Σφ may well
have no global elements, in which case the interpretation of Aφ : Σφ → Rφ
in terms of values is somewhat subtler. This has to be done internally using
the language L(τφ) associated with the topos τφ: the overall logical structure
is a nice example of a ‘coherence’ theory of truth [30].
As far as axiomatic properties of Rφ are concerned, the minimal require-
ment is presumably that it should have some ordering property that arises in
all topos representations of the system S. This universal property could be
coded into the internal language, L(S), of S. This implements our intuitive
129This is rather like a Dedekind real number except that the overlap axiom is missing.
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feeling that, in so far as the concept of ‘value’ has any meaning, it must be
possible to say that the value of one quantity is ‘larger’ (or ‘smaller’) than
that of another. It seems reasonable to expect this relation to be transitive,
but that is about all. In particular, we see no reason to suppose that this
relation will always correspond to a total ordering: perhaps there are pairs of
physical quantities whose ‘values’ simply cannot be compared at all. Thus,
tentatively, we can augment L(S) with the axioms for a poset structure on
R.
Beyond this simple ordering property, it becomes less clear what to as-
sume about the quantity-value object. The example of quantum theory shows
that it is wrong to automatically equate Rφ with the real-number object Rφ
in the topos τφ. Indeed, we believe that is almost always the case.
However, this makes it harder to know what to assume of Rφ. The quan-
tum case shows that Rφ may have considerably fewer algebraic properties
than the real-number object Rφ. On a more ‘topological’ front it is attrac-
tive to assume that Rφ is an internal locale in the topos τφ. However, one
should be cautious when conjecturing about Rφ since our discussion of var-
ious possible quantity-value objects in quantum theory depended closely on
the specific details of the spectral structure in this topos.
A more general perspective is given by the work of Heunen and Spitters
[38]. We recall that their starting point is a (non-commutative) C∗-algebra,
A in an ambient topos S. Then they construct the topos of co-presheaves,
SV(A), and show that A is an internal, pre C∗-algebra in this topos. Finally,
they construct the spectrum, Σ, of A and show that it is an internal locale.
Having shown that Σ has the structure of a locale, it is rather natural to
consider the (internal) topos of sheaves, Sh(Σ), over Σ, and then construct
the ‘interval-domain’ object in this topos130. In the case of quantum theory,
they show that this is related to what we have called R↔.
This approach might be a useful tool when looking for ways of axioma-
tising Rφ. Thus, if in any topos representation φ, we assume that the state
object Σφ is an internal local in τφ, we can construct the internal topos Sh(Σφ)
and consider its interval-domain number object. It remains to be seen if this
has any generic use in practice.
130If X is any topological space it is well-known that the real numbers in the topos Sh(X)
are in one-to-one correspondence with elements of the space, C(X,R), of continuous, real-
valued functions on X
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14.3 The Truth Objects T, or Pseudo-State Object Wφ
The truth objects in a topos representation are certain sub-objects of PΣφ.
Their construction will be very theory-dependent, as are the pseudo-states,
and the pseudo-state object, Wφ, if there is one. Each proposition about
the physical system is represented by a sub-object J ⊆ Σφ, and given a
truth-object T ⊆ PΣφ, the generalised truth value of the proposition is
[[ J ∈ T ]] ∈ ΓΩφ; in terms of pseudo-states, w, the generalised truth values
are of the form [[w ⊆ J ]] ∈ ΓΩφ.
The key properties of the quantum truth objects, T |ψ〉, (or pseudo-states
w |ψ〉) can easily be emulated if one is dealing with a more general base
category, C, so that the topos concerned is SetsCop . However, it is not clear
what, if anything, can be said about the structure of truth objects/pseudo-
states in a more generic topos representation.
An attractive possibility is that there is a general analogue of (6.54) in
the form
1τφ PΣφ-
pwq
w Σφ-
?
πφ
(14.1)
and that obstructions to the existence of global elements of the state-object
Σφ can be studied with the aid of this diagram. If there is a pseudo-state
object Wφ then this could be a natural replacement for PΣφ in this diagram.
15 Conclusion
In this long article we have developed the idea that, for any given theory-
type (classical physics, quantum physics, DI-physics,. . . ) the theory of a
particular physical system, S, is to be constructed in the framework of a
certain, system-dependent, topos. The central idea is that a local language,
L(S), is attached to each system S, and that the application of a given
theory-type to S is equivalent to finding a representation, φ, of L(S) in
a topos τφ(S); this is equivalent to finding a translation of L(S) into the
internal language associated with τφ(S); or a functor to τφ(S) from the topos
associated with L(S).
Physical quantities are represented by arrows in the topos from the state
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object Σφ,S to the quantity-value object Rφ,S, and propositions are repre-
sented by sub-objects of the state object. The idea of a ‘truth sub-object’
of PΣφ,S (or a ‘pseudo-state’ sub-object of Σφ,S) then leads to a neo-realist
interpretation of propositions in which each proposition is assigned a truth
value that is a global element of the sub-object classifier Ωτφ(S). In general,
neo-realist statements about the world/system S are to be expressed in the
internal language of the topos τφ(S). Underlying this is the intuitionistic,
deductive logic provided by the local language L(S).
These axioms are based on ideas from the topos representation of quan-
tum theory, which we have discussed in depth. Here, the topos involved is
SetsV(H)
op
: the topos of presheaves over the base category V(H) of com-
mutative, von Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra, B(H), of all bounded
operators on the quantum Hilbert space, H. Each such sub-algebra can
be viewed as a context in which the theory can be viewed from a classi-
cal perspective. Thus a context can be described as a ‘classical snap-shot’,
or ‘window on reality’, or ‘world-view’/weltanschauung. Mathematically, a
context is a ‘stage of truth’: a concept that goes back to Kripke’s use of a
presheaf topos as a model of his intuitionistic view of time and process.
We have shown how the process of ‘daseinisation’ maps projection oper-
ators (and hence equivalent classes of propositions) into sub-objects of the
state-object Σ. We have also shown how this can be extended to an arbitrary,
bounded self-adjoint operator, Aˆ. This produces an arrow A˘ : Σ→ R where
the minimal choice for the quantity-value object, R, is the object R. We
have also argued that, from a physical perspective, it is more attractive to
choose R↔ as the quantity-value presheaf. The significance of these results
is enhanced considerably by the alternative, Heunen & Spitters derivation of
Σ as the spectrum of an internal, commutative algebra. These, and related,
results all encourage the idea that quantum theory can be viewed as classical
theory but in a topos other than the topos of sets, Sets.
Every classical system uses the same topos, Sets. However, in general,
the topos will be system dependent as, for example, is the case with the
quantum topoi of the form SetsV(H)
op
, where H is the Hilbert space of the
system. This leads to the problem of understanding how the topoi for a class
of systems behave under the action of taking a sub-system, or combining
a pair of systems to give a single composite system. We have presented a
set of axioms that capture the general ideas we are trying to develop. Of
course, these axioms are not cast in stone, and are still partly ‘experimental’
in nature. However, we have shown that classical physics exactly fits our sug-
gested scheme, and that quantum physics ‘almost’ does: ‘almost’ because of
the issues concerning the translation representation of the arrows associated
182
with compositions of systems that were discussed in Section 13.3.
An important challenge for future work is to show that our general topos
scheme can be used to develop genuinely new theories of physics, not just to
rewrite old ones in a new language. Of particular interest is the problem with
which we motivated the scheme in the first place: namely, to find tools for
constructing theories that go beyond quantum theory and which do not use
Hilbert spaces, path integrals, or any of the other familiar entities in which
the continuum real and/or complex numbers play a fundamental role.
As we have discussed, the topoi for quantum systems are of the form
SetsV(H)
op
, and hence embody contextual logic in a fundamental way. One
way of going ‘beyond’ quantum theory, while escaping the a priori imposition
of continuum concepts, is to use presheaves over a more general ‘category of
contexts’, C, i.e., develop the theory in the topos SetsCop . Such a structure
embodies contextual, multi-valued logic in an intrinsic way, and in that sense
might be said to encapsulate one of the fundamental insights of quantum
theory. However, and unlike in quantum theory, there is no obligation to use
the real or complex numbers in the construction of the category C.
Indeed, early on in this work we noted that real numbers arise in theories
of physics in three different (but related) ways: (i) as the values of physi-
cal quantities; (ii) as the values of probabilities; and (iii) as a fundamental
ingredient in models of space and time. The first of these is now subsumed
into the quantity-value object Rφ, and which now has no a priori relation
to the real number object in τφ. The second source of real numbers has gone
completely since we no longer have probabilities of propositions but rather
generalised truth values whose values lie in ΓΩτφ . The third source is also
no long binding since models of space and time in a topos could depend on
many things: for example, infinitesimals.
Of course, although true, these remarks do not of themselves give a con-
crete example of a theory that is ‘beyond quantum theory’. On the other
hand, these ideas certainly point in a novel direction, and one at which,
almost certainly, we would not have arrived if the challenge to ‘go beyond
quantum theory’ had been construed only in terms of trying to generalise
Hilbert spaces, path integrals, and the like.
From a more general perspective, other types of topoi are possible realms
for the construction of physical theories. One simple, but mathematically rich
example arises from the theory of M-sets. Here, M is a monoid and, like all
monoids, can be viewed as a category with a single object, and whose arrows
are the elements ofM . Thought of as a category, a monoid is ‘complementary’
to a partially-ordered set. In a monoid, there is only one object, but plenty of
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arrows from that object to itself; whereas in a partially-ordered set there are
plenty of objects, but at most one arrow between any pair of objects. Thus a
partially-ordered set is the most economical category with which to capture
the concept of ‘contextual logic’. On the other hand, the logic associated
with a monoid is non-contextual as there is only one object in the category.
It is easy to see that a functor from M to Sets is just an ‘M-set’: i.e., a
set on which M acts as a monoid of transformations. An arrow between two
such M-sets is an equivariant map between them. In physicists’ language,
one would say that the topos SetsM—usually denoted BM— is the category
of the ‘non-linear realisations’ of M .
The sub-object classifier, ΩBM , in BM is the collection of left ideals inM ;
hence, many of the important constructions in the topos can be handled using
the language of algebra. The topos BM is one of the simplest to define and
work with and, for that reason, it is a popular source of examples in texts on
topos theory. It would be intriguing to experiment with constructing model
theories of physics using one of these simple topoi. One possible use of M-
sets is discussed in [43] in the context of reduction of the state vector, but
there will surely be others.
Is there ‘un gros topos’? It is clear that there are many other topics for
future research. A question that is of particular interest is if there is a single
topos within which all systems of a given theory-type can be discussed. For
example, in the case of quantum theory the relevant topoi are of the form
SetsV(H)
op
, where H is a Hilbert space, and the question is whether all such
topoi can be gathered together to form a single topos (what Grothendieck
termed ‘un gros topos’) within which all quantum systems can be discussed.
There are well-known examples of such constructions in the mathematical
literature. For example, the category, Sh(X), of sheaves on a topological
space X is a topos, and there are collections T of topological spaces which
form a Grothendieck site, so that the topos Sh(T) can be constructed. A
particular object in Sh(T) will then be a sheaf over T whose stalk over any
object X in T will be the topos Sh(X).
For our purposes, the ideal situation would be if the various categories
of systems, Sys, can be chosen in such a way that M(Sys) is a site. Then
the topos of sheaves, Sh(M(Sys)), over this site would provide a common
topos in which all systems of this theory type—i.e., the objects of Sys—can
be discussed. We do not know if this is possible, and it is a natural subject
for future study.
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Some more speculative lines of future research. At a conceptual level,
one motivating desire for the entire research programme was to find a for-
malism that would always give some sort of ‘realist’ interpretation, even in
the case of quantum theory which is normally presented in an instrumental-
ist way. But this particular example raises an interesting point because the
neo-realist interpretation takes place in the topos SetsV(H)
op
, whereas the
instrumentalist interpretation works in the familiar topos Sets of sets, and
one might wonder how universal is the use of a pair of topoi in this way.
Another, related, issue concerns the representation of the PL(S)-propositions
of the form “Aε∆” discussed in Section 5. This serves as a bridge between
the ‘external’ world of a background spatial structure, and the internal world
of the topos. This link is not present with the L(S) language whose proposi-
tions are purely internal terms of type Ω of the form ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’. In a topos
representation, φ, of L(S), these become propositions of the form ‘A ∈ Ξ’,
where Ξ is a sub-object of Rφ.
In general, if we have an example of our axioms working neo-realistically
in a topos τ , one might wonder if there is an ‘instrumentalist’ interpretation
of the same theory in a different topos, τi, say? Of course, the word ‘in-
strumentalism’ is used metaphorically here, and any serious consideration of
such a pair (τ, τi) would require a lot of very careful thought.
However, if a pair (τ, τi) does exist, the question then arises of whether
there is a categorial way of linking the neo-realist and instrumentalist inter-
pretations: for example, via a functor I : τ → τi. If so, is this related to
some analogue of the daseinisation operation that produced the representa-
tion of the PL(S)-propositions, “Aε∆” in quantum theory? Care is needed
in discussing such issues since informal set theory is used as a meta-language
in constructing a topos, and one has to be careful not to confuse this with
the existence, or otherwise, of an ‘instrumentalist’ interpretation of any given
representation.
If such a functor, I : τ → τi, did exist then one could speculate on the
possibility of finding an ‘interpolating chain’ of functors
τ → τ 1 → τ 2 → · · · → τn → τi (15.1)
which could be interpreted conceptually as corresponding to an interpolation
between the philosophical views of realism and instrumentalism!
Even more speculatively one might wonder if “one person’s realism is
another person’s instrumentalism”. More precisely, given a pair (τ, τi) in the
sense above, could there be cases in which the topos τ carries a neo-realist
interpretation of a theory with respect to an instrumentalist interpretation in
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τi, whilst being the carrier of an instrumentalist interpretation with respect
to the neo-realism of a ‘higher’ topos; and so on? For example, is there
some theory whose ‘instrumentalist manifestation‘ takes place in the topos
SetsV(H)
op
?
On the other hand, one might want to say that ‘instrumentalist’ interpre-
tations always take place in the world of classical set theory, so that τi should
always be chosen to be Sets. In any event, it would be interesting to study
the quantum case more closely to see if there are any categorial relations be-
tween the formulation in SetsV(H)
op
and the instrumentalism interpretation
in Sets. It can be anticipated that the action of daseinisation will play an
important role here.
All this is, perhaps131, rather speculative but there is a more obvious
situation in which a double-topos structure will be necessary, irrespective of
philosophical musings on instrumentalism. This is if one wants to discuss
the ‘classical limit’ of some topos theory. In this case this limit will exist in
the topos, Sets, and this must be used in addition to the topos of the basic
theory. A good example of this, of course, is the topos of quantum theory
discussed in this article. If, pace Landsmann, one thinks of ‘quantisation’
as a functor from Sets to SetsV(H)
op
, then the classical limit will perhaps
involve a functor going in the opposite direction.
Implications for quantum gravity. A serious claim stemming from our
work is that a successful theory of quantum gravity should be constructed
in some topos U—the ‘topos of the universe’—that is not the topos of sets.
All entities of physical interest will be represented in this topos, including
models for space-time (if there are any at a fundamental level in quantum
gravity) and, if relevant, loops, membranes etc. as well as incorporating the
anticipated generalisation of quantum theory.
Such a theory of quantum gravity will have a neo-realist interpretation in
the topos U , and hence would be particularly useful in the context of quantum
cosmology. However, in practice, physicists divide the world up into smaller,
more easily handled, chunks, and each of them would correspond to what
earlier we have called a ‘system’ and, correspondingly, would have its own
topos. Thus U is something like the ‘gros topos’ of the theory, and would
combine together the individual ‘sub-systems’ in a categorial way. Of course,
it is most unlikely that there is any preferred way of dividing the universe up
into bite-sized chunks, but this is not problematic as the ensuing relativism
is naturally incorporated into the idea of a Grothendieck site.
131To be honest, the ‘perhaps’ should really be replaced by ‘highly’.
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16 Appendix 1: Some Theorems and Con-
structions Used in the Main Text
16.1 Results on Clopen Subobjects of Σ.
Theorem 16.1 The collection, Subcl(Σ), of all clopen sub-objects of Σ is a
Heyting algebra.
Proof. First recall how a Heyting algebra structure is placed on the set,
Sub(Σ), of all sub-objects of Σ.
The ‘∨’- and ‘∧’-operations. Let S, T be two sub-objects of Σ. Then
the ‘∨’ and ‘∧’ operations are defined by
(S ∨ T )V := SV ∪ T V (16.1)
(S ∧ T )V := SV ∩ T V (16.2)
for all contexts V . It is easy to see that if S and T are clopen sub-objects of
Σ, then so are S ∨ T and S ∧ T .
The zero and unit elements. The zero element in the Heyting algebra
Sub(Σ) is the empty sub-object 0 := {∅V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}, where ∅V is
the empty subset of ΣV . The unit element in Sub(Σ) is Σ. It is clear that
both 0 and Σ are clopen sub-objects of Σ.
The ‘⇒’-operation. The most interesting part is the definition of the
implication S ⇒ T . For all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), it is given by
(S ⇒ T )V := {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V, if
Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ SV ′ then Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ T V ′} (16.3)
= {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V, if
λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′ then λ|V ′ ∈ T V ′}. (16.4)
Since ¬S := S ⇒ 0, the expression for negation follows from the above
as
(¬S)V = {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V, Σ(iV ′V )(λ) /∈ SV ′} (16.5)
= {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V, λ|V ′ /∈ SV ′}. (16.6)
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We rewrite the formula for negation as
(¬S)V =
⋂
V ′⊆V
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ ScV ′
}
(16.7)
where SV ′
c denotes the complement of SV ′ in ΣV ′ . Clearly, SV ′
c is clopen in
ΣV ′ since SV ′ is clopen. Since the restriction Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ is continu-
ous and surjective132, it is easy to see that the inverse image Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c)
is clopen in ΣV . Clearly,
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) =
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′c
}
(16.8)
and so, from (16.7) we have
(¬S)V =
⋂
V ′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) (16.9)
The problem is that we want (¬S)V to be a clopen subset of ΣV . Now
the right hand side of (16.9) is the intersection of a family, parameterised by
{V ′ | V ′ ⊆ V }, of clopen sets. Such an intersection is always closed, but it is
only guaranteed to be open if {V ′ | V ′ ⊆ V } is a finite set, which of course
may not be the case.
If V ′′ ⊆ V ′ and λ|V ′′ ∈ SV ′′c, then λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′c. Indeed, if we had λ|V ′ ∈
SV ′, then (λ|V ′)|V ′′ = λ|V ′′ ∈ SV ′′ by the definition of a sub-object, so we
would have a contradiction. This implies Σ(iV ′′V )
−1(SV ′′
c) ⊆ Σ(iV ′V )−1(SV ′c),
and hence the right hand side of (16.9) is a decreasing net of clopen subsets
of ΣV which converges to something, which we take as the subset of ΣV that
is to be (¬S)V .
Here we have used the fact that the set of clopen subsets of ΣV is a
complete lattice, where the minimum of a family (Ui)i∈I of clopen subsets is
defined as the interior of
⋂
i∈I Ui. This leads us to define
(¬S)V := int
⋂
V ′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) (16.10)
= int
⋂
V ′⊆V
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ (SV ′c)
}
(16.11)
as the negation in Subcl(Σ). This modified definition guarantees that ¬S
is a clopen sub-object. A straightforward extension of this method gives a
consistent definition of S ⇒ T .
132See proof of Theorem 16.2 below.
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This concludes the proof of the theorem.
The following theorem shows the relation between the restriction map-
pings of the outer presheaf O and those of the spectral presheaf Σ. We
basically follow de Groote’s proof of Prop. 3.22 in [33] and show that this
result, which uses quite a different terminology, actually gives the desired
relation.
Theorem 16.2 Let V, V ′ ∈ Ob(V(H)) such that V ′ ⊂ V . Then
SO(iV ′V )(δo(Pˆ )V ) = Σ(iV
′V )(Sδo(Pˆ )V ). (16.12)
Proof. First of all, to simplify notation, we can replace δo(Pˆ )V by Pˆ (which
amounts to the assumption that Pˆ ∈ P(V ). This does not play a roˆle for
the current argument). By definition, O(iV ′V )
(
Pˆ
)
= δo(Pˆ )V ′ , so we have to
show that Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ = Σ(iV
′V )(SPˆ ) holds.
If λ ∈ SPˆ , then λ(Pˆ ) = 1, which implies λ(Qˆ) = 1 for all Qˆ ≥ Pˆ . In
particular, λ(δo(Pˆ )V ′) = 1, so Σ(iV ′V )(λ) = λ|V ′ ∈ Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ . This shows that
Σ(iV ′V )(SPˆ ) ⊆ Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ .
To show the converse inclusion, let λ′ ∈ Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ , which means that
λ′(δo(Pˆ )V ′) = 1. We have Pˆ ∈ O(iV ′V )−1(δo(Pˆ )V ′). Let
Fλ′ := {Qˆ ∈ P(V ′) | λ′(Qˆ) = 1} = λ′−1(1) ∩ P(V ′). (16.13)
As shown in section 8.3, Fλ′ is an ultrafilter in the projection lattice P(V ′).133
The idea is to show that Fλ′∪ Pˆ is a filter base in P(V ) that can be extended
to an ultrafilter, which corresponds to an element of the Gel’fand spectrum
of V .
Let us assume that Fλ′ ∪ Pˆ is not a filter base in P(V ). Then there exists
some Qˆ ∈ Fλ′ such that
Qˆ ∧ Pˆ = QˆPˆ = 0ˆ, (16.14)
which implies Pˆ ≤ 1ˆ− Qˆ, so
O(iV ′V )(Pˆ ) = δ
o(Pˆ )V ′ ≤ O(iV ′V )(1ˆ− Qˆ) = 1ˆ− Qˆ (16.15)
and hence we get the contradiction
1 = λ′(δo(Pˆ )V ′) ≤ λ′(1ˆ− Qˆ) = 0. (16.16)
133In general, each ultrafilter F in the projection lattice of an abelian von Neumann
algebra V corresponds to a unique element λF of the Gel’fand spectrum of V . The
ultrafilter is the collection of all those projections that are mapped to 1 by λ, i.e., F =
λ−1F (1) ∩ P(V ).
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By Zorn’s lemma, the filter base Fλ′∪ Pˆ is contained in some (not necessarily
unique) maximal filter base in P(V ). Such a maximal filter base is an ul-
trafilter and thus corresponds to an element λ of the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV
of V . Since Pˆ is contained in the ultrafilter, we have λ(Pˆ ) = 1, so λ ∈ SPˆ .
By construction, Σ(iV ′V )(λ) = λ|V ′ = λ′ ∈ Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ , the element of ΣV ′ we
started from. This shows that Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ ⊆ Σ(iV ′V )(SPˆ ), and we obtain
Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ = Σ(iV
′V )(SPˆ ). (16.17)
It is well-known that every state λ′ ∈ ΣV ′ is of the form λ′ = Σ(iV ′V )(λ) =
λ|V ′ for some λ ∈ ΣV . This implies
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ ) = Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ ⊆ ΣV . (16.18)
Note that on the right hand side, Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ (and not SPˆ , which is a smaller set
in general) shows up.
De Groote has shown in [33] that for any unital abelian von Neumann
algebra V , the clopen sets SQˆ, Qˆ ∈ P(V ), form a base of the Gel’fand
topology on ΣV . Formulas (16.17) and (16.18) hence show that the restriction
mappings
Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′
λ 7→ λ|V ′
of the spectral presheaf are open and continuous. Using continuity, it is easy
to see that Σ(iV ′V ) is also closed: let C ⊆ ΣV be a closed subset. Since ΣV is
compact, C is compact, and since Σ(iV ′V ) is continuous, Σ(iV ′V )(C) ⊆ ΣV ′
is compact, too. However, ΣV ′ is Hausdorff, and so Σ(iV ′V )(C) is closed in
ΣV ′.
16.2 The Grothendieck k-Construction for an Abelian
Monoid
Let us briefly review the Grothendieck construction for an abelian monoid
M .
Definition 16.1 A group completion of M is an abelian group k(M) to-
gether with a monoid map θ : M → k(M) that is universal. Namely, given
any monoid morphism φ :M → G, where G is an abelian group, there exists
a unique group morphism φ′ : k(M) → G such that φ factors through φ′;
i.e., we have the commutative diagram
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with φ = φ′ ◦ θ.
It is easy to see that any such k(M) is unique up to isomorphism.
To prove existence, first take the set of all pairs (a, b) ∈M ×M , each of
which is to be thought of heuristically as a− b. Then, note that if inverses
existed in M , we would have a− b = c− d if and only if a+ d = c+ b. This
suggests defining an equivalence relation on M ×M in the following way:
(a, b) ≡ (c, d) iff ∃g ∈M such that a+ d+ g = b+ c + g. (16.19)
Definition 16.2 The Grothendieck completion of an abelian monoid M is
the pair (k(M), θ) defined as follows:
(i) k(M) is the set of equivalence classes [a, b], where the equivalence rela-
tion is defined in (16.19). A group law on k(M) is defined by
(i) [a, b] + [c, d] := [a + c, b+ d], (16.20)
(ii) 0k(M) := [0M , 0M ], (16.21)
(iii) − [a, b] := [b, a], (16.22)
where 0M is the unit in the abelian monoid M .
(ii) The map θ :M → k(M) is defined by
θ(a) := [a, 0] (16.23)
for all a ∈M .
It is straightforward to show that (i) these definitions are independent of
the representative elements in the equivalence classes; (ii) the axioms for a
group are satisfied; and (iii) the map θ is universal in the sense mentioned
above.
It is also clear that k is a functor from the category of abelian monoids to
the category of abelian groups. For, if f : M1 → M2 is a morphism between
abelian monoids, define k(f) : k(M1) → k(M2) by k(f)[a, b] := [f(a), f(b)]
for all a, b ∈M1.
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16.3 Functions of Bounded Variation and ΓR
These techniques will now be applied to the set, ΓR, of global elements
of R. We could equally well consider ΓR↔ and its k-extension, but this
would just make the notation more complex, so in this and the following
subsections, we will mainly concentrate on ΓR (resp. R). The results can
easily be extended to ΓR↔ (resp. R↔).
It was discussed in Section 8.2 how global elements of R↔ are in one-to-
one correspondence with pairs (µ, ν) consisting of an order-preserving and
an order-reversing function on the category V(H); i.e., with functions µ :
Ob(V(H)) → R such that, for all V1, V2 ∈ Ob(V(H)), if V2 ⊆ V1 then
µ(V2) ≤ µ(V1) and ν : Ob(V(H))→ R such that, for all V1, V2 ∈ Ob(V(H)),
if V2 ⊆ V1 then ν(V2) ≥ ν(V1); see (8.75). The monoid law on ΓR↔ is given
by (8.79).
Clearly, global elements of R are given by order-reversing functions ν :
V(H) → R, and ΓR is an abelian monoid in the obvious way. Hence the
Grothendieck construction can be applied to give an abelian group k(ΓR).
This is defined to be the set of equivalence classes [ν, κ] where ν, κ ∈ ΓR,
and where (ν1, κ1) ≡ (ν2, κ2) if, and only if, there exists α ∈ ΓR, such that
ν1 + κ2 + α = κ1 + ν2 + α (16.24)
Since ΓR has a cancellation law, we have (ν1, κ1) ≡ (ν2, κ2) if, and only if,
ν1 + κ2 = κ1 + ν2. (16.25)
Intuitively, we can think of [ν, κ] as being ‘ν−κ’, and embed ΓR in k(ΓR)
by ν 7→ [ν, 0]. However, ν, κ are R-valued functions on Ob(V(H)) and hence,
in this case, the expression ‘ν − κ’ also has a literal meaning: i.e., as the
function (ν − κ)(V ) := ν(V )− κ(V ) for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
This is not just a coincidence of notation. Indeed, let F
(
Ob(V(H)),R)
denote the set of all real-valued functions on Ob(V(H)). Then we can con-
struct the map,
j : k(ΓR) → F (Ob(V(H)),R) (16.26)
[ν, κ] 7→ ν − κ
which is well-defined on equivalence classes.
It is easy to see that the map in (16.26) is injective. This raises the
question of the image in F
(
Ob(V(H)),R) of the map j: i.e., what types of
real-valued function on Ob(V(H)) can be written as the difference between
two order-reversing functions?
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For functions f : R → R, it is a standard result that a function can be
written as the difference between two monotonic functions if, and only if, it
has bounded variation. The natural conjecture is that a similar result applies
here. To show this, we proceed as follows.
Let f : Ob(V(H))→ R be a real-valued function on the set of objects in
the category V(H). At each V ∈ Ob(V(H)), consider a finite chain
C := {V0, V1, V2, . . . , Vn−1, V | V0 ⊂ V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Vn−1 ⊂ V } (16.27)
of proper subsets, and define the variation of f on this chain to be
Vf(C) :=
n∑
j=1
|f(Vj)− f(Vj−1)| (16.28)
where we set Vn := V . Now take the supremum of Vf (C) for all such chains
C. If this is finite, we say that f has a bounded variation and define
If (V ) := sup
C
Vf(C) (16.29)
Then it is clear that (i) V 7→ If (V ) is an order-preserving function on
Ob(V(H)); (ii) f − If is an order-reversing function on Ob(V(H)); and (iii)
−If is an order-reversing function on Ob(V(H)). Thus, any function, f , of
bounded variation can be written as
f ≡ (f − If )− (−If ) (16.30)
which is the difference of two order-reversing functions; i.e., f can be ex-
pressed as the difference of two elements of ΓR.
Conversely, it is a straightforward modification of the proof for functions
f : R → R, to show that if f : Ob(V(H))→ R is the difference of two order-
reversing functions, then f is of bounded variation. The conclusion is that
k(ΓR) is in bijective correspondence with the set, BV(Ob(V(H)),R), of
functions f : Ob(V(H))→ R of bounded variation.
16.4 Taking Squares in k(ΓR)
We can now think of k(ΓR) in two ways: (i) as the set of equivalence
classes [ν, κ], of elements ν, κ ∈ ΓR; and (ii) as the set, BV(Ob(V(H)),R),
of differences ν − κ of such elements.
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As expected, BV(Ob(V(H)),R) is an abelian group. Indeed: suppose
α = ν1 − κ1 and β = ν2 − κ2 with ν1, ν2, κ1, κ2 ∈ ΓR, then
α + β = (ν1 + ν2)− (κ1 + κ2) (16.31)
Hence α + β belongs to BV(Ob(V(H)),R) since ν1 + ν2 and κ1 + κ2 belong
to ΓR.
The definition of [ν, 0]2. We will now show how to take the square of
elements of k(ΓR) that are of the form [ν, 0]. Clearly, ν2 is well-defined as
a function on Ob(V(H)), but it may not belong to ΓR. Indeed, if ν(V ) < 0
for any V , then the function V 7→ ν2(V ) can get smaller as V gets smaller,
so it is order-preserving instead of order-reversing.
This suggests the following strategy. First, define functions ν+ and ν− by
ν+(V ) :=
{
ν(V ) if ν(V ) ≥ 0
0 if ν(V ) < 0
(16.32)
and
ν−(V ) :=
{
0 if ν(V ) ≥ 0
ν(V ) if ν(V ) < 0.
(16.33)
Clearly, ν(V ) = ν+(V ) + ν−(V ) for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Also, for all V ,
ν+(V )ν−(V ) = 0, and hence
ν(V )2 = ν+(V )
2 + ν−(V )
2 (16.34)
However, (i) the function V 7→ ν+(V )2 is order-reversing; and (ii) the function
V 7→ ν−(V )2 is order-preserving. But then V 7→ −ν−(V )2 is order-reversing.
Hence, by rewriting (16.34) as
ν(V )2 = ν+(V )
2 − (−ν−(V )2) (16.35)
we see that the function V 7→ ν2(V ) := ν(V )2 is an element of BV(Ob(V(H)),R).
In terms of k(ΓR), we can define
[ν, 0]2 := [ν2+,−ν2−] (16.36)
which belongs to k(ΓR). Hence, although there exist ν ∈ ΓR that have
no square in ΓR, such global elements of R do have squares in the k-
completion, k(ΓR). On the level of functions of bounded variation, we have
shown that the square of a monotonic (order-reversing) function is a function
of bounded variation.
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On the other hand, we cannot take the square of an arbitrary element
[ν, κ] ∈ ΓR, since the square of a function of bounded variation need not be
a function of bounded variation.134
16.5 The Object k(R) in the Topos SetsV(H)
op
.
16.5.1 The Definition of k(R).
The next step is to translate these results about the set k(ΓR) into the
construction of an object k(R) in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. We anticipate that,
if this can be done, then k(ΓR) ≃ Γk(R).
As was discussed in Section (8.2), the presheaf R is defined at each stage
V by
RV := {ν :↓V → R | ν ∈ OR(↓V,R)}. (16.37)
If iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , then the presheaf map from RV to RV ′ is just the
restriction of the order-reversing functions from ↓V to ↓V ′.
The first step in constructing k(R) is to define an equivalence relation
on pairs of functions, ν, κ ∈ RV , for each stage V , by saying that (ν1, κ1) ≡
(ν2, κ2) if, and only, there exists α ∈ RV such that
ν1(V
′) + κ2(V
′) + α(V ′) = κ1(V
′) + ν2(V
′) + α(V ′) (16.38)
for all V ′ ⊆ V .
Definition 16.3 The presheaf k(R) is defined over the category V(H) in
the following way.
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)):
k(R)V := {[ν, κ] | ν, κ ∈ OR(↓V,R)}, (16.39)
where [ν, κ] denotes the k-equivalence class of (ν, κ).
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The arrow k(R)(iV ′V ) : k(R)V →
k(R)V ′ is given by
(
k(R)(iV ′V )
)
([ν, κ]) := [ν|V ′, κ|V ′] for all [ν, κ] ∈
k(R)V .
134We have to consider functions like (ν++ν−−(κ++κ−))2, which contains terms of the
form ν+κ− and ν−κ+: in general, these are neither order-preserving nor order-reversing.
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It is straightforward to show that k(R) is an abelian group-object in the
topos SetsV(H)
op
. In particular, an arrow + : k(R) × k(R) → k(R) is
defined at each stage V by
+V
(
[ν1, κ1], [ν2, κ2]
)
:= [ν1 + ν2, κ1 + κ2] (16.40)
for all
(
[ν1, κ1], [ν2, κ2]
) ∈ k(R)V × k(R)V . It is easy to see that (i)
Γk(R) ≃ k(ΓR); and (ii) R is a sub-object of k(R) in the topos SetsV(H)op .
16.5.2 The Presheaf k(R) as the Quantity-Value Object.
We can now identify k(R) as a possible quantity-value object in SetsV(H)
op
.
To each bounded, self-adjoint operator Aˆ, there is an arrow [δ˘o(Aˆ)] : Σ →
k(R), given by first sending Aˆ ∈ B(H)sa to δ˘o(Aˆ) and then taking k-
equivalence classes. More precisely, one takes the monic ι : R →֒ k(R)
and then constructs ι ◦ δ˘o(Aˆ) : Σ→ k(R).
Since, for each stage V , the elements in the image of [δ˘o(Aˆ)]V = (ι ◦
δ˘o(Aˆ))V are of the form [ν, 0], ν ∈ RV , their square is well-defined. From a
physical perspective, the use of k(R) rather than R renders possible the
definition of things like the ‘intrinsic dispersion’, ∇(Aˆ) := δ˘o(Aˆ2) − δ˘o(Aˆ)2;
see (9.4).
16.5.3 The square of an arrow [δ˘o(Aˆ)].
An arrow [δ˘o(Aˆ)] : Σ → k(R) is constructed by first forming the outer
daseinisation δ˘o(Aˆ) of Aˆ, which is an arrow from Σ to R, and then composing
with the monic arrow from R to k(R). Since only outer daseinisation is
used, for each V ∈ V(H) and each λ ∈ ΣV one obtains an element of k(R)V
of the form [δo(Aˆ)V (λ), 0]. We saw how to take the square of these functions,
and applying this to all λ ∈ ΣV and all V ∈ V(H), we get the square [δ˘o(Aˆ)]2
of the arrow [δ˘o(Aˆ)].
If we consider an arrow of the form δ˘(Aˆ) : Σ→ R↔, then the construction
involves both inner and outer daseinisation, see Theorem 8.2. For each V
and each λ ∈ ΣV , we obtain a pair of functions (δi(Aˆ)V (λ), δo(Aˆ)V (λ)), which
are both not constantly 0 in general. There is no canonical way to take the
square of these in R↔V . Going to the k-extension k(R
↔) of R↔ does not
improve the situation, so we cannot define the square of an arrow δ˘(Aˆ) (or
[δ˘(Aˆ)] in general.
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17 Appendix 2: A Short Introduction to the
Relevant Parts of Topos Theory
17.1 What is a Topos?
It is impossible to give here more than the briefest of introductions to topos
theory. At the danger of being highly imprecise, we restrict ourselves to
mentioning some aspects of this well-developed mathematical theory and
give a number of pointers to the literature. The aim merely is to give a very
rough idea of the structure and internal logic of a topos.
There are a number of excellent textbooks on topos theory, and the reader
should consult at least one of them. We found the following books useful:
[54, 29, 56, 48, 8, 52].
Topos theory is a remarkably rich branch of mathematics which can be
approached from a variety of different viewpoints. The basic area of mathe-
matics is category theory; where, we recall, a category consists of a collection
of objects and a collection of morphisms (or arrows).
In the special case of the category of sets, the objects are sets, and a
morphism is a function between a pair of sets. In general, each morphism f
in a category is associated with a pair of objects135, known as its ‘domain’
and ‘codomain’, and is written as f : B → A where B and A are the domain
and codomain respectively. Note that this arrow notation is used even if
f is not a function in the normal set-theoretic sense. A key ingredient in
the definition of a category is that if f : B → A and g : C → B (i.e., the
codomain of g is equal to the domain of f) then f and g can be ‘composed’
to give an arrow f ◦ g : C → A; in the case of the category of sets, this is
just the usual composition of functions.
A simple example of a category is given by any partially-ordered set
(‘poset’) C: (i) the objects are defined to be the elements of C; and (ii) if
p, q ∈ C, a morphism from p to q is defined to exist if, and only if, p  q in
the poset structure. Thus, in a poset regarded as a category, there is at most
one morphism between any pair of objects p, q ∈ C; if it exists, we shall write
this morphism as ipq : p→ q. This example is important for us in form of the
‘category of contexts’, V(H), in quantum theory. The objects in V(H) are
the commutative, unital136 von Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra, B(H),
135The collection of all objects in category, C, is denoted Ob(C). The collection of arrows
from B to A is denoted HomC
(
B,A
)
. We will only be interested in ‘small’ categories in
which both these collections are sets (rather than the, more general, classes.)
136‘Unital’ means that all these algebras contain the identity operator 1ˆ ∈ B(H).
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of all bounded operators on the Hilbert space H.
Topoi as mathematical universes. Every (elementary) topos τ can be
seen as a mathematical universe. As a category, a topos τ possesses a number
of structures that generalise constructions that are possible in the category,
Sets, of sets and functions.137 Namely, in Sets, we can construct new sets
from given ones in several ways. Specifically, let S, T be two sets, then we
can form the cartesian product S × T , the disjoint union S ∐ T and the
exponential ST—the set of all functions from T to S.
These constructions turn out to be fundamental, and they can all be
phrased in an abstract, categorical manner, where they are called the ‘prod-
uct’, ‘co-product’ and ‘exponential’, respectively. By definition, in a topos
τ , these operations always exist. The first and second of these properties are
called ‘finite completeness’ and ‘finite co-completeness’, respectively.
One consequence of the existence of finite limits is that each topos, τ , has
a terminal object, denoted by 1τ . This is characterised by the property that
for any object A in the topos τ , there exists exactly one arrow from A to 1τ .
In Sets, any one-element set 1 = {∗} is terminal.138
Of course, Sets is a topos, too, and it is precisely the topos which usually
plays the roˆle of our mathematical universe, since we construct our mathe-
matical objects starting from sets and functions between them. As a slogan,
we have: a topos τ is a category with ‘certain crucial’ properties that are
similar to those in Sets. A very nice and gentle introduction to these aspects
of topos theory is the book [54]. Other good sources are [29, 55].
In order to ‘do mathematics’, one must also have a logic, including a
deductive system. Each topos comes equipped with an internal logic, which is
of intuitionistic type. We will now very briefly sketch the main characteristics
of intuitionistic logic and the mathematical structures in a topos that realise
this logic.
The sub-object classifier. Let X be a set, and let P (X) be the power set
of X; i.e., the set of subsets of X. Given a subset K ∈ P (X), one can ask for
each point x ∈ X whether or not it lies in K. Thus there is the characteristic
137More precisely, small sets and functions between them. Small means that we do not
have proper classes. One must take care in these foundational issues to avoid problems
like Russell’s paradox.
138Like many categorical constructions, the terminal object is fixed only up to isomor-
phism: all one-element sets are isomorphic to each other, and any of them can serve as a
terminal object. Nonetheless, one speaks of the terminal object.
198
function χK : X → {0, 1} of K, which is defined as
χK(x) :=
{
1 if x ∈ K
0 if x /∈ K (17.1)
for all x ∈ X; cf. (6.2). The two-element set {0, 1} plays the roˆle of a set of
truth-values for propositions (of the form “x ∈ K”). Clearly, 1 corresponds
to ‘true’, 0 corresponds to ‘false’, and there are no other possibilities. This is
an argument about sets, so it takes place in, and uses the logic of, the topos
Sets of sets and functions. Sets is a Boolean topos, in which the familiar
two-valued logic and the axiom (∗) hold. (This does not contradict the fact
that the internal logic of topoi is intuitionistic, since Boolean logic is a special
case of intuitionistic logic.)
In an arbitrary topos, τ , there is a special object Ωτ , called the sub-object
classifier, that takes the roˆle of the set {0, 1} ≃ {false, true} of truth-values.
Let B be an object in the topos, and let A be a sub-object of B. This means
that there is a monic A → B,139 (this is the categorical generalisation of
the inclusion of a subset K into a larger set X). As in the case of Sets,
we can also characterise A as a sub-object of B by an arrow from B to the
sub-object classifier Ωτ ; in Sets, this arrow is the characteristic function
χK : X → {0, 1} of (17.1). Intuitively, this ‘characteristic arrow’ from B to
Ωτ describes how A ‘lies in’ B. The textbook definition is:
Definition 17.1 In a category τ with finite limits, a sub-object classifier is
an object Ωτ , together with a monic true : 1τ → Ωτ , such that to every monic
m : A→ B in τ there is a unique arrow χA : B → Ωτ which, with the given
monic, forms a pullback square
B Ωτ-χA
A 1τ-
?
?
m
?
?
true
In Sets, the arrow true : 1 → {0, 1} is given by true(∗) = 1. In general,
the sub-object classifier, Ωτ , need not be a set, since it is an object in the
topos τ , and the objects of τ need not be sets. Nonetheless, there is an
139A monic is the categorical version of an injective function. In the topos Sets, monics
exactly are injective functions.
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abstract notion of elements (or points) in category theory that we can use.
Then the elements of Ωτ are the truth-values available in the internal logic
of our topos τ , just like ‘false’ and ‘true’, the elements of {false, true}, are
the truth-values available in the topos Sets.
To understand the abstract notion of elements, let us consider sets for a
moment. Let 1 = {∗} be a one-element set, the terminal object in Sets. Let
S be a set and consider an arrow e from 1 to S. Clearly, (i) e(∗) ∈ S is an
element of S; and (ii) the set of all functions from 1 to S corresponds exactly
to the set of all elements of S.
This idea can be generalised to any category that has a terminal object 1.
More precisely, an element of an object A is defined to be an arrow from 1 to
A in the category. For example, in the definition of the sub-object classifier
the arrow ‘true : 1τ → Ωτ ’ is an element of Ωτ . It may happen that an
object A has no elements, i.e., there are no arrows 1τ → A. It is common to
consider arrows from subobjects U of A to A as generalised elements.
As mentioned above, the elements of the sub-object classifier, understood
as the arrows 1τ → Ωτ , are the truth-values. Moreover, the set of these
arrows forms a Heyting algebra (see, for example, section 8.3 in [29]). This
is how (the algebraic representation of) intuitionistic logic manifests itself in
a topos. Another, closely related fact is that the set, Sub(A), of sub-objects
of any object A in a topos forms a Heyting algebra.
The definition of a topos. Let us pull together these various remarks
and list the most important properties of a topos, τ , for our purposes:
1. There is a terminal object 1τ in τ . Thus, given any object A in the
topos, there is a unique arrow A→ 1τ .
For any object A in the topos, an arrow 1τ → A is called a global
element of A. The set of all global elements of A is denoted ΓA.
Given A,B ∈ Ob(τ), there is a product A × B in τ . In fact, a topos
always has pull-backs, and the product is just a special case of this.140
2. There is an initial object 0τ in τ . This means that given any object A
in the topos, there is a unique arrow 0τ → A.
Given A,B ∈ Ob(τ), there is a co-product A ⊔ B in τ . In fact, a
topos always has push-outs, and the co-product is just a special case of
this.141
140The conditions in 1. above are equivalent to saying that τ is finitely complete.
141The conditions in 2. above are equivalent to saying that τ is finitely co-complete.
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3. There is exponentiation: i.e., given objects A,B in τ we can form an
object AB, which is the topos analogue of the set of functions from B
to A in set theory. The definitive property of exponentiation is that,
given any object C, there is an isomorphism
Homτ
(
C,AB
) ≃ Homτ(C × B,A) (17.2)
that is natural in A and C; i.e., it is ‘well-behaved’ under morphisms
of the objects involved.
4. There is a sub-object classifier Ωτ .
17.2 Presheaves on a Poset
To illustrate the main ideas, we will first give a few definitions from the
theory of presheaves on a partially ordered set (or ‘poset’); in the case of
quantum theory, this poset is the space of ‘contexts’ in which propositions
are asserted. We shall then use these ideas to motivate the definition of a
presheaf on a general category. Only the briefest of treatments is given here,
and the reader is referred to the standard literature for more information
[29, 56].
A presheaf (also known as a varying set) X on a poset C is a function
that assigns to each p ∈ C, a set Xp; and to each pair p  q (i.e., ipq : p→ q),
a map Xqp : Xq → Xp such that (i) Xpp : Xp → Xp is the identity map idXp
on Xp, and (ii) whenever p  q  r, the composite map Xr
Xrq−→ Xq
Xqp−→ Xp
is equal to Xr
Xrp−→ Xp, i.e.,
Xrp = Xqp ◦Xrq. (17.3)
The notation Xqp is shorthand for the more cumbersome X(ipq); see below
in the definition of a functor.
An arrow, or natural transformation η : X → Y between two presheaves
X, Y on C is a family of maps ηp : Xp → Y p, p ∈ C, that satisfy the
intertwining conditions
ηp ◦Xqp = Y qp ◦ ηq (17.4)
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whenever p  q. This is equivalent to the commutative diagram
Y q Y p-Y qp
Xq Xp-
Xqp
?
ηq
?
ηp
(17.5)
It follows from these basic definitions, that a sub-object of a presheaf X
is a presheaf K, with an arrow i : K → X such that (i) Kp ⊆ Xp for all
p ∈ C; and (ii) for all p  q, the map Kqp : Kq → Kp is the restriction of
Xqp : Xq → Xp to the subset Kq ⊆ Xq. This is shown in the commutative
diagram
Xq Xp-Xqp
Kq Kp-
Kqp
? ?
(17.6)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The collection of all presheaves on a poset C forms a category, denoted
SetsC
op
. The arrows/morphisms between presheaves in this category the
arrows (natural transformations) defined above.
17.3 Presheaves on a General Category
The ideas sketched above admit an immediate generalization to the theory
of presheaves on an arbitrary ‘small’ category C (the qualification ‘small’
means that the collection of objects is a genuine set, as is the collection of
all arrows/morphisms between any pair of objects). To make the necessary
definition we first need the idea of a ‘functor’:
The idea of a functor. A central concept is that of a ‘functor’ between
a pair of categories C and D. Broadly speaking, this is an arrow-preserving
function from one category to the other. The precise definition is as follows.
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Definition 17.2 1. A covariant functor F from a category C to a category
D is a function that assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object FA;
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism F (f) : FB → FA
such that F (idA) = idFA; and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
F (f ◦ g) = F (f) ◦ F (g). (17.7)
2. A contravariant functor X from a category C to a category D is a
function that assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object XA;
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism X(f) : XA → XB
such that X(idA) = idXA ; and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
X(f ◦ g) = X(g) ◦X(f). (17.8)
The connection with the idea of a presheaf on a poset is straightforward.
As mentioned above, a poset C can be regarded as a category in its own
right, and it is clear that a presheaf on the poset C is the same thing as a
contravariant functor X from the category C to the category Sets of normal
sets. Equivalently, it is a covariant functor from the ‘opposite’ category142 Cop
to Sets. Clearly, (17.3) corresponds to the contravariant condition (17.8).
Note that mathematicians usually call the objects in C ‘stages of truth’, or
just ‘stages’. For us they are ‘contexts’, ‘classical snap-shops’, or ‘world
views’.
Presheaves on an arbitrary category C. These remarks motivate the
definition of a presheaf on an arbitrary small category C: namely, a presheaf
on C is a covariant functor143 X : Cop → Sets from Cop to the category of sets.
Equivalently, a presheaf is a contravariant functor from C to the category of
sets.
We want to make the collection of presheaves on C into a category, and
therefore we need to define what is meant by a ‘morphism’ between two
presheaves X and Y . The intuitive idea is that such a morphism from X to
142The ‘opposite’ of a category C is a category, denoted Cop, whose objects are the same
as those of C, and whose morphisms are defined to be the opposite of those of C; i.e., a
morphism f : A→ B in Cop is said to exist if, and only if, there is a morphism f : B → A
in C.
143Throughout this series of papers, a presheaf is indicated by a letter that is underlined.
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Y must give a ‘picture’ of X within Y . Formally, such a morphism is defined
to be a natural transformation N : X → Y , by which is meant a family of
maps (called the components of N) NA : XA → Y A, A ∈ Ob(C), such that if
f : B → A is a morphism in C, then the composite map XA NA−→ Y A
Y (f)−→ Y B
is equal to XA
X(f)−→ XB NB−→ Y A. In other words, we have the commutative
diagram
Y A Y B-Y (f)
XA XB-
X(f)
?
NA
?
NB
(17.9)
of which (17.5) is clearly a special case. The category of presheaves on C
equipped with these morphisms is denoted SetsC
op
.
The idea of a sub-object generalizes in an obvious way. Thus we say that
K is a sub-object of X if there is a morphism in the category of presheaves
(i.e., a natural transformation) ι : K → X with the property that, for each A,
the component map ιA : KA → XA is a subset embedding, i.e., KA ⊆ XA.
Thus, if f : B → A is any morphism in C, we get the analogue of the
commutative diagram (17.6):
XA XB-X(f)
KA KB-
K(f)
? ?
(17.10)
where, once again, the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The category of presheaves on C, SetsCop , forms a topos. We do not need
the full definition of a topos; but we do need the idea, mentioned in Section
17.2, that a topos has a sub-object classifier Ω, to which we now turn.
Sieves and the sub-object classifier Ω. Among the key concepts in
presheaf theory is that of a ‘sieve’, which plays a central role in the con-
struction of the sub-object classifier in the topos of presheaves on a category
C.
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A sieve on an object A in C is defined to be a collection S of morphisms
f : B → A in C with the property that if f : B → A belongs to S, and if
g : C → B is any morphism with co-domain B, then f ◦ g : C → A also
belongs to S. In the simple case where C is a poset, a sieve on p ∈ C is any
subset S of C such that if r ∈ S then (i) r  p, and (ii) r′ ∈ S for all r′  r;
in other words, a sieve is nothing but a lower set in the poset.
The presheaf Ω : C → Sets is now defined as follows. If A is an object in
C, then ΩA is defined to be the set of all sieves on A; and if f : B → A, then
Ω(f) : ΩA → ΩB is defined as
Ω(f)(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} (17.11)
for all S ∈ ΩA; the sieve Ω(f)(S) is often written as f ∗(S), and is known as
the pull-back to B of the sieve S on A by the morphism f : B → A.
It should be noted that if S is a sieve on A, and if f : B → A belongs to
S, then from the defining property of a sieve we have
f ∗(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} = {h : C → B} =: ↓B (17.12)
where ↓B denotes the principal sieve on B, defined to be the set of all
morphisms in C whose codomain is B.
If C is a poset, the pull-back operation corresponds to a family of maps
Ωqp : Ωq → Ωp (where Ωp denotes the set of all sieves/lower sets on p in the
poset) defined by Ωqp = Ω(ipq) if ipq : p→ q (i.e., p  q). It is straightforward
to check that if S ∈ Ωq, then
Ωqp(S) :=↓p ∩ S (17.13)
where ↓p := {r ∈ C | r  p}.
A crucial property of sieves is that the set ΩA of sieves on A has the
structure of a Heyting algebra. Specifically, the unit element 1ΩA in ΩA is
the principal sieve ↓A, and the null element 0ΩA is the empty sieve ∅. The
partial ordering in ΩA is defined by S1  S2 if, and only if, S1 ⊆ S2; and the
logical connectives are defined as:
S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2 (17.14)
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2 (17.15)
S1 ⇒ S2 := {f : B → A | ∀g : C → B if f ◦ g ∈ S1 then f ◦ g ∈ S2}(17.16)
As in any Heyting algebra, the negation of an element S (called the pseudo-
complement of S) is defined as ¬S := S ⇒ 0; so that
¬S := {f : B → A | for all g : C → B, f ◦ g 6∈ S}. (17.17)
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It can be shown that the presheaf Ω is a sub-object classifier for the
topos SetsC
op
. That is to say, sub-objects of any object X in this topos
(i.e., any presheaf on C) are in one-to-one correspondence with morphisms
χ : X → Ω. This works as follows. First, let K be a sub-object of X with
an associated characteristic arrow χK : X → Ω. Then, at any stage A in C,
the ‘components’ of this arrow, χKA : XA → ΩA, are defined as
χKA(x) := {f : B → A | X(f)(x) ∈ KB} (17.18)
for all x ∈ XA. That the right hand side of (17.18) actually is a sieve on A
follows from the defining properties of a sub-object.
Thus, in each ‘branch’ of the category C going ‘down’ from the stage A,
χKA(x) picks out the first member B in that branch for which X(f)(x) lies in
the subset KB, and the commutative diagram (17.10) then guarantees that
X(h ◦ f)(x) will lie in KC for all h : C → B. Thus each stage A in C serves
as a possible context for an assignment to each x ∈ XA of a generalised
truth value—a sieve belonging to the Heyting algebra ΩA. This is the sense
in which contextual, generalised truth values arise naturally in a topos of
presheaves.
There is a converse to (17.18): namely, each morphism χ : X → Ω (i.e., a
natural transformation between the presheaves X and Ω) defines a sub-object
Kχ of X via
KχA := χ
−1
A {1ΩA}. (17.19)
at each stage A.
Global elements of a presheaf. For the category of presheaves on C, a
terminal object 1 : C → Sets can be defined by 1A := {∗} at all stages A in
C; if f : B → A is a morphism in C then 1(f) : {∗} → {∗} is defined to be the
map ∗ 7→ ∗. This is indeed a terminal object since, for any presheaf X, we
can define a unique natural transformation N : X → 1 whose components
NA : X(A)→ 1A = {∗} are the constant maps x 7→ ∗ for all x ∈ XA.
As a morphism γ : 1 → X in the topos SetsCop , a global element corre-
sponds to a choice of an element γA ∈ XA for each stage A in C, such that,
if f : B → A, the ‘matching condition’
X(f)(γA) = γB (17.20)
is satisfied.
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